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Abstract
For the past decade the Kosovo has been a subject of conflict. Since June 1999 the 
Province is undergoing the reconstruction of civil society under the direction of the 
United Nations in the form of the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo 
(UNMIK). This thesis analyzes the prospects of developing democratic government in a 
post-conflict Kosovo. On a larger scale, the Kosovo study serves the basis for the analysis 
of the techniques available for the international community to build democracy in 
ethnically divided societies.
The argument of this thesis rests on the premise that in ethnically divided societies 
traditional democratic means are not always able to provide equally meaningful 
participation of minority and majority ethnic groups in government. The lack of 
inclusiveness will contribute to the perpetuation of constant political struggle and general 
instability in a post-conflict zone. Based on the Kosovo study, this thesis argues for the 
need for a conceptual framework for peace-building in ethnically divided societies. The 
framework must channel all international activities in a coherent and comprehensive 
manner towards the goal of democracy-building and stabilization. The thesis suggests 
that such a framework is found in a combination of the UN concept of peace-building and 
a model of consociational democracy -  a system of governance that provides for 
mechanisms of inclusion of minorities in government. According to the model of 
consociational democracy, the governmental structures function according to the 
principles of proportional representation, grand coalition among the leaders of the major 
segments of a society and a right of each segments to veto decisions, which are contrary 
to its interests.
Given the limited experience of the UNMIK to date, there is insufficient data to 
reach definite conclusions about the success or failure of the international approach to 
post-conflict reconstruction. Instead, this thesis evaluates how the approximation to a 
consociational model increases the chances for the development of stable democratic 
government in Kosovo.
x
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
List of Abbreviations
AAK Alliance for the Future of Kosova
AJC Advisory Judicial Commission
BSDAK Bosniacs Party of Democratic Action of Kosova
CEC Central Election Commission
DRSM Democratic Reform Party of Muslims
ECAC Election Complaints and Appeals Sub-Commission
EJS Emergency Judicial System
EU European Union
GIG Citizens’ Initiative of Gora
IAC Interim Advisory Council
ICP International Civilian Police
IOM International Organization for Migration
IQPM Citizens’ Initiative of the Independents of Mitrovica
JAC Joint Advisory Council on Provisional Judicial Appointments
JIAS Joint Interim Administrative Structure
KFOR Kosovo Force
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army
KP Coalition for Independence
KPC Kosovo Protection Corps
KPS Kosovo Police Service
KTC Kosovo Transitional Council
KTHP Turkish People’s Party of Kosova
LDK Democratic League of Kosovo
LNDSH Albanian National Democratic Movement
PQLK Liberal Centre Party of Kosovo
PLK Liberal Party of Kosova
MEC Municipal Election Commission
MTTT Mitrovica Turk Community
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
OMIK OSCE Mission in Kosovo
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDASHK Ashkali Albanian Democratic Party of Kosova
PDK Democratic Party of Kosovo
PGK Provisional Government of Kosova
PRSH Albanian Republican Party
PBKD National Democratic Front of Kosova
PGJK Green Party of Kosova
PLDK Liberal Democratic Party of Kosova
PSDK Social Democratic Party of Kosova
PSHDK Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosova
PRK Republican Party of Kosova
PNDSH Albanian National Democratic Party
RJS Regular Judicial System
SDA Party of Democratic Action of Kosova
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General
UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USD Social Democratic Union
xii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Acknowledgements
Writing this thesis was a hard work (fortunately, sprinkled with some moments of 
enjoyment from the process and from the completed product) not only for me, but also 
for my professors, family and friends. I want to thank all of them for advice and support, 
patience and understanding, inspiration and encouragement.
I am very grateful to my supervisor Professor Leon Trakman and my reader 
Professor Kindred who enormously helped me to develop and improve my thesis. Their 
insightful advice and encouragement to great extent account for the enjoyment that I felt 
during the last stages of writing and satisfaction with the work done. I equally express my 
appreciation to my examiner Professor Richard Devlin for his critical and helpful 
comments.
Thanks go to my mom and dad who probably worried about my project much more 
than I did. Thanks to all my friends for making my stay in Halifax enjoyable (even during 
the last months of intensive writing). Special thanks to Ola and Yehenew who always 
availed their mighty shoulders to cry on and their sharp minds to discuss the issues of my 
thesis. Huge amounts of coffee (and accompanying it conversations) that they regularly 
pumped into me were a necessary source of energy and inspiration without which the 
work would not have been completed yet.
Thanks to the library staff who were always ready to assist with the most incredible 
search demands.
Thanks go to all wonderful people that I met this year for making my life in Halifax 
more colourful and exciting.
xiii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Introduction
One of the most striking contradictions of the contemporary world politics is the 
great advance in the international mechanisms for the promotion and establishment of 
peace and almost equally remarkable “development” of the tools and techniques of war and 
repression. Due to the close interrelation of national, political and economic processes in 
today’s world, internal conflicts perhaps have stronger impact on the neighbouring states 
and on the global atmosphere than they did before. Intervention for the establishment of 
peace may be viewed among the most important tools capable of mitigating the negative 
consequences of internal conflicts. As a result, the utilization of peace operations has 
increased dramatically during the last decade. The development of various forms of peace 
operations, on one hand, has opened new opportunities for conflict resolution, but, on the 
other, has brought new questions about the legal framework for such operations and their 
relative effectiveness and cost.
One of these new and relatively unexplored peace tools is peace-building. The 
idea of peace-building was first introduced in the range of the UN instruments for peace 
in 1992 by An Agenda for Peace.1 However, only in June 1999 (the time of the 
establishment of the United Nations International Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
could we evidence the comprehensive practical implementation of this idea.
It would be wrong to say that the UNMIK is the first, pilot peace-building activity. 
Similar tasks were carried out by the peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Cambodia. 
However, the Kosovo mission represents a qualitatively new effort. Unlike the majority 
of previous missions, it seeks not merely to treat the symptoms of a conflict, but to 
address its sources. This objective requires greater international involvement not only in 
the termination of a conflict and initial restoration of peace in Kosovo, but also in a long­
term reconstruction of state institutions and the development of civil society. This
1 An Agenda for Peace -  Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping: Report o f the 
Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR/SCOR, 47lh Sess., Preliminary List Item 10 at 55, U.N. Docs. 
A/47/277 & S/24111 (1992) [hereinafter An Agenda for Peace].
1
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is probably the first instance o f a mission with such a wide scope of activities - wholesale 
reconstruction of the state2 and society.
This thesis covers only a narrow segment of the multidimensional international 
efforts in the Province -  the development of self-government and the reconstruction of 
the judiciary. In this respect, I discuss the following issues: what measures are available 
for the reconstruction of a stable democratic government in a deeply divided post-conflict 
society; what measures are feasible for the Kosovo situation; and what are the potential 
long-term effects of their application in Kosovo.
My framework for analysis of the Kosovo reconstruction is the synergy of two 
concepts - peace-building and consociationalism. Each of the concepts highlights a 
different aspect of the international activities in Kosovo. The peace-building concept 
provides the framework for the assessment of the institutional arrangement of the 
UNMIK. Consociationalism evaluates how the means adopted by the UNMIK contribute 
to the development of stable democratic government in an ethnically divided Kosovo. 
Consociationalism suggests that stability and democratic governance in an ethnically 
divided society can be achieved only through the employment of special techniques 
which guarantee minority inclusiveness and cooperative decision-making on matters of 
concern to the whole society.
The thesis seeks to capture both theoretical controversies located within the 
discourse of peace-building and practical problems of the Kosovo mission. Chapter I 
reviews the concept of peace-building and consociational democracy. It explores the 
potential benefits of their cooperative utilization and establishes the criteria for the 
evaluation of the UNMIK activities. Chapter II presents a theoretical debate over the legal 
and moral issues of peace-building. This chapter further develops the criteria for legitimate 
peace-building. Chapters IH and IV deal with the practical aspects of the development of 
self-government and re-establishment of the judiciary in Kosovo. Each activity of the 
international mission is viewed in two dimensions: first, whether it complies with the 
requirements and limits established for peace-building; second, how these activities 
contribute to the conciliatory democratic result generally sought in peace-building.
21 refer to the activities in Kosovo as state building meaning solely the nature of the international 
activities, but not implying that the international community attempts to build an independent 
state of Kosovo.
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3
I do not contend that an international administration was expressly guided by the 
principles of consociationalism. Neither do I suggest that consociationalism can be applied 
in Kosovo without any reservations. The success of consociationalism in each individual 
case depends on the individual circumstances and means used for the implementation of its 
principles.
Two years of an international administration is not a long term enough to allow 
finite conclusions on the success or failure of the UNMIK. The currently available 
information gives one an opportunity to judge on the achievement of short-term goals, such 
as humanitarian relief and the re-establishment of state institutional structures. In this 
respect, the UNMIK can only be judged on its ability to live up to certain expectations of 
the international community in bringing stability to the Province. However, there is still 
little basis for the evaluation of the long-term effect of the consociational-type techniques 
adopted in Kosovo. At the same time, considering consociationalism critically, I will 
analyze whether it can offer effective solution for situations like Kosovo and if not, what 
needs to be changed in this theoretical concept to improve it.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter I
A Theoretical Framework for Effective Peace-building
Any theoretical model or concept is usually construed as a set of general trends 
observed in a particular situation and a range of remedies that can be applied for the 
resolution of tensions in that particular situation. The general character of concepts and 
models is both an advantage and a limitation. On the one hand, the general character of a 
model allows the remedies to be applied to a wider range of situations. On the other hand, 
the success of the implementation of a model may often be limited because general 
guidelines fail to adequately address the deviations from the usual circumstances. The 
peace-building concept suffers from such limitations. Although it was developed 
specifically for the establishment of peace, it does not embrace the peculiarities of 
reconstruction in ethnically divided societies. Because of that, I will tailor my theoretical 
approach to the analysis of the events in Kosovo as a combination of two concepts which 
together can provide crucial and sensitive guidelines for the practical reconstruction of 
the ethnically divided Province. They are peace-building and consociational democracy. 
Both concepts seek the same objective -  ensuring stability and democratic governance in 
a society. However, they seek this objective from different perspectives. Peace-building 
focuses more on what should be done, while consociationalism tells how it is to be done 
in an ethnically divided society and what effect particular means are likely to have. 
Because the two concentrate on different aspects of governance, their combined 
utilization in peace operations can provide a well-rounded approach to post-conflict 
reconstruction. Each concept will be discussed in this Chapter. The application of each 
element of the two concepts in Kosovo will be analyzed in Chapters m  and IV.
A. Peace-building
/ .  Definitions and characteristics 
There is no clear agreement among scholars or practitioners as to the concept of peace­
building. In the most general understanding, peace-building refers to the “creation
4
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of a specific infrastructure within and among nations, which removes causes of war and 
offers alternatives to war in situations where it might occur.”3
The modern UN concept of peace-building stems from three major documents: 
An Agenda for Peace,4 the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace,5 and the Brahimi 
Report.6
The 1992 Agenda for Peace introduced the initial, basic ideas about peace­
building. It identified the main direction of peace-building -to  prevent reoccurrence of 
conflict - and exemplified possible peace-building activities. An Agenda for Peace 
defined peace-building as “an action to identify and support structures which will tend to 
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”7 Peace-building is 
viewed in two dimensions: as “concrete cooperative projects which link two or more 
countries in a mutually beneficial undertaking"8 and as UN assistance in the 
transformation of deficient national structures and strengthening of democratic rule.9 
Moreover, the document stipulated the UN obligation to “develop and provide when 
requested”10 support for development of new democratic institutions in post-conflict 
states.
A Supplement to An Agenda for Peace has further developed the guidelines for 
the “structures for the institutionalization of peace.”11 Given that after an intra-state 
conflict state institutions have often collapsed, the Secretary-General emphasized that the 
international peace-building intervention must extend beyond military and humanitarian
3 Dyan Mazurana & Susan McKay, Women and Peace-Building (Montreal, PQ: International 
Centre Human Rights & Democratic Development, 1999) at 7.
4 An Agenda for Peace, supra note 1.
s Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper o f the Secretary-General on the Occasion 
o f the Fiftieth Anniversary o f the United Nations, U.N. GAOR/SCOR, SO18 Sess., U.N. Docs. 
A/50/60 & S/195/1 (1995) [hereinafter Supplement to An Agenda for Peace ].
6 Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations, Report o f the Panel on the United Nations Peace 
Operations, UN GAOR, 55th Sess., UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (2000) at 2, online: United 
Nations Homepage, http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace operations/ > (date accessed: 24 
September 2000) [hereinafter Brahimi Report].
7 An Agenda for Peace, supra note I.
8 An Agenda for Peace, supra note 1, para. 56.
9 Ibid., para. 59.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., para. 49.
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tasks and include reconstruction and reconciliation activities.12 The Supplement 
distinguished two situations when peace-building can take place. First, peace-building in 
the zone where no peacekeeping operation has been deployed before. Then, the 
Secretary-General should act on the basis of his general mandate for preventive 
diplomacy, peacekeeping and peace-building and take an initiative of sending a mission 
(given that a host state gives its consent) to the country in question.13
The second case for peace-building is when a comprehensive political settlement 
has been negotiated and verification of its implementation is entrusted with a 
multifunctional peace-keeping force.14 In such a situation the UN already has a presence 
in the state, and its role has already been accepted by the parties; the peace-keeping 
operation is already mandated with peace-building activities.15 Here, peace-keeping is 
seen as a prerequisite for peace-building. It is proposed that when a multifunctional 
peace-keeping operation succeeds in restoring normal conditions, the UN programmes, 
funds, offices and agencies take over the responsibility for further economic, social and 
humanitarian reconstruction.16 The Supplement suggested that the decision-making 
responsibility in a peace-building operation should be transferred from the Security 
Council to the General Assembly or other inter-govemmental bodies.17 At the same time, 
the peace-building strategy should be worked out in joint consultations between the UN 
and the parties to the conflict.18
The recent Brahimi Report represents one of the first attempts to summarize the 
UN experience in peace maintenance and to derive practical recommendations from this 
practice. It reaffirms many of the previously stated features of peace-building. The Report 
defined peace-building as “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble 
the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations 
something that is more than just the absence of war.’' 19 It recognized the importance of
12 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, supra note 5, para. 13.
13 Ibid., para. 56.
14 Ibid., para. 49.
15 Ibid., para. 50.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., para. 54.
18 Ibid., para. 48.
19 Brahimi Report, supra note 6, para. 13.
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the multidimensional engagement of local parties in peace-building,20 In particular, it is 
necessary that the population consciously accepts elections and the formation of local 
government as “an appropriate and credible mechanism through which their views on 
government are represented.”21 This means that peace-builders should be concerned not 
only with the implementation of solutions that they deem appropriate, but also with the 
population’s acceptance and understanding of such solutions.
The Report recognized the great transformative character of peace-building: 
“United Nations thus do not deploy into post-conflict situations so much as they deploy 
to create such situations.”22 Through the work in personal, political and other areas, 
peace-builders drive an unfinished conflict from the military to the political arena and 
this way make the diversion of a conflict permanent.23
The Report also takes the connection between peacekeeping and peace-building 
seriously: “History has taught that peacekeepers and peacebuilders are inseparable 
partners in complex operations: while the peacebuilders may not be able to function 
without peacekeepers’ support, the peacekeepers have no exit without the peacebuilders’ 
work.”24
According to the mentioned UN documents, peace-building encompasses a 
variety of activities in different areas of public life: disarmament, restoration of order, 
destruction of weapons, repatriation of refugees, training of security personnel, electoral 
monitoring, strengthening the rule of law, reforming governmental institutions, 
promoting reconciliation, etc.23 These measures have different degrees of priority, 
depending on the stage of post-conflict rehabilitation. At the time of deployment, peace­
building activities are targeted at rapid humanitarian relief, reconstruction of 
humanitarian objects, disarmament and restoration of order. At a further stage, 
international organizations will usually proceed towards institution-building -  the 
establishment of the judiciary (through the appointment of judges and prosecutors, their 
legal training, technical support of the courts, etc.), the formation of representative bodies
20Brahimi Report, supra note 6, para 37.
21 Ibid., para. 38.
22 Brahimi Report, supra note 6, para. 20.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., para. 28.
25 Ibid. See also An Agenda for Peace, supra note 1, para. 55.
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(through the promotion of political participation, preparation and monitoring of 
elections), and the creation and training of the local police.
As evidenced in the UN documents, peace-building is exercised by an outside 
authority (usually in the form of an international administration) which seeks to fulfill 
two objectives -  to transform a post-conflict society and to provide for its sustainability. 
Transformation is aimed at changing the conflict at the political, structural and social 
levels, which precludes reoccurrence of tension.26 Sustainability means: 1) local 
governmental structures are put in operation and are able to independently manage the 
affairs in a post-conflict zone after the withdrawal of an international mission; and 2) 
those local structures continue to function in accordance with democratic principles 
introduced by peace-builders.
The achievement of the two main goals of peace-building requires adoption of a 
certain strategy. Boutros-Ghali noted in An Agenda for Peace that “there is an obvious 
connection between democratic practices -  such as the rule of law and transparency in 
decision-making -  and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable 
political order.”27 Consequently, democratization becomes one of the central strategies 
for achieving transformation and sustainability. First, democratic institution-building 
catalyses the transformation of society and its political system. In turn, the existence and 
the work of the newly established institutions lays the foundations for the self­
sustainability of a post-conflict society.28
The transformation sought by peace-builders implies the alteration of the nature 
of a post-conflict society. Such a task involves a number of challenges from both a 
practical and a scholarly point of view. From a scholarly perspective, the difficulties with 
exercising transformative peace-building are twofold: first, no comprehensive peace­
building theory has been elaborated yet29 -  for example, there are no clear principles
26 John Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington: 
US Institute of Peace Press, 1997) at 75.
27 An Agenda for Peace, supra note 1.
28 The causal relation between democracy and resolution of the problems of a post-conflict 
society can also be viewed from another perspective: the establishment of democratic government 
may be a result, rather than the cause of the transformation. See, Samuel Barnes, ‘The 
Contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Postconflict Societies” (2001) 95 AJIL 86 at 86-87.
29 Here, I mean lack of developments other than guidelines stipulated in An Agenda for Peace, 
Supplement to an Agenda for Peace and the Brahimi Report.
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governing the status of peace-builders in a post-conflict zone (e.g., to what extent they 
should be impartial, when could they use weapons, etc.); second, how legitimate are 
lengthy large-scale international interventions in post-conflict reconstruction.30 These 
theoretical problems have a strong impact on the practical exercise of peace-building. As 
I will show in the next Chapter, the legitimacy of a peace-building mission, and the 
organs re-established by it, influences the amount of support that an international 
administration will receive from the local population.
As pointed out above, to date the peace-building concept remains vague. Neither 
the UN documents nor scholarly discussion provide sufficient precision about the 
characteristics which allow one to distinguish peace-building from other peace operations 
and to define the limits on the conduct of peace-builders. For the purposes of this thesis, 
one can identify the following characteristics of peace-building (as derived from the 
previously discussed Agenda for Peace, the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace and the 
Brahimi Report);31 I) comprehensive nature -  it embraces political, economic, military, 
humanitarian and other tasks; 2) it includes institution-building as one of its essential 
activities; 3) it seeks to transform a society in a way that precludes the reoccurrence of 
tension and provides the sustainability of such transformation; 4) it is exercised in close 
connection with peacekeeping (the latter is seen as a prerequisite for peace-building in 
terms of both the legal basis and the foundation for practical activities of a peace-building 
mission); S) it requires close cooperation between peace-builders and local parties; and 6) 
it takes place after the cessation of hostilities.
These characteristics create a certain idea about peace-building, but leave 
unresolved several essential issues, including: whether a host state’s consent is required 
for peace-building; whether peace-builders have to be neutral and impartial; how broad 
their military and police power of a peace-building mission should be. The answers to 
these questions will be provided through the analysis of the theory and practice of peace­
building in Chapter II. From the perspective of the UN documents, we can observe the
30 The second problem may be classified as a “moral” problem of peace-building. It will be 
examined in Chapter n.
31 Peace-building can be exercised at pre-conflict stage as a counterpart of preventive diplomacy 
and at post-conflict stage. The discussion of this thesis concerns post-conflict peace-building 
only.
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following trend. First, the host state’s consent is likely to be needed. An Agenda for 
Peace and the Supplement expressed a concern that peace-building may be treated by 
local parties as an invasion on the sovereignty of their state. Since such a situation is of 
concern, it would be logical for the international community to seek the host state’s 
consent to the deployment of a mission. Second, because the documents recognize deep 
involvement of the UN and other agencies in reconstruction and the transformative nature 
of such reconstruction, I can suggest that peace-builders are viewed as parties to the 
reconstruction process, but not as neutral and impartial observers of the transformation.
2. Peace-building in a divided society
At the point when the international community has not acquired enough feedback 
about peace-building through “in Held’’ missions, the theoretical concept of peace- 
building is likely to be the main guideline for the planning of international actions. As a 
concept, peace-building stipulates commonly shared values -  peace, democracy, human 
rights -  but does not prescribe particular means for their achievement. What is crucial in 
relation to Kosovo, is that the peace-building concept to date has inadequately addressed 
the issue of institution-building under the circumstances of divided societies.
According to political science studies, “ ...a peculiar set of problems surrounds the 
maintenance of democracy”33 in divided societies.34 The peculiarities of political 
organization and electoral behaviour in these societies create a situation that even under 
the existence of democratic institutions and procedures the domination by a majority is
32 Here, I mean the concept derived from An Agenda for Peace, the Supplement to an Agenda for 
Peace and the Brahimi Report
"  Donald L. Horowitz, “Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?” in Designing Democratic 
Institutions, Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo (eds.) (New York: New York University Press, 2000) 
253 at 253.
34 Societies may be divided by different criteria -  ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious, social, etc. 
The following discussion places a lot of emphasis on the distinct nature of divided societies, 
especially ethnically divided societies, like Kosovo (the evidence for that will be provided in 
Chapter m). It should be borne in mind that the effect of democratic practices is contingent not 
merely on the fact of ethnic division, but rather on the nature of such division, historical 
peculiarities of the zone, political culture, etc.
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possible, along with the exclusion of minorities from government.35 Let us briefly review 
why democratic practices produce such an effect in a divided society.36
The two inalienable characteristics of democracy are contestation and 
inclusiveness: contestation of political power within a framework of rights and 
institutions and inclusiveness regarding the adult population’s right to participate in such 
contestation.37
In an ethnically divided society, ethnic identity would often define if a person or a 
group is included or excluded in the contestation of power. Moreover, the very 
contestation of power is exercised along ethnic lines. The sense of ethnic group creates a 
strong impetus towards party organization along ethnic lines.38 After a deadly ethnic 
conflict, ethnic affiliation becomes even stronger source of the sense of “trust...and 
protection against neglect of one’s interests by strangers.”39 Thus, not only parties are 
formed along ethnic lines, but also people usually vote for parties, which represent their 
ethnic group. Then, democratic elections regress into a zero-sum game: one ethnic group 
wins by its democratic weight and others see themselves as losing all and being excluded 
not only from the government, but also from the larger political community.40 Being 
underrepresented in the organs of government, minority groups have limited access to 
power and little opportunity to ensure that their interests are taken into account. The 
majority rule in a divided society may produce decisions that serve the benefit of the
33 Donald Horowitz, “Democracy in Divided Societies” in Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and
Democracy, Larry Diamond & Marc Platter (eds.) (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University
Press, 1994) 35 at 37.
36 The following discussion involves a great deal of generalization about patterns of democracy in 
divided societies. I highlight only the most important and common trends that can be expected in 
such a society. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the peculiarities of ethno- 
political balance and the effect of consociational techniques may significantly differ from case to 
case.
37 Bames, supra note 28 at 88.
38 Ibid.
39 Horowitz, supra note 35 at 49.
40 Donald Horowitz, “Ethnic Conflict Management for Policy Makers” in Joseph V. Montville 
(ed.) Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (Lexington. Mass.: Lexington Books, 
1990), 115-16.
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majority, but ignore the needs of minorities. This way majority rule becomes not only 
ineffective in mitigating ethnic tensions, but also incompatible with democracy.41
The peace-building concept refers to democracy-building in general terms and, 
thus, it most likely suggests only traditional democratic means for democratization in an 
ethnically divided society. Yet, in an ethnically divided society the usual democratic rules 
do nothing about ethnic exclusion and even more, they foster it.42 The unresolved tension 
between minority and majority will be like a powder keg ready to explode any time. 
Then, the peace-building concept, which relies on traditional means and does not include 
special mechanisms against exclusion of minorities from the government, will fail to 
achieve its main goal - transformation of society in a way that prevents the reoccurrence 
of a conflict and sustainability of that transformation. Consequently, to accomplish its 
objective, peace-building has to address ethnic division through the mechanisms that 
reconcile ethnic divergences within the democratic process. In my opinion, such 
mechanisms can be found in political science theory. In particular, the model of 
consociational democracy suggests some avenues for more effective peace-building.
B. Consociational Democracy
/ .  General characteristic
The model of consociational democracy was initially developed by Arend 
Lijphart in his work “Democracy in Plural Societies.” This model suggests that in plural 
societies43 the establishment and maintenance of stable democratic government becomes 
possible due to special built-in techniques, which ensure participation of all major 
segments of the society in state decision-making. These special techniques (or elements 
of consociational democracy) are: 1) grand coalition; 2) mutual veto; 3) proportionality in 
political representation, civil service appointments and allocation of public finds; and 4) a 
high degree of autonomy for each segment of the society.44
41 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (London: Yale 
University Press, 1977) at 113.
42 Horowitz, supra, note 35 at 45.
43 Plural society is a society divided into segments based on linguistic, cultural religious, racial, 
ethnic or other characteristics. See, Lijphart, supra note 41 at 3-4. Note that the term “plural 
society” is broader than “ethnically divided society.”
44 lbid.,at 25.
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The grand coalition presupposes the participation of the leaders of all significant 
segments in governing a society.43 Grand coalition is a central element of 
consociationalism. It is the factor that guarantees conciliation in a society. The 
participation of the major segments of the society may be achieved, inter alia, through 
the establishment of reserved seats in the legislature, special requirements to the 
composition of the organs of government, etc. Importantly, it is not the mere fact of 
participation that produces the conciliatory result of a grand coalition. It is the willingness 
and ability of the leaders of the segments to cooperate and compromise. If the leaders of 
segments are formally included in government, but refuse to cooperate with each other, 
no mutually acceptable solution can be elaborated and the decision-making is most likely 
to be ruled by the segment that has majority in government.
Grand coalition is complemented by three other instruments: mutual veto, 
proportionality and segmental autonomy. These three elements may be regarded as 
procedural rules, which support collective decision-making and adoption of mutually 
acceptable decisions.
Grand coalition allows minority participation in decision-making, but if in such a 
coalition decisions are made by majority vote, there is no guarantee that minority 
interests will not be outvoted by the majority. This is why an effective grand coalition 
requires such a tool of political protection as mutual veto.46 Each segment of a society has 
power to veto a decision if it considers it to be contrary to that segment’s interests. 
Mutual veto may be incorporated in legal rules as a requirement of making decisions by 
consensus.
Proportionality is the third element, which represents a deviation from majority 
rule. Proportionality is utilized in at least two forms. First, as a guideline for allocating 
seats in state organs and financial resources among different segments47 and in the design 
of an electoral system. Second, as a principle of decision-making that allows groups to 
influence decisions in proportion to their numeric weight.48
45Lijphart, supra note 41, at 32.
46 Ibid., at 37.
47 Ibid., at 38.
48 Ibid., at 39.
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Segmental autonomy is a corollary of the grand coalition principle. The decisions 
on matters of common concern are made by all segments of the society together. The 
matters of exclusive concern for a particular segment are resolved by that segment 
alone.49 Segmental autonomy enables minorities to rule over the areas of their exclusive 
concern.50 It includes delegation of rule-making and rule-application powers to the 
segments of a plural society. One of the forms of segmental autonomy is federalism.51
These are briefly the main characteristics of the elements of consociationalism. 
Because I propose consociationalism as a remedy for Kosovo, we need to be aware not 
only of the benefits, but also of the limitations of this model.
The criticisms of consociationalism can be summarized in four points. First, it is 
noted that grand coalition provides for relatively small and weak opposition.52 Inclusion 
of all segments in decision-making undermines the incentives for democratic 
competition, which is an essential prerequisite for healthy democracy. If everybody is 
included and minorities have their fixed seats in representative bodies, what is the sense 
of trying to win voters’ support?53 Minority parties that automatically get seats in the 
legislature may feel reluctant to actively participate in the contest for power during 
elections. At the same time, majority parties are likely to oppose automatic inclusion of 
minority members in the legislature on the grounds that such inclusion unduly favours 
minority parties. Thus, grand coalition may not only weaken the opposition, but also 
strengthen the aggressiveness of majority parties. It may also produce an opposition, 
which is based not on difference in political positions, but rather on ethnic affiliation.
Second, as a corollary of grand coalition, proportional system creates little 
incentives to generate pooling of votes across ethnic lines either at electoral or at post- 
electoral stage. Because the consociational system relies on quotas and restraints rather 
than positive incentives, the interethnic dialogue will have a competitive rather than 
cooperative character.54 Paradoxically, proportionality may be viewed as preventing
49 Lijphart, supra note 41, at 41.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., at 42.
52 Ibid., at 47.
53 Horowitz, supra note 35 at 49.
54 Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific, Michael E. Brown & Sumit 
Ganguly (eds.) (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997) at 553.
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conciliatory results, which is sought through introducing consociational techniques. 
Another objection to proportionality may be raised from the position of meritocracy. 
Appointments based on person’s ethnic identity rather than individual qualities, 
emphasize ethnic affiliation as a passport for obtaining certain public positions. Then, 
ethnic boundaries are likely to be maintained rather than smoothed over.
Third, the consociational model, concerned with equal treatment of groups rather 
than individual equality,ss creates “communal society” as opposed to democracy in a 
homogenous society, where the emphasis is made on individual rights and freedoms.56 
The emphasis on ethnic community threatens to undermine the goals of maximizing 
individual freedom and equality in society.57
Fourth, the remedies of the consociational model are mainly targeted at the 
representative or executive branch of government. The other systems of state organs, Uke 
the judiciary and the police, are usually overlooked as if they were not influenced by 
ethnic division. This omission is erroneous. Not only the judiciary and the police reflect 
ethnic division, but they may also contribute to mitigation or, to the contrary, 
strengthening of ethnic exclusion.58 Consequently, consociationalism needs to develop 
mechanisms of minority inclusion, which will be suitable for application to the judiciary 
and the police.
The presented critiques are strong enough to question the workability and 
usefulness of adapting consociationalism in plural societies. Do these limitations imply 
that consociationalism is inherently flawed? I do not support either an extreme position 
that consociationalism is an inherently flawed model or an opposite view on it as a 
panacea for divided societies. The degree of the deficiency of consociationalism depends 
on two factors: the individual set of circumstances in the country in question and the 
means chosen for the implementation of the elements of consociationalism. The 
limitations of consociationalism reveal themselves in different forms and to different 
degrees, depending on the characteristics of a particular society. For example, in such
55 Horowitz, supra note 35 at 49.
56 Ibid., at 48.
57 David Wippman, “Introduction” in International Law and Ethnic Conflict David Wippman 
(ed.) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998) at 240.
58 This issue will be discussed in detail in Chapter ID.
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plural societies as Belgium and Switzerland consociationalism does not prevent either 
pooling of votes across ethnic lines or the existence of effective opposition.59 There the 
power sharing among ethnic groups is traditionally exercised through inter-ethnic 
coalitions: poly-ethnic parties (Switzerland) or through poly-ethnic unions of mono­
ethnic parties (Belgium).60 It should be noted that consociationalism was developed on 
the basis of studies of stable democracies in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland. Consequently, the proposed remedies largely rely on the processes inherent 
to stable democracies. Because the circumstances of a post-conflict society are different, 
the peculiarities of the country in question may place a restraint on the success of 
consociational techniques. Thus, depending on the characteristics of a society, 
consociationalism may or may not suffer from the mentioned limitations.
Another factor that influences the effectiveness of consociationalism in mitigating 
ethnic tension is the means chosen to implement the elements of consociationalism. For 
example, consociationalism is criticized for creating little incentive for politicians to 
moderate their statements and for voters to vote across ethnic lines. The incentives for 
such pooling of votes and moderation of positions depend, inter alia, on the design of an 
electoral system. One of the successful examples of creating such incentives through 
electoral system is found in Nigeria. There the electoral system was designed in a way to 
guarantee that a candidate for President of the Republic would be moderate on matters of 
interethnic relations.61 To win a candidate had to receive the largest number of votes plus 
at least 25% of the votes in at least two-thirds of the 19 states.62 This formula precluded 
two of the three main ethnic groups from combining to win elections without minority 
support63 The first elections provided for the sought result -  the first president, Shehu 
Shagari proved to be a “panethnic figure.”64 This example confirms that 
consociationalism developed on the basis of stable democracies can still be effective in
59 Philippe Van Parijs “Power-sharing versus Border-crossing in Ethnically Divided Societies” in 
Designing Democratic Institutions, Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo (eds.) (New York: New York 
University Press, 2000) 296 at 307.
60 Ibid. Actually, the model of consociationalism elaborated by Lijphart was to great extent 
inspired by the democratic practice of these two countries.
61 Horowitz, supra note 33 at 263.
62 Ibid. The territories of states were a proxy for ethnicity.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
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developing states if implemented with careful consideration of local peculiarities. As we 
can see, it is not consociationalism as such that works or does not work, but the 
mechanisms for its implementation that are inadequate or not. In Chapter in  we will see 
what system was adopted for the implementation of the elements of consociationalism in 
Kosovo.
2. Implication o f consociationalism fo r  Kosovo
The particular set of circumstances in Kosovo will to a great extent define what 
elements of consociationalism can be adopted and what adverse effect on reconciliation 
the limitations of consociationalism may have. The characteristics of the situation in 
Kosovo may be divided into two categories: those that are likely to increase the adverse 
effect of consociationalism and those that are likely to mitigate it. The nature and degree 
of ethnic division, the previous existence of an open conflict between ethnic groups, poor 
economic conditions, uncertainty about the future status of the Province, differences in 
political positions of the majority and minority parties -  these factors are likely to 
increase the adverse effect of consociationalism. These factors themselves are limitations 
on the implementation of consociationalism and its success in Kosovo. At the same time, 
there is a factor that is likely to mitigate the limitations of consociationalism. It is the 
existence of an international administration in Kosovo, which has power to set up the 
rules of behaviour of the main participants of the political process and to control the 
enforcement of these rules. Usually the division of society prevents it from taking an 
action to overcome such division.63 However, in case of Kosovo, there is an outside 
power (an international administration) that exercises pressure for the implementation of 
a coherent package of techniques, which facilitate minority inclusion.
It has been determined in the preceding discussion that the success of 
consociationalism depends on the circumstances of a particular country and measures 
adopted for the implementation of consociationalism. Then, in relation to Kosovo it is 
necessary to look at: 1) what elements of consociationalism are suitable for Kosovo? 2) 
can these elements be actually implemented? If yes, through what techniques? 3) what is 
the likely effect of their implementation? These questions will be briefly addressed
“ Horowitz, supra note 33 at 261.
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below, but their more detailed analysis is to follow in Chapters m  and IV where the 
concrete techniques used by the UNMIK will be discussed.
Grand coalition. For a post-conflict society, the importance of a grand coalition 
lies in its potential to promote post-conflict reconciliation, cooperation and fairness of 
decision-making. Given the peculiarities of Kosovo (that Kosovo is a part of a state; that 
it is currently administered by an international administration; etc.), the formation of a 
grand coalition will differ from the process described by Lijphart. He applied the model 
for independent states, but Kosovo is an internationally administered province. The 
essence of the principle remains the same -  to ensure that matters of common concern are 
decided with consideration of the interests of all segments. However, there may be 
several deviations from the pattern proposed by Lijphart.
In Kosovo grand coalitions are created under the pressure of the international 
administration, but not through the internal incentives of the political process. Grand 
coalition at the provincial level was created through the nomination of the representatives 
of all major segments of the Kosovo society in the UNMIK-created organs.66 These 
organs included the leaders of religious, political, ethnic and other segments. The 
pressure of the international authority was crucial for overcoming the post-conflict 
reluctance of political leaders to enter multiethnic bodies and conduct dialogue with each 
other.
The mere fact of the inclusion of ethnic community leaders is a precondition, but 
not yet a guarantee for the emergence of a grand coalition. For example, Kosovar leaders 
often resorted to boycotting decision-making or refusing to participate in multiethnic 
organs in order to advocate their political demands.67 If leaders are formally included, but 
decline the mutual decision-making, a grand coalition does not accomplish its aim of 
producing mutually acceptable solutions. It confirms our previous assumption that an 
international administration can only create strong preconditions for overcoming 
unwillingness of local parties to enter into inter-ethnic dialogue, but it is for the locals to 
make the most of such preconditions.
66 For more detailed discussion of these organs, their composition and powers see. Chapter III.
67 One of the vivid examples is the position of Kosovo Serbs. Their representatives were 
appointed to the UNMIK-created organs, but they refused to take seats. Only after negotiations 
with the SRSG did hey agree to participate in the meetings as observers only.
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Mutual veto. Mutual veto is an important guarantee that minorities have their 
interests taken into account during decision-making in grand coalitions. However, there is 
a danger that the frequent use of veto will lead to paralysis and deadlock in decision­
making. Lijphart believed that this danger is not likely to be serious because, first, the 
fact that the veto is available creates the feeling of security for a respective minority and, 
thus, makes the use of the veto improbable;68 second, each segment is aware of the threat 
of deadlock and will try to reach mutually acceptable solutions.69 These reasons seem to 
be convincing, but they are likely to be true for societies with more or less established 
structures and power sharing where rationality becomes a main guideline for decisions. In 
contrast, the behaviour in post-conflict societies continues to be significantly influenced 
by ethnic sentiment. Minority and majority groups are so hostile towards each other that 
decisions are likely to be dictated by populist motives and emotions rather than 
rationality. When rationality, as the main safeguard against unrestricted use of veto, is 
absent, the risk of deadlock becomes very high. There is a danger that in a post-conflict 
society mutual veto will have destructive, rather than conciliatory effect. Again, a lot will 
depend on the instruments chosen to design the veto power. In this respect, the approach 
adopted by the UNMIK is very interesting. Through a number of tools the administration 
tailored a model of a moderate mutual veto which, on the one hand, allows ethnic 
communities to protect their interests, but, on the other, reduces the danger of deadlock.70 
Another tool available for preventing deadlock, which results from the use of the veto, is 
the power of the international administration to interfere in case of an organ’s inability to 
reach a decision. This method, however, should be viewed as acceptable only for the 
initial stages of reconstruction.
Proportionality. Proportionality is another important mechanism, which 
strengthens the inclusiveness of minorities in government through seat allocation and 
decision-making procedures. In Chapters m  and IV we will examine in more detail how 
the UNMIK employed proportionality in the appointment of the local bodies and judicial 
personnel and in tailoring the electoral system.
68 Lijphart, supra note 41 at 37.
69 Ibid.
70 This mechanism will be discussed in Chapter III.
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Segmental autonomy. Segmental autonomy provides major segments of the 
society with the authority to manage their affairs independently. Lijphart discussed 
segmental autonomy as a solution for a state. In relation to the province of Kosovo, it 
may have somewhat different effect. On the one hand, segmental autonomy would mean 
delegation of certain powers to the Province’s minorities in the areas of their (minority) 
concentration.71 This ability of minorities to manage own affairs facilitates their fuller 
inclusion in the government. It would also be consistent with the general trend of 
decentralization of power through the municipal self-government. On the other hand, in 
regard to the Serb municipalities segmental autonomy can produce a destabilizing effect. 
In my opinion, further delegation of power to the Serb communities may lead to their 
claims for secession. For this reason, the issue of implementing segmental autonomy and 
its scope should be dealt with special care. It may be expedient to implement only three 
(grand coalition, mutual veto and proportionality), but not four elements72 in Kosovo. 
Then, there is a legitimate question whether these elements can be implemented 
separately. On the one hand, according to Lijphart’s concept, the four elements of 
consociationalism -  grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality and segmental 
autonomy -  are complementary to each other. Only together can they be effective in 
mitigating ethnic tension. Horowitz suggests that the four elements of the consociational 
model are complementary to each other and are intended to work as a coherent project. 
He warns that the adoption of certain parts of the model without the others may not only 
fail to reduce a conflict, but also lead to worse results than doing nothing at all.73 For 
example, grand coalition without mutual veto will not guarantee that the interests of 
minorities will not be overridden by the ethnic majority. On the other hand, not all 
elements are suitable or can be quickly implemented in Kosovo. In his work on 
democratization in South Africa, Horowitz noted that “the trick [about successful
71 All Kosovo municipalities are granted equal degree of self-government, but this is not 
segmental autonomy. Segmental autonomy means delegation of powers to segments, but not 
merely territorial units. In Kosovo municipal boundaries do not coincide with the ethnic 
distribution of the population (except for the three Serb municipalities).
72 As pointed at the beginning of the section, the fourth element is segmental autonomy.
73 Horowitz, supra note 33 at 261.
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democracy-building] is to borrow right institutions,”74 i.e., those that are appropriate and 
suitable in given circumstances. I suggest that grand coalition, mutual veto and 
proportionality can be and should be implemented in Kosovo. The implementation of 
segmental autonomy may be subject to the reservations that I have expressed above. I 
concur with Lijphart who said that “[t]he essential characteristic of consociational 
democracy is not so much any particular institutional arrangement as the deliberate joint 
effort by the elites to stabilize the system.”75 My point here is not that institutional 
arrangement has to be defined by elites (this pattern an be considered undemocratic), but 
that there is no one strictly determined structure for consociationalism, which has to be 
equally followed in all situations. In each case the design of the elements and institutions 
will be contingent on the circumstances of the country in question. At the same time, the 
elements of consociationalism have to be implemented in a way that allows preserving 
the internal checks and balances among the elements of consociationalism.'6
C. Peace-building and consociationaism: a mutually beneficial 
union?
Both the peace-building concept and the consociational model have their 
limitations in relation to reconstruction of divided societies. The peace-building concept 
does not incorporate techniques to accommodate tensions in ethnically divided societies 
and because of that an international administration may fail to eliminate the sources of a 
conflict -  dictatorship by the majority and exclusion of minorities. Consociationalism 
provides for techniques of ethnic inclusion, but these techniques may not be implemented 
by the parties to a conflict without international pressure. Thus, peace-building 
complements consociationalism in terms of providing a framework for an international 
administration in a post-conflict zone and consociationalism adds important conciliatory 
techniques to the range of peace-building tools.
74 Donald Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1991) at 101.
75 Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy” (1969) 21 World politics, reprinted in Van Parijs 
supra note 59 at 307.
76 For example, proportionality has to be adopted not only in relation to one state institution or 
branch of government, but all of them when applicable, that is, not only the legislature should be 
based on proportionality, but also the composition of the cabinet and the election of a president as 
well as formation of the judiciary and the police.
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The strength of the interrelation of peace-building and consociationalism is in the 
exchange between theory and practice. The consociational model is suggested as a 
possible way for the resolution of the potential democratic deficit in Kosovo associated 
with majority government. The activities of peace-building missions give feedback about 
the practical value of consociational mechanisms. Moreover, the empirical evidence from 
such missions contributes new aspects to the theoretical model of consociationalism (for 
example, the necessity to apply proportionality not only in representative organs, but also 
for the creation of the judiciary and the police77).
Even the combination of peace-building and consociationalism does not 
automatically mean success for a peace-building mission. Consociationalism, proposed as 
a solution for the “ethnic neutrality” of peace-building, has its limitations, which may 
even be intensified by the circumstances of post-conflict Kosovo. Although I have 
already expressed a critical stance on the proposed theoretical model, the conclusion 
about its workability and its limitations in Kosovo and similar situations will ultimately 
be reached through the further analysis of this thesis.
77 For the discussion of these issues see, Chapter IV.
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Chapter II 
General Issues of Peace-building
A painter usually starts a picture with the choice of several basic colours and their 
correlation. The three or four main spots of colour are the basis for the further work on 
details and overtones and a guideline for the harmonic combination of images and 
perspectives in the picture.
I want to start my picture of peace-building in Kosovo with the presentation of the 
basic “colours” of this peace operation: the circumstances, which led to the establishment 
of the mission, the legal basis of the mission, and the major problems that have been and 
may be encountered during the exercise of peace-building activities there.
This Chapter combines a theoretical discussion of peace-building with the 
analysis of practical aspects of the UNMIK activities. Section A provides an overview of 
the major events in Kosovo that happened since 1989. Based on the facts of Section A, 
Section B reveals major legal and moral controversies of peace-building which should be 
borne in mind during a further discussion of self-government and judicial reform in 
Kosovo. It also further defines the characteristics required of a peace-building mission 
and analyzes how well the UNMIK meets these requirements.
A. The Establishment and Powers of the UNMIK
What follows is not a comprehensive analysis of the development of the Kosovo 
conflict.78 Rather, these are the basic facts that create a necessary context for the 
understanding of peace-building activities in Kosovo.79
78 For detailed analysis of the events in Kosovo, see: Tim Judah, Kosovo War and Revenge (New 
Heaven: Yale University Press, 2000); Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond 
(Toronto: Viking, 2000); Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History o f Kosovo 
(London: Hurst & Company, 1998); Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (New York : New 
York University Press, 1998).
79 The debate about the lawfulness of the actions of the Serbian authorities in Kosovo, the scale of 
ethnic violence (e.g., whether it amounted to ethnic cleansing or genocide), the nature of the 
Kosovo struggle (whether it can be viewed as self-determination movement), the lawfulness of 
the NATO intervention and related issues are beyond the scope of this paper. For the discussion 
of these problems, see: Michael Smith “NATO, the Kosovo Liberation Army, and the War for an 
Independent Kosovo: Unlawful Aggression or Legitimate Exercise of Self-Determination?'
23
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1. Statement o f facts80 
Historically, the Province of Kosovo is of great importance for both Serbs and 
Albanians. For Serbs, Kosovo is the birthplace of the Serb nation.81 The Albanians’ claim 
to Kosovo is based on historical connection: the Albanian national movement started in 
Kosovo in 1878 and since that time Kosovo is considered one of the centers of Albanian 
nationalism.83 Another factor is demographics. For centuries Kosovo has been populated 
predominantly by Albanians. During 1953-1991 the Albanian population in Kosovo 
increased from 64.9% to 82.2%.83 The growth of the Albanian part of the population was 
accompanied by a significant decrease in numbers of Serb, Montenegrin, Croat and Turk 
minorities. By 1998 Albanians made up more than 90% of Kosovo’s population.84
In 1974, under President Tito’s rule, Kosovo obtained the status of an autonomous 
region within Serbia. The next several years were characterized by growing 
“Albanization” of the political, economic and cultural life of Kosovo. The positive 
discrimination pursued by formerly disadvantaged Albanians83 was experienced by other 
ethnic groups as injustice and contributed to their sense of insecurity.86
(2001) 27 Army Law. 1; Richard B. Bilder, "Kosovo and the “New Interventionism”: Promise or 
Peril? “ (1999) 9 J. Transnat’l L & Pol’y 153; Julie Mertus, “Reconsidering the Legality of 
Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from Kosovo” (2000) 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1743; Walter 
Gary Sharp, “Operation Allied Force: Reviewing the Lawfulness of NATO’s Use of Military 
Force to Protect Kosovo” (1999) 23 Md. J. Int’l L. & Trade 295; “Editorial Comments: NATO’s 
Kosovo Intervention” (1999) 93 AJIL 824. In the description of the events in Kosovo I do not 
take either pro-Albanian or pro-Serb side. My goal here is briefly summarize the facts of the 
conflict as they were presented by different authors.
80 For a flow chart of the major events, see Appendix 1.
81 The significance of Kosovo for the Serb history is seen first of all in the battle between the Serb 
knights and the Ottoman Turks that took place in Kosovo Polje on 28 June 1389. The loss of the 
battle led to the establishment of the Ottoman Turk rule over the Balkans. Serbs viewed the 
collapse of the Serb medieval state as one of the central events in their history and found its 
explanation in the Battle of Kosovo. “The epic cycle of Kosovo became the longest, most 
beautiful and most important of all the Serbian epics. These epic myths ... become 
institutionalized as a part of the ...Serbian national programme.” See, Vickers, supra note 78 at 
12-15.
82 M. Smith, Kosovo: Background and Chronology, online: Federation of American Scientists 
Homepage http://www.fas.org/man/dod-10 l/ops/docs99/g72-mas-compl.htm (date accessed: 20 
January 2001).
83 Judah, supra note 78 at 313.
84 Smith, supra note 82.
85 After World War Q the Yugoslav government suppressed Kosovo Albanians in many ways. 
The land of Albanian farmers was given to numerous Serbian and Montenegrin families, which 
were encouraged to settle in Kosovo. Albanians were discriminated in employment. Very few
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In 1981-82 a series of riots calling for “unified Albania” and “Kosovo Republic” 
shook the Province.87 The riots were often accompanied by abusive actions against Serbs 
and Montenegrins, including beatings and the destruction of property. At that point, 
Milosevic exploited the general instability in the Province and the growing concerns of 
Serbs about their position in Kosovo to increase his popularity among the Serb 
population. He expressed strong support for the Serbs of Kosovo and willingness to help 
in fighting “Albanization,”88 what gained him wide support among Serbs.
After becoming a Serb president in 1989, Milosevic supported a series of 
measures to limit Kosovo autonomy. The abolition of the Kosovo autonomy started with 
the amendments to the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia in March 1989.89 
The same month, the work of the Kosovo Executive Council and the Kosovo Assembly 
was suspended. In July 1990 the Serb National Assembly took administrative and 
executive control over the Province.90 In September 1990 the process of abolishing the de 
jure and de facto Kosovo autonomy was completed with the adoption of a new Serb 
Constitution, which defined Kosovo as a region within Serbia.
Seeking to reinforce control over Kosovo, the Serb government used various 
means of oppression against the Albanian population, ranging from firing Albanians from 
public sector positions and reducing funding for Kosovo public institutions to arrests, 
beatings and other forms of intimidation. In turn, the Kosovars refused to recognize the 
legitimacy of the Serb direct rule over Kosovo. They formed parallel political, economic 
and social institutions, including a shadow government, political parties, schools, trade 
unions and hospitals.91 The Kosovars managed to create a highly coordinated system of
schools and educational and cultural institutions provided instruction in Albanian. See, 
Expulsions o f Albanians and Colonization o f Kosova, online: <
http://www.ess.uwe.ac.Uk/Kosovo/chap3.htm#n4> (date accessed: I August 2001)
86 Vickers, supra note 78 at 223.
87 Ibid., at 198.
88 Vickers, supra note 78 at 229.
89 Ibid., at 234.
90 Ibid., at 245.
91 Ibid.
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institutions, which provided for nearly all services “except for their own army and 
garbage collection.”92
In 1991 the Kosovo shadow parliament proclaimed Kosovo independence, which 
was further supported on a secret referendum by 99.87% of the eligible voters.93 In the 
1992 parliamentary and presidential elections to the Kosovo parallel structures, the 
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) - one of the central actors of the Albanian 
opposition - won the majority of votes. The movement’s leader Rugova was elected the 
president of Kosovo.
During 1992-1994, the Serb oppression over Kosovo grew. Rugova’s policy of 
peaceful resistance and reliance on the international support failed to change the situation. 
His tactics were challenged by more radical members of the Kosovo community, who 
advocated armed resistance to the Serb administration. Among them was the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA), which adopted an aggressive policy of attacking the Serb police 
and security forces and assassinating Serb officials. Quickly gaining support among the 
population, the KLA soon became a force equally important to the LDK. By 1998 it 
controlled about 25-30 percent of the Province’s territory.94 After the Serb withdrawal from 
Kosovo in 1999 the KLA assumed de facto authority in many Kosovo municipalities93 and 
continued to play an active role in Kosovo political life after the deployment of the UNMIK.
Due to popular support, well-developed structures and substantial financial 
resources, the KLA-tied organizations and the LDK remain the most influential political 
entities in Kosovo. They played a central role in the self-government structures created by 
the UNMIK and led over other political parties during the 2000 municipal elections. A 
detailed discussion of these issues is to follow in Chapter III.
The year 1998 was marked by intensified violence from both the Serb and Kosovar 
sides. The strengthened KLA undertook several massive operations against the Serb police.
92 Julie Mertus, “Nationalism and Nation-Building: Milosevic Turns to Montenegro and Kosovo” 
(1994) 26 NYU J. Int’l L. & P. 511 at 519.
93 Vickers, supra note 78 at 251.
94 Assessment o f the Situation o f Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, OSCE Report, September 2000, at 
3, online: OSCE Homepage http://www.osce.org/kosovo/publications/pdf/mibrep.pdf (date 
accessed: 12 February 2001).
95 October 28, 2000 -- Municipal Elections in Kosovo: A Human Rights Watch Backgrounder, 
Human Rights Watch Report, November 2000, online: Human Rights Watch Homepage 
www .hrw.org/press/2000/10/kosovo1020-bck.htm (date accessed: 10 February 2001).
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In response, the Serb security forces conducted a series of raids against Albanians in the 
Drenica region. Later on, numerous battles for effective control over the parts of Kosovo 
arose between the Serb and Yugoslav troops and the KLA. The conflict was turning into a 
guerrilla war.96 The victims of clashes between the KLA and the security forces have 
commonly been the civilian population.97 Thousands of Kosovars, frightened by the 
escalating hostilities, poured into neighbouring Albania and Montenegro. According to the 
UNHCR report, in the beginning of 1998 about 350,000 people were displaced or fled 
abroad.98
Increased violence and intensive flows of refugees from Kosovo raised concerns 
within the international community about stability in the Balkan region. In 1998 the Security 
Council adopted three resolutions on the situation in Kosovo. The first one, Resolution 
116099 of March 1998, condemned the excessive use of force by the Serb police against 
civilians in Kosovo and the terrorist acts of the KLA. It called for an immediate dialogue 
between the Belgrade authorities and the Kosovo Albanian community and imposed an arms 
embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), including Kosovo.100 The situation, 
however, continued to worsen. In September 1998 the Security Council, concerned with the 
increased fighting and mass flow of refugees from Kosovo, adopted Resolution 1199.101 It 
demanded withdrawal of the FRY security forces from the Province. NATO was ready for 
air strikes if the FRY failed to comply with the demands of the Security Council. On 4 
October 1998 Milosevic claimed that he was withdrawing his forces from Kosovo. Several 
days later, after negotiations with the US envoy Richard Holbrooke, Milosevic made further
96 Focus on Kosovo: A Timeline o f Tension, online: CNN Homepage <
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1998/1O/kosovo/timeline/#1998 > (date accessed: 3 March 
2001).
97 German Foreign Office Report on Kosovo (November 1998), online: Balkania Homepage < 
wysiwyg://5/http://raembers.tripod.com/Balkania/resources/history/gfo_report.html > (date 
accessed: 4 July 2001).
98 Refugees Magazine, issue 116, 1999, UNHCR publications, online: UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees Homepage < http://www.unhcr.ch/pubs/rml 16/rml 1603.htm > (date accessed: 4 
July 2001).
99 Security Council Resolution 1160, S/RES/1160 (1998), online: United Nations Homepage 
http://www.un.orp/Docs/scres/1998/sres 1160.htm (date accessed: 12 March 2001).
100 Security Council Resolution 1160, supra note 99, para. 4 & 8.
101 Security Council Resolution 1199, S/RES/1199 (1998), online: United Nations Homepage 
http://www.un.orp/Docs/scres/1998/sres 1199 .htm (date accessed: 12 March 2001).
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concessions. He gave his consent to the deployment of the OSCE Kosovo Verification 
Mission (KVM) and of a NATO-led aerial observer mission.102
Soon it appeared that, in breach of the requirements of SCR 1199, not all Serb forces 
left Kosovo and even some new troops were deployed there. On 24 October 1998, the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1203 where it determined that the situation in Kosovo 
constituted a threat to international peace and security and demanded the FRY to comply 
with the previous resolutions.103 The same day the Supreme Allied Commander Wesley 
Clark and the NATO Military Committee Chairman Klaus Naumann warned Milosevic that 
NATO would launch air strikes unless Serb troops were withdrawn from Kosovo by October 
27. The threat was suspended after Milosevic started withdrawal of the Yugoslav troops.
A series of international diplomatic efforts that followed in November-December 
1998 failed to promote the FRY - Kosovo Albanian dialogue. The situation deteriorated after 
the massacre of 40 unarmed Kosovo Albanian civilians in the village of Racak on IS 
January 1999.104 Seeing that fighting in Kosovo continued, the six-nation Contact Group105 
started peace talks with the Serb and Albanian leaders in Rambouillet (France) in February 
1999. The talks lasted for 17 days with a follow-on session in Paris in mid-March. The 
negotiations broke down on March 19 after the refusal of the Serb delegation to sign an 
agreement.
On 24 March 1999, following the Serb rejection of a diplomatic solution, NATO 
launched a 78-day air strike campaign against the FRY. Throughout the period of the NATO 
air strikes the international community continued its diplomatic efforts to resolve the 
Kosovo crisis. In May 1999 the Group of Eight worked out principles for the settlement of 
the conflict, which the FRY accepted on June 3. On June 9 the Military Technical 
Agreement, concerning the deployment of the international security presence and the FRY
102 Smith, supra note 82.
103 Security Council Resolution 1203, S/RES/1203 (1998), online: United Nations Homepage 
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/sres 1203 htm (date accessed: 12 March 2001).
104 More than 40 ethnic Albanians were executed by the Serb police in Racak. For more details, 
see Massacre in Kosovo, 19 January 1999, online: BBC Homepage <
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid 256000/256364.stm > (date accessed: 8 
August 2001).
105 The Contact Group included France, Germany, Italy, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, 
and the United States. See, Stefan Toebst, Conflict in Kosovo: Failure o f Prevention? An 
Analytical Documentation, 1992-1998, online: European Centre for Minority Issues Homepage,
< http://www.ecmi.de/doc/download/working paper 1-pdf > (date accessed: 3 August 2001).
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withdrawal from Kosovo was signed by both the FRY and NATO. The next day the NATO 
air strikes were suspended. On June 10 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1244106 
based on the G-8 principles for the settlement of the conflict and drafted by the G-8 foreign 
ministers.
The deployment of the international security presence started on June 13. On June 
20 the Special Representative ad interim -  a temporary head of the international civil 
presence - Sergio Vieira de Mello, arrived in Kosovo.
The deployment of the international presence took place under difficult 
circumstances. Public service structures, including schools, telephone communication, 
public transport were largely inoperable.107 Many Kosovo municipalities suffered from 
the shortage of water and electricity. Kosovo’s industry and agriculture were seriously 
debilitated during the conflict. The payments system and financial sector did not function. 
Commercial activity was not likely to be revived in a short term because of instability, 
lack of financial resources and other impediments.108
In sum, the political, economic and humanitarian situation in Kosovo after the 
bombing was disastrous. The economy and infrastructure were seriously damaged. The 
state institutions, including courts, law enforcement and security forces, were inoperable.
In the circumstances of a security vacuum, local military and political forces were 
competing to expand their de facto control over the Kosovo territory. An additional 
challenge for the international community was the absence of sufficient previous 
experience in post-conflict rehabilitation109 and the lack of a clear peace-building strategy 
that could be readily applied in Kosovo.
These circumstances should be kept in mind during the analysis of the overall 
effectiveness of the UNMIK activities. The difficulty of the situation is not a justification 
for mistakes of the UNMIK mission; but it is a vital factor in determining whether an
106 Security Council Resolution 1244, S/RES/1244 (1999), online: United Nations Homepage 
<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/l999/sresl244.html> (date accessed: 16 September 2000).
107 Report o f the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo, S/1999/779, 12 July 1999, para. 44, online: United Nations Homepage at 7 (date 
accessed: 12 November 2000) [hereinafter Report o f the Secretary-General o f 12 July 1999].
108 Ibid., para. 16 at 4.
109 The missions in, for example, Somalia and Bosnia involved many of the issues dealt with in 
Kosovo, but the tasks of those missions were not that comprehensive.
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intervention was worthwhile, and whether the mission provided significant improvement 
in public and private life of the local population.110
2. Security Council Resolution 1244
Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1244 is the main source of authority for the 
international civil and security presence in Kosovo. Adopted on 10 June 1999, after the 
cessation of the NATO bombing, the Resolution outlines immediate measures for the 
improvement of the situation in Kosovo, as well as long-term measures for the future 
development of Kosovo. The Security Council determined the situation in Kosovo as 
continuing to constitute a threat to international peace and security and authorized the 
employment of measures under Chapter VII.111 Those measures included the deployment 
of the international security and international civil presence. The Resolution recognized 
the necessity for “substantial autonomy and meaningful self-determination for 
Kosovo.”112 At the same time, it reaffirmed the commitment of the UN Member states to 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY.113
The Resolution is based on a statement of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign 
Ministers on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis and the principles for resolution of 
the Kosovo crisis accepted by Belgrade on June 3, 1999. (These documents are included 
in the Resolution, as Annexes 1 and 2 respectively.) The Resolution reaffirmed the 
consent of the FRY to the principles for the resolution of the Kosovo crisis, namely, the 
withdrawal of the FRY from Kosovo, the deployment of the international security and 
civil presence and the transfer of the authority over the Province to the international 
transitional administration. It appears that the primary authority for the establishment of 
an international administration and the obligation of the FRY for withdrawal steins not 
from SCR 1244, but from the principles for resolution of the Kosovo crisis, which the 
FRY accepted on June 3, 1999.114 At the same time, in relation to other UN Member
110 A detailed assessment of these issues is to follow in Chapters III and IV.
111 Security Council Resolution 1244, supra note 106, preamble.
112 Ibid
113 Ibid.
114 According to Article 25 of the UN Charter, the UN Members are obliged to accept and carry 
out the decisions of the Security Council. At the time of the issuance of SCR 1244, the FRY was
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States and international organizations, SCR 1244 is a source of an obligation to assist in 
post-conflict reconstruction. The resolution is also the primary source for the mandate of 
a peace-building mission.
This example points out the distinction between the sources of obligations of a 
host state, obligations of the UN Member States and the source of the peace-building 
mission’s mandate. Each of the sources will be further discussed during the analysis of 
the general legal basis for peace-building in Section B.
SCR 1244 clearly separated the civil and security components of the international 
mission.115 The international security presence known as the Kosovo Force (KFOR) is 
led by NATO. It was entrusted with monitoring the cease-fire, ensuring withdrawal of the 
Serb forces from Kosovo, demilitarization of the KLA, ensuring public safety until the 
international civil presence could take responsibility for this task, etc.116
The international civil presence is structured in a form of an interim 
administration “under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy”117 
within the FRY. The Secretary-General and relevant international organizations118 were 
put in charge of establishing the international civil presence. The civil presence has broad 
responsibilities in political, economic and humanitarian spheres. In particular, they 
include promotion of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, general 
administration of the Province, economic reconstruction, maintaining law and order, 
promoting human rights, assuring safe return of refugees, etc.119 The administration is 
headed by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG).
To sum up, SCR 1244 played the following important functions in relation to the 
exercise of peace-building in Kosovo: 1) it reaffirmed the FRY’s obligation to withdraw 
from Kosovo and its consent to the international deployment. These two created
not a member of the United Nations and, thus was not clearly bound by the requirements of SCR 
1244.
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was admitted as a member of the United Nations by General 
Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/12 of 1 November 2000, online: United Nations Homepage 
http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html (date accessed: 28 January 2001).
115 No such distinction was drawn in either An Agenda for Peace, the Supplement to An Agenda 
for Peace or the Brahimi Report.
116 Security Council Resolution 1244, supra note 106, para. 9.
117 Security Council Resolution 1244, supra note 106, para 10.
118 The Resolution does not specify which organizations participate in this process.
119 Security Council Resolution 1244, supra note 106, para 11.
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necessary preconditions for the establishment of the UNMIK. 2) It created the obligations 
of the UN Member States in relation to the Kosovo reconstruction, thus, providing the 
basis for the comprehensive international involvement in the Province. 3) It outlined the 
mandate of the international civil and security presence, which served as a starting point 
for the international reconstruction of Kosovo.
3. Competence o f the UNMIK
SCR 1244 has set basic tasks and guidelines for the international action in 
Kosovo. The practical method of implementing SCR 1244 was outlined by the UN 
Secretary-General in the Report to the Security Council on July 12, 1999. The Report 
provided a working plan for the international administration in Kosovo. In particular, it 
set out the UNMIK structure; outlined the competencies of the administration as a whole 
as well as of its pillars; and defined the stages for the implementation of the UNMIK 
mandate.
The definition of all these elements required interpretation of SCR 1244 by the 
UN Secretary-General. In certain respects, he interpreted the Resolution’s provisions very 
broadly. For example, the Report expressly stated that all the legislative and executive 
power, as well as the authority to administer the judiciary, is vested with the UNMIK. In 
contrast, SCR 1244 refers to the competence of the international civil administration in 
more vague terms: “providing] transitional administration,” “establishing and overseeing 
the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions.” The Resolution 
did not specifically mention what powers an international administration would have and 
how it would provide transitional administration. Thus, it is questionable whether the 
Security Council meant to confer the full legislative and executive authority on the 
UNMIK.
Another example of the broad interpretation of SCR 1244 is the definition of the 
authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). According to 
the Report, all the authority vested with die UNMIK is exercised by the SRSG.120 All
120 SCR 1244 does not contain any reference to the SRSG as the main official in Kosovo. In this 
respect, the Secretary-General followed the framework for peace-building missions suggested in 
the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: “In a country ruined by war,... the [UN] programmes, 
funds, offices and agencies... gradually take over responsibility from the peace-keepers, with the
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major legislative and executive powers -  to issue legislative acts, change, repeal or 
suspend existing laws and to appoint and remove any official of the international 
administration - are concentrated in the hands of the SRSG. In addition to that, the SRSG 
is the final authority to interpret SCR 1244.121 This gives him almost unlimited power 
over the Province.
The broad interpretation of SCR 1244 by the Secretary-General is somewhat 
problematic. The question is two-fold: the authority of the Secretary-General to provide 
the interpretation of Security Council Resolutions; and the limits of such interpretation 
(how broad it can be). A certain prototype for the role of the Secretary-General in 
interpreting SCR 1244 may be derived from the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, 
which proposes the transfer of decision-making power from the Security Council to the 
General Assembly or other inter-governmental organization.122 Still, even this provision 
cannot be considered a sufficient basis for the concentration of authority for the 
interpretation within a unilateral body like the Secretary-General.
The limits of the interpretation can be defined by balancing the considerations of 
practicality and legitimacy. On the one hand, SCR 1244 does not provide sufficient 
details about the institutional organization of the mission and the division of power 
between its elements. Then, from practical point of view, a detailed interpretation of the 
Resolution’s provisions is necessary for the effective implementation of the UNMIK 
mandate. On the other hand, extensive interpretation by the Secretary-General can be 
viewed as substituting the legislative authority of the Security Council and developing the 
Resolution’s provisions beyond their original meaning and, thus, lacking legitimacy. The 
question of legitimacy becomes important in two respects: 1) the interpretation of the 
Secretary-General provided the basis for the UNMIK structure, division of powers among
resident coordinator in due course assuming the coordination functions temporarily entrusted to 
the special representative of the Secretary-General.” See, ibid.
According to the Report of 12 July 1999, "the Special Representative of the Secretary-General as 
the head of UNMIK, is the highest international civilian official in Kosovo. He will enjoy the 
maximum civilian executive powers envisaged and vested in him by the Security Council in its 
resolution 1244 (1999), and will also be the final authority on their interpretation.. . . ,  the Special 
Representative will facilitate a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, 
taking into account the Rambouillet accords." See, Report o f the Secretary-General o f 12 July 
1999, supra note 107.
121 Ibid., para 44 at 8.
122 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, supra, note 5, para. 54.
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the pillars, timeline for the reconstruction, etc. and, thus the legitimacy of that 
interpretation affects the legitimacy of the very UNMIK; 2) whether such a pattern of the 
Secretary-General’s interpretation should be followed in regard to the future peace­
building missions.
4. The UNMIK structure
Peace-building is a multidimensional activity which includes humanitarian 
assistance, democratization, economic reconstruction, etc. Even such a well-developed 
organization as the UN cannot manage all the tasks of peace-building alone. Bearing in 
mind that “regional entities can enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN 
efforts for peace,”123 several organizations were united under the UNMIK framework to 
carry out their activities in Kosovo in “...an integrated manner with a clear chain of 
command.”124
The structure of the UNMIK was defined by the Report of the UN Secretary- 
General of 12 July 1999. According to it, the UNMIK comprises four major components 
(or pillars). Each is responsible for a particular area of reconstruction: the UN -  for civil 
administration; the UNHCR -  for humanitarian assistance; the OSCE -  for institution- 
building; the EU -  for economic reconstruction. Each pillar is divided into a number of 
functional elements.
The civil administration led by the UN has three divisions:
1) public administration -  responsible for the establishment of multi-ethnic 
governmental structures;
2) police (Kosovo Police Service) - responsible for law and order,
3) judicial affairs division -  entrusted with the re-establishment of the 
Kosovo judiciary.125
The responsibilities of the institution-building pillar (the OSCE) are divided into 
three major categories -  democratization and institution building, elections, and human
123 Report o f the Secretary-General o f 12 July 1999, supra note 107.
124 Ibid., para. 43.
Ibid., para. 55-78. The responsibilities of the judicial affairs division and of the UNMIK Police 
will be discussed in Chapter IV.
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rights.126 The tasks of the pillar are distributed among five divisions: Police Training and 
Education, Democratization, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Media Affairs and
17 7Elections. The Democratization and Elections divisions are responsible for the 
promotion of citizens’ involvement in social and political life in Kosovo and the 
development of self-government. The Human Rights division monitors the human rights 
situation in Kosovo. The Rule of Law segment provides logistical and material support to 
courts. The Media Affairs department assists in the development of professional and 
independent media.
The humanitarian component of the UNMIK, led by the UNHCR, includes 
divisions responsible for the provision of humanitarian assistance and mine action. It is 
primarily responsible for providing shelter, food and medical assistance to returnees and 
coordination of mine support action in Kosovo.128
The European Union is the key player in the UNMIK economic reconstruction. 
The EU is responsible for planning the reconstruction of Kosovo, preparing economic 
policies and coordinating the activities of various donors and international financial 
institutions working in Kosovo.129
The interrelation between the UNMIK components is characterized by both 
cooperation and independence of the pillars. Structurally and in terms of resources and 
responsibilities, the pillars maintain substantial independence. This tendency may be 
observed, for example, the representation of the pillars in Kosovo municipalities. In the 
municipalities, the UNMIK is represented not as a single entity, but as a network of the 
offices of its pillars (See, Table 1).
At the same time, the idea behind the establishment of the UNMIK was to 
increase the effectiveness of peace-building through uniting the resources and expertise 
of various organizations. These organizations reinforce their activities through 
cooperation. For example, the OSCE Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law is a 
key player in the Task Force on Minorities established by the UNHCR and the Task
126 Ibid., para. 79.
127 Annual Report on OSCE Activities (2000), online: OSCE Homepage
http://www.osce.org/docs/english/misc/anrepOOe activ.htm#Anchor-1.-41834 (date accessed: 8 
April 2001).
1 Report o f the Secretary-General o f 12 July 1999, supra note 107, para. 92-100.
129 Ibid., para. 107.
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Force on Juvenile Justice established by the UNICEF.130 The Rule of Law division 
maintains intensive contacts with the Administrative Department of Justice of the UN-led 
Civil Administration, which is responsible for the overall management of the judicial 
system and correctional service. The OSCE Human Rights division has a unique position 
in relation to Pillar II -  the Civil Administration. Being structurally a part of the UNMIK, 
the mandate of Human Rights division includes a quasi-independent authority to monitor 
the observation of human rights in Kosovo, including the judicial system administered by 
Pillar II.131 In particular, the OSCE legal system monitoring mandate includes a 
responsibility to report on:
- the current statistics relating to the criminal justice system;
- systematic violations of international law;
- gross violations of fair trial standards in individual cases that must be 
immediately remedied.132
The extensiveness of the activities of the pillars in the municipalities differs. 
Table 1 demonstrates that the UN Civil Administration and the OSCE Pillar, which have 
offices in every municipality, are likely to be more involved in managing the municipal 
affairs comparing to the UNHCR or the EU. This may be seen as a sign of the currently 
leading role of the UN-led and the OSCE-led pillars in the UNMIK framework.
Table 1. UNMIK Pillars
Municipality UN Civil OSCE UNHCR EU
Administratio
n
130 Kosovo: A Review o f the Criminal Justice System, OSCE Report, February -  July 2000, at 6, 
online: OSCE Homepage <
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/iustice/criminal iustice.pdf > (date accessed: 3 
February 2001) [hereinafter A Review o f the Criminal Justice System].
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
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Source: Profiles of Kosovo Municipalities (2000), online: OSCE Homepage 
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/municipal profiles/ (date accessed: 12 
May 2001).
A certain amount of criticism has been expressed in relation to the involvement of 
many international organizations in the exercise of administration in Kosovo. For 
example, Ruth Wedgwood and Harold Jacobson view a “hodgepodge of international 
agencies”133 involved in reconstruction as one of the factors adding to the UNMIK 
disability in post-conflict reconciliation. “The overlay of redundant officials, the rate- 
limiting pace of the most laggard political process, the ability to play one agency against 
the other, and the absence of singular responsibility for the mission, all conspire to hobble 
the project of reconstruction.”134 At this point we do not have enough information to 
assess whether the involvement of many agencies is actually effective or not. The 
expressed criticism apparently is rational and will be relevant to later discussion about the 
motives for the involvement of international organizations and states in peace-building.
133 Ruth Wedgwood & Harold K. Jacobson, “Symposium: State Reconstruction After Civil 
Conflict” (2001) 95 AJIL I at 2.
134 Wedgwood & Jacobson, supra note 133 at 3.
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Interim conclusion
The information presented in the preceding sections is sufficient to permit 
preliminary conclusions about the conformity of the UNMIK’s structure with the 
characteristics of peace-building identified in Chapter I. This analysis will be further 
expanded in the next section.
First, comprehensive character. The UNMIK was entrusted with wide range of 
varying tasks in all spheres of public life what confirms the comprehensive character of 
this undertaking.
Second, institution-building as one of the essential tasks. SCR 1244 expressly 
included the development of self-government (which implies creation of a particular 
institutional structure) as the purpose of the UNMIK. Moreover, the OSCE (also called 
the Institution-building pillar) was entrusted with institution-building in Kosovo. The 
large scale of UNMIK activities necessarily presupposes the transformation of the 
Kosovo government and society.
Third, close cooperation between peace-builders and local parties. Such 
cooperation is not only intended, but required by SCR 1244.135 Numerous UNMIK 
arrangements, including creation of the mixed Kosovar-intemational organs, serve as 
evidence of the actual realization of this principle by the UNMIK.
Fourth, close connection with peacekeeping. There was no UN peacekeeping 
force in Kosovo before the deployment of the UNMIK, thus, no interrelation between 
peacekeepers and peace-builders could take place. I will return to the discussion about the 
rationality of the interrelation between peacekeeping and peace-building in the next 
section.
The Supplement to An Agenda for Peace provided that if no peacekeeping 
mission was previously established, a peace-building mission should be initiated by the 
Secretary-General. In contrast, in Kosovo the Secretary-General did not take the initiative 
for the establishment of the mission, but later he assumed a leading role in the
135 For example, SCR 1244 reads that the UNMIK “will provide transitional administration while 
establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing 
institutions.” Such a formulation presupposes participation of the local parties in democracy- 
building. Further, the UNMIK Regulation on the Establishment of the Joint Interim 
Administrative Structure expressly reaffirms the participation of local parties in the provincial 
administration.
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development of the UNMIK structure and allocation of the competencies between the 
UNMIK pillars. As mentioned before, the central controversy surrounding the role of the 
Secretary-General in the interpretation of SCR 1244 lies between practicality and 
legitimacy. From a practical perspective, it is convenient to spell out only the core 
functions of the international presence in the Security Council Resolution and to leave the 
job of adjusting the powers for their practical implementation to the Secretary-General. 
Such an approach permits the successful achievement of short-term goals -to  define the 
responsible organizations quickly and to establish their tasks and framework under which 
they work. This, in turn, leads to a more rapid deployment and allows an immediate start 
of relief activities. However, the reverse side of such an interpretation is the problem of 
its legitimacy and its long-term impact on peace-building. An Agenda for Peace, the 
Supplement and the Brahimi Report are silent about the role of the Secretary-General in 
interpreting the Security Council resolutions. The only relevant provision is contained in 
the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, which proposes the transfer of decision-making 
authority to the General Assembly or other intergovernmental organ. This provision 
shows intent to transfer the authority to a collective organ only. Then, the Secretary- 
General as a unilateral organ does not have enough legitimacy to assume any decision­
making powers, including the interpretation of Security Council Resolutions, which 
serves the basis for the activities of a peace-building mission.
For me, legitimacy is a practical problem because it affects the long-term results 
of peace-building. The opinion of the local population about the international activities 
and re-established institutions as legitimate increases the chances that people will, first, 
support international activities during the first years of reconstruction and, second, that 
the population and its leaders will maintain the established structures after the withdrawal 
of the international presence. In a global perspective, the legitimacy of the international 
mission in Kosovo influences the future willingness of states to intervene in post-conflict 
zones and of host states to allow peace-building interventions. For this reason, I consider 
it necessary to examine the moral issues of peace-building (including legitimacy) in more 
detail in the next section.
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B. Issues off Peace-building
Due to its comprehensive nature, peace-building penetrates into the very 
foundations of a post-conflict society, attempting to transform its inside characteristics. 
The dramatic character of such transformation and its interventionist nature raises a 
number of legal, moral and practical concerns about peace-building.
The legal issues include the legal basis for the establishment of international 
administrations; the correlation of their establishment with the principle of state 
sovereignty; and the scope of authority that such administrations may assume. The moral 
aspect of peace-building touches upon the legitimacy of implementing “Western” ideas 
of democracy in post-conflict societies. The practical issues include assessing the 
correlation of the goals set for peace-building missions, the means chosen for their 
achievement and the results reached.
The section below briefly addresses the legal and moral issues. The practical 
problems of peace-building are considered in detail in Chapters 01 and IV, which 
describe the role of the UNMIK in the organization of elections and judicial reform.
1. Legal Issues
The discussion of the legal basis for peace-building includes four core issues. 
First, what is the general legal basis for peace-building?136 Second, does the UN have 
adequate authority to establish international administrations, like the one in Kosovo? 
Third, what is the place of peace-building on the scale of peace operations? Fourth, are 
there any limitations on the participation of regional organizations in peace-building?
Ideally, these issues should be addressed in the peace-building concept. However, 
as mentioned, the concept remains quite vague. Some of the mentioned issues were 
addressed in passing in An Agenda for Peace and the Supplement to An Agenda for 
Peace, but many issues of the legal basis of peace-building in particular those concerning 
the host state’s consent, the neutrality of peace-builders, and the scope of military 
powers, remain unresolved. The discussion below suggests some answers to these 
questions.
136 Please, differentiate the legal basis for peace-building from the peace-building concept 
discussed in Chapter I.
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a. General legal basis 
The UN Charter does not contain any express reference to peace-building. Similar 
to peacekeeping,137 the concept of peace-building was developed through the initiatives 
of the UN Secretary-General138 and subsequent UN practice. The definition of peace­
building and its elements can be found in An Agenda for Peace, the Supplement to An 
Agenda for Peace, and the Brahimi Report.139 These documents, however, do not provide 
any guidance about the procedural side of authorizing peace-building or the permissible 
scope of peace-building missions.140 The Supplement to An Agenda for Peace only 
mentions that the Secretary-General should seek the government’s consent to the 
deployment of a peace-building mission if no peacekeeping mission has been deployed in 
that zone before. An Agenda for Peace indicates the necessity for close cooperation 
between peace-builders and local parties.
The few examples of peace-building (e.g., Kosovo, Bosnia, East Timor) and 
quasi-peace-building missions (e.g., Cambodia141 and Somalia142) point out several
137 One of the first resolutions authorizing peacekeeping in the Congo in 1960 did not identify any 
particular Article of the UN Charter as the basis for the peacekeeping deployment. Secretary- 
General Dag Hammarskjold considered Article 40 to be the basis for such operations. See, Letter 
o f from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President o f the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 
15th Sess., 1920lh mtg at 1, U.N. Doc. S/4381 (1960).
138 Here, I mean through his initiative to develop a concept of peace-building in An Agenda for 
Peace and the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace.
139 See, Chapter I.
140 Even if they did, neither An Agenda for Peace, nor the Supplement nor the Brahimi Report 
have sufficient authority to be a source of power for the UN organs.
141 The establishment of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was based on 
both state’s consent and Security Council authorization. According to the Agreement on a 
Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, the Cambodian parties agreed on 
the principles for the settlement of the Cambodia conflict. In particular, the Agreement provided 
for the delegation of powers to the UNTAC, which could exercise civil and military functions in 
the country. These provisions of the Agreement were subsequently endorsed by Security Council 
Resolution 668 (1990). See, Peace Agreements Digital Collection: Cambodia, online: US Institute 
for Peace Homepage http://www.usip.org/librarv/pa/index/pa cambodia.html (date accessed: 31 
July, 2001).
142 In contrast to Cambodia, the deployment of the United Nations Operations in Somalia II 
(UNOSOM II) was primarily based on Security Council authority under Chapter VII. Based on 
the presumption that there was no sovereign authority in Somalia, SCR 814 (1993) specified the 
extent of the UNOSOM nation-building mandate. For more information on the Somalia 
operations, see Michael J. Kelly, Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace Operation: 
The Search for a Legal Framework (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999); Sean D. 
Murphy, “The Security Council, Legitimacy, and the Concept of Collective Security After the 
Cold War” (1994) 32 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 201 at 231.
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possible sources of authority for the establishment of international administrations: the 
authorization of the Security Council under Chapter VII or state’s consent to intervention, 
or the combination of the two.143
State’s consent and Security Council authorization are mutually complementary. 
A Security Council resolution creates a legal basis for a peace-building mission. A host 
state’s consent to the establishment of a peace-building mission provides preconditions 
for potentially more legitimate and successful (due to the cooperation of the local 
authorities) peace-building. As evidenced from the practice of the above mentioned 
missions, a state's consent may be expressed through signing peace accords between the 
parties to an internal conflict,144 or through acceptance of the principles for the settlement 
of a conflict proposed by an international community.145
b. The UN authority to establish an international administration 
The power of the Security Council to authorize actions to restore and maintain 
international peace and security is derived from Article 39 of the UN Charter. According 
to it, the Security Council has the authority to “...determine the existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’’146 and decide on measures to be 
taken to restore and maintain peace and security. In the Lockerbie decision (provisional 
measures order of April 14, 1992) Judge Weeramantry stated that it is only for the 
Security Council to judge on the existence of the circumstances, which “bring Chapter 
VII into operation.”147 Moreover, there is nothing in the UN Charter that suggests that the
143 From the point of view of state sovereignty, both state’s consent and enforcement action, are 
legitimate bases for the exception to the principle of state sovereignty and non-interference. 
According to Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, the UN is prohibited from intervening in essentially 
domestic affairs of states, except in application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
144 Sonia Han, "Building a Peace that Lasts: The United Nations and Post-civil War Peace- 
Building" (1994) 26 NYU J. Int'l L. & P. 837 at 884.
145 One can argue about the voluntary character of such consent Often the host state has to agree 
to the proposed solution under the pressure from the international community. For example, the 
FRY was under political, economic and military pressure to give consent to the principles for the 
resolution of the Kosovo crisis. Moreover, the principles for the resolution of the Kosovo crisis 
were drafted by the by the G-8 foreign ministers without the participation of the FRY.
146 Charter o f the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No.7, art.39.
147 Questions o f Interpretation and Application o f the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from an 
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States), Order of 14 April 1992,
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decision of the Security Council can be reviewed by any other body, including the 
International Court of Justice.148
Being initially intended for international conflicts, the notion of threat to peace 
has been gradually extended to capture internal conflicts that are deemed to constitute 
threats to the peace. As the ICTY stated in the Tadic decision, "it can thus be said that 
there is a common understanding, manifested by the "subsequent practice" of the 
membership of the United Nations at large, that the "threat to the peace" of Article 39 
may include, as one of its species, internal armed conflicts.”149
In the last decades the Security Council has used its power under Chapter VII in 
relation to many essentially internal conflicts. The circumstances leading to the 
determination of the threat to peace have varied from an aggravating humanitarian 
catastrophe130 to the continuing escalation of human rights violations and mass flow of 
refugees from a conflict zone.151
Having determined the existence of the threat to peace and security, the Security 
Council can authorize measures to restore and maintain peace in accordance with Articles
41 and 42. Article 41 defines measures “not involving the use of armed force."152 Article
42 prescribes other actions involving the use of air, sea or land forces. Neither Article 41 
nor Article 42 includes the establishment of an international administration as one of the 
suggested measures.
In the Tadic decision on the appeals of jurisdiction, the ICTY addressed the issue 
whether the Security Council is bound to employ only measures expressly provided in 
Articles 41 and 42. The Tribunal admitted that the Security Council has very broad 
powers under Chapter VII (Articles 41 and 42). “These two Articles leave to the Security 
Council such a wide choice as not to warrant searching, on functional or other grounds,
online: ICJ Homepage <http://www.icj-
cii.org/iciwww/idecisions/isummaries/ilussummarv920414.htm> (date accessed: 15 July 2001).
1 As Judge Weeramantry put it: “it is not for the court to sit in review on a given resolution of the 
Security Council.” See, ibid.
149 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic. Decision of 2 October 1995, para. 29, online: ICTY Homepage 
http://www.un.org/ictv/ind-e.htm [hereinafter Tadic].
150 Security Council Resolution 794, S/RES/794 (1992), online: United Nations Homepage 
http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1992/s92r794e.pdf (date accessed: 5 June 2001).
131 Security Council Resolution 940, S/RES/940 (1994) online: United Nations Homepage 
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1994/9431222e.htm (date accessed: 5 June 2001).
152 Charter o f the United Nations, supra note 146, art. 41.
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for even wider and more general powers than those already expressly provided for in the 
Charter.”153 The ICTY stated that the measures listed in Article 41 are only illustrative 
examples "which obviously do not exclude other measures.”154 Under this interpretation, 
the establishment of an interim administration will also be within the powers of the 
Security Council under Chapter VU. In fact, the establishment of an international 
administration is not the sole example of the Security Council utilizing the measures not 
expressly provided in Article 41 or 42. Earlier, the Security Council authorized the 
creation of international judicial bodies155 (the ICTY and the ICTR) and the creation of a 
special fund to compensate the victims of the Gulf War.156
c. Peace-building and enforcement action 
Let us now look at how peace-building may be classified on the scale of the 
contemporary peace operations. The distinction between the operations can be drawn 
according to two criteria: legal basis for an operation and actual characteristics of an 
operation. If Security Council authorization were the sole basis for the establishment of a 
peace-building mission, peace-building would, actually, constitute peace enforcement. 
However, we have already seen that at least formally peace-building is partially based on 
state's consent. It is interesting why the international community would seek such 
consent if the Security Council can authorize the establishment of an international 
administration under Chapter VII. I think that the reasons for seeking host state’s consent 
are twofold: first, because peace-building interventions are problematic from the point of 
view of legitimacy (the international community seeks to mitigate this problem by 
obtaining formal state consent); second, because through state consent the international 
community can ensure the cooperation of the local authorities with peace-builders. 
Another question is whether the host state’s consent can actually be regarded as consent. 
In many respects it will be imposed under economic, political or even military pressure.
153 Tadic, supra note 149, para. 31
154 Ibid., para. 32.
135 Security Council Resolution 827, S/RES/827(1993), online: United Nations Homepage 
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993Z827e.pdf (date accessed: 4 June 2001). The Resolution 
authorized the creation of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
136 Security Council Resolution 687, S/RES/687 (1991), online: United Nations Homepage 
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/199 lZ687e.pdf (date accessed: 4 June 2001).
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For example the FRY was exposed to all these kinds of pressure when it agreed to the 
withdrawal and to the international deployment in Kosovo. Moreover, the host state may 
have little say in elaborating the solution to which it consents. Again, in case of the FRY, 
the principles of the political settlement for Kosovo were prepared by the G-8.137 Thus, 
from a formal point of view peace-building is not an enforcement operation because it is 
partially based on state consent, but because of doubtful nature of such “consent” peace­
building, actually, may be equated to peace enforcement.
Let us look at other characteristics of peace-building and its place among peace 
operations. The four types of peace operations (peace-making, peacekeeping, peace 
enforcement and peace-building138) can be differentiated by two characteristics: when 
they take place in time and how intrusive they are on the state sovereignty. Viewed over 
the duration of a conflict, peacemaking and peace-building are located at far ends of a 
conflict. Peacemaking usually takes place before the development of open tension. Post­
conflict peace-building is exercised after the establishment of the initial peace between 
the warring parties. In contrast, peacekeeping and peace enforcement take place during or 
shortly after the end of open hostilities.
Measured by their degree of intrusiveness over state sovereignty, peacemaking 
and peacekeeping are less coercive. Peacemaking “is action to bring hostile parties to 
agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of 
the Charter of the United Nations.”139 Peacekeeping involves the deployment of the UN 
force in a conflict zone. It is based on three core principles: consent of parties, 
impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense.160 In contrast, peace 
enforcement, intended to redress threat to international peace and security or acts of 
aggression, involves coercive military action, to which state consent is not necessary.
Because peace-building missions were often established partially on the basis of 
state consent, peace-building seems to be close to peacekeeping. The UN documents also 
emphasize the close connection between peacekeeping and peace-building. At the same 
time, the other two essential features of peacekeeping -  use of force only in self-defense
137 See, Section A of this Chapter.
158 An Agenda for Peace, supra note I.
139 Ibid., para. 20.
160 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, supra note S, para. 33.
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and impartiality -  are not characteristic of peace-building. First, peace-building mandates 
comprise broad military and police powers, which allow the use of force beyond self- 
defense. For example, the international security presence in Kosovo includes a military 
contingent with broad powers “to take such actions as are required, including the use of 
necessary force, to ensure compliance with this Agreement and protection of the 
international security force ("KFOR'*).”161
Second, peace-builders are not neutral or impartial. They become parties to the 
reconstruction process and pursue post-conflict rehabilitation from the perspective of 
their own values and outlook.162 Peace-building is more coercive than peacekeeping also 
because it includes the temporary transfer of authority from a state to an international 
administration, that is, a significant infringement upon state sovereignty. Thus, judged by 
its legal basis and other characteristics, peace-building comprises elements of both 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
Graphically, the place of peace-building among other peace operations can be 
presented in the following way. (See, illustration below)
Time





Beginning of a conflict peacemaking
Intrusiveness over state sovereignty
Picture 1. Peace-building on the scale of peace operations.
161 Military Technical Agreement, the International Security Presence (“KFOR”) and the 
Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 9 June 1999, 
online: KFOR Homepage http://www.kforonline.com/resources/documents/mta.htm (date 
accessed: 29 April, 2001).
162 This issues falls within the range of moral controversies of peace-building which will be 
discussed in Section B.
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d. Participation o f international organizations in UN authorized
peace-building
As seen from the description of the UNMIK, the UN does not exercise peace­
building alone, but engages other international organizations in reconstruction. We have 
now defined the sources of the UN authority to establish international administrations. 
What is the basis for the participation of other international organizations in peace­
building?
The basis for the participation of international organizations in peace-building 
should be sought in the UN Charter and the constitutive documents of respective 
organizations. The Security Council is likely to use regional arrangements for peace­
building under Article 52 of the UN Charter. In other situations the ability of 
international organizations to participate in peace-building will be primarily defined 
according to whether their constitutive documents provide for such participation. Let us 
briefly review the participation of the OSCE, the EU and NATO163 in peace-building in 
Kosovo.
i. The OSCE
The 1992 Helsinki Summit Document declared the OSCE (the CSCE at that time) 
a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII.164 It also defined the main principles of the 
OSCE participation in peacekeeping.163 In particular, the Helsinki Document expressly 
restricted the OSCE participation in enforcement actions.166
Peace-building occupies an intermediate position between peace enforcement and 
peacekeeping. Because peace-building is more coercive than peacekeeping, it is 
necessary to consider whether there are any limitations on the OSCE participation in such 
operations. As applied to the Kosovo situation, the concrete responsibilities of the OSCE 
as a part of the UNMIK include: organization of elections, promotion of human rights,
163 According to SCR 1244, NATO leads the international security presence in Kosovo (KFOR), 
which is not a part of UNMIK.
164 CSCE Helsinki Document “The Challenges of Change”(1992), para. 25, online: OSCE 
Homepage http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/hels92e.htm (date accessed: 5 
May 2001).
163 Note that none of die OSCE Summit documents expressly refers to peace-building.
166 CSCE Helsinki Document “The Challenges of Change”, supra note 164, ch. IH.
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development of independent media, democratization, etc.167 They do not go beyond the 
main goals of the organization and permissible activities spelled out in the OSCE basic 
documents, that is, conflict management and prevention, human rights, economic 
cooperation and social justice.168 Consequently, the coercive nature of peace-building 
itself does not prevent the OSCE participation in the UNMIK so far as the concrete 
activities of the OSCE are consistent with the organization's goals and principles.
«. The EU and NATO
Unlike the OSCE, neither NATO nor the EU views conflict prevention and post- 
conflict rehabilitation as its primary objective.169 Neither they are regional arrangements 
within the meaning of Chapter Vm.
167 See, section A of this Chapter.
168 The 1992 Helsinki Summit Declaration reads: ‘\..[W]e emphasize the central role of the CSCE 
in fostering and managing change in our region. In this era of transition, the CSCE is crucial to 
our efforts to forestall aggression and violence by addressing the root causes of problems and to 
prevent, manage and settle conflicts.” 1992 Helsinki Summit Declaration Document, para. 19, 
online: OSCE Homepage < http://www.osce.org/docs/enplish/1990-1999/summits/hels92e.htm 
(date accessed: 5 May 2001). Further the 1994 CSCE Budapest Document affirms that “[t]he 
CSCE will be a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management 
in the region. We have agreed that the participating States may in exceptional circumstances 
jointly decide that a dispute will be referred to the United Nations Security Council on behalf of 
the CSCE.” 1996 Lisbon Summit: “Our approach is one of co-operative security based on 
democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, market economy 
and social justice.”
169 The preamble the NATO Treaty reads: “The Parties to this Treaty ... seek to promote stability 
and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective 
defence and for the preservation of peace and security.” North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949, 
online: NATO Homepage < http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treatv.htm > (date accessed: 22 
May 2001)
Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union defines the following objectives:
-to promote economic and social progress and a high level of employment and to achieve 
balanced and sustainable development, in particular through the creation of an area without 
internal frontiers, through the strengthening of economic and social cohesion and through the 
establishment of economic and monetary union, ultimately including a single currency in 
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;
-to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a 
common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence 
policy, which might lead to a common defence, in accordance with the provisions of Article 17; 
-to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its Member States 
through the introduction of a citizenship of the Union;
-to maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free 
movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external 
border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime;
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For example, NATO has been established as an alliance oriented towards defense 
from an external threat.170 Originally, it was not considered a regional arrangement under 
Chapter VIE. However, during the last decade NATO was frequently utilized in the UN- 
led restoration and maintenance of international peace and security.
In Resolution 1244, the Security Council welcomed the participation of both the EU 
and NATO in peace-building in Kosovo. It is, however, unclear whether this reference 
confers on them the status of regional arrangements and provides sufficient authority on the 
participation of those organizations in peace-building.
Some guidelines about the participation of international and regional organizations in 
peace operations, including peace-building, can be found in An Agenda for Peace and the 
Supplement to An Agenda for Peace. An Agenda for Peace suggests that regional 
arrangements should be utilized in peace-building. It also mentions that the Charter of the 
United Nations deliberately does not give a precise definition of regional arrangements, thus 
allowing more flexibility for the utilization of such arrangements. Regional arrangements 
can include a variety of organizations, even those that were initially formed for mutual 
security and defence, as well as organizations for general regional development or for 
cooperation in particular economic, political or social area.171 Under this definition, the EU 
and NATO apparently are not precluded from participation in peace-building.
2. Moral problems of peace-building
Since peace-building is based on Security Council authorization under Chapter VII 
or a state’s consent or both, the establishment of an international administration is a 
legitimate exception to the sovereignty principle. However, the formal legality of 
international interference does not resolve some “moral” concerns about peace-building
-to maintain in full the acquis communautaire and build on it with a view to considering to what 
extent the policies and forms of cooperation introduced by this Treaty may need to be revised 
with the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanisms and the institutions of the 
Community. Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, online: <
http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html > (date accessed: 22 May 2001).
170 Article 5 of the NATO Treaty reads: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or 
more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and 
consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right 
of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations...” North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 169.
171 Agenda for Peace, supra note 1, para. 61.
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activities. Among the “moral” concerns are the fear of the neo-colonialist nature of peace­
building, monopolization of the local administration by “outsiders,” imposition of a 
“Western” style democracy and economy over post-conflict societies. Thus, the question 
arises not that much about the legitimacy of a peace-building intervention itself, but about its 
scope and the means by which such intervention is exercised. Let us look at these “moral” 
problems in more detail.
a. Peace-building: echoes o f neo-colonialism?
As one can observe from the instances of Kosovo, Somalia or Bosnia, peace­
building takes place in zones where state institutions have totally or partially collapsed 
and, thus, no effective authority exists to maintain order, stop human rights abuses, 
provide basic public services, etc.(e.g., Somalia, Kosovo) The extreme circumstances of 
such a zone give rise to negative perceptions about post-conflict societies: 1) Such post­
conflict states (also called “failed” states, i.e., states which are not able to govern 
themselves because their institutions have collapsed) are often viewed as requiring 
serious guidance from the international community. This approach implies some 
inequality of treatment, a perception that “failed” states are inferior, incapable, 
uncivilized. These are attitudes characteristic of the colonial era. 2) The perception about 
post-conflict societies as “uncivilized” may lead to the application of lower standards of 
protection to such societies compared to those normally applied in “developed” countries. 
For example, peace-builders may feel that an “uncivilized” environment justifies 
application of “uncivilized” means, like use of force in violation of human rights 
standards, discrimination, etc.172 One of the vivid examples of such ‘"uncivilized” 
behaviour are the actions of peacekeepers in Somalia. According to the reports by human
172 For the example of such “uncivilized” ways of behaviour of peacekeepers, see the following 
materials on the actions of peacekeepers in Somalia: Peacekeepers Tortured Somali Suspects, 
Electronic Mail & Guardian http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/97iune 1/11 iune-somali.html: Global 
Rules Now Apply to Peacekeepers, U.N. Chief Declares, August 12, 1999, NY Times 
http://www.nvtimes.com/leaming/students/ask reporters/articles/crossette-article2.html: Women 
Tell UN Security Council of Abuses During War, October 23, 2000, online: United Nations 
Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) Homepage < 
http://www.unifem.undp.org/pr unseccoun.html > (date accessed: 15 August 2001). These 
materials primarily refer to the cases of human rights abuses committed by peacekeepers in 
Somalia. These are the most “famous” cases, but such happenings give rise to suspicion that 
similar violations might have occurred in other missions, including Kosovo.
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rights organizations, their actions included rape and torture of the members of local 
communities. I am inclined to think that every mission potentially can suffer from such 
problems and that every mission may have instances of such behaviour.
Another moral problem is the scope of the authority of international missions. 
For example, the Report by the UN Secretary General concerning the implementation of 
SCR 1244 reads: “The Security Council ... has vested in the interim civil administration 
authority over the territory and people of Kosovo.”173 Concentrating all the authority in 
its hand, an international administration is in position to dictate the approach to 
democratization in a war-torn society. If local parties are perceived as lacking knowledge 
and development and, thus, not being worth consulting, an international administration 
can effectively preclude local communities from choosing the way of reconstruction of 
their own country. If the UN imposes the solutions to a post-conflict society (even, if it is 
considered to be for the good of that society) it is likely to violate its own democratic 
principles. The spirit of the UN Charter (“We the People of the United Nations...”174) 
implies that the population should be included in the government, that their voice should 
be heard.
These are the general thoughts about the moral side of peace-building. To assess 
whether peace-building brings a real threat of neo-colonialism, we have to look at the 
aims and means of peace-building -  the motives for international involvement in post­
conflict reconstruction and the kind of values that are “imposed” in post-conflict 
societies.
i. Motives fo r peace-building
Notwithstanding the extremely high costs of peacekeeping and peace-building, 
international organizations continue to engage in these operations and even expand their 
scope. Because states are rational actors,175 there must be compelling reasons for their 
involvement. Although humanitarian concerns for the population of a conflict zone are a 
noble goal, they usually would not be the primary motive for the international
173 Report o f the Secretary-Genera o f 12 July 1999, supra note para 107. Emphasis added. SCR 
1244 itself does to refer to the authority of the UNMIK over the people of Kosovo.
174 Charter o f the United Nations, supra note 146, preamble.
175 Anthony Clark Arend, “Do Legal Rules Matter?” (1998) 38 Va. J. Int’l L.107 at 119.
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involvement (although from a formal point of view, an international intervention should 
be and formally is primarily motivated exclusively by humanitarian concerns176).
International aid is selective. The willingness of states to interfere and the scope 
of the international engagement depend on the vital interests of intervening states. Where 
such interests are at stake, states will intervene more actively. For example, the situations 
in Chechnya and Eritrea were no less serious than in Kosovo or Iraq, but the international 
community was much more attentive to the latter than the former two.177
States seek to maximize their interests.178 Peace-building is not merely assistance in 
post-conflict reconstruction carried by the international community for humanitarian 
considerations. It is a way to pursue states’ political objectives. In post-conflict peace­
building states pursue at least two objectives. First, they mitigate the threat that the conflict 
poses to stability and well-being in the region. Second, they expand the areas of their 
influence over a reviving state. In the short term, peace-building activities allow for the 
return of refugees and reduce trans-border crime, thus lightening the economic and security 
burden on regional states. In a long run, states-peace-builders participate in shaping a new 
order in the region.179
It follows from the above that the intervening states have not only a common interest 
of protecting peace and human rights, but also a self-interest, which significantly influences 
their willingness to move forward with an intervention. On the one hand, self-interest is 
essential for peace-building because it stimulates states’ political support without which the 
UN is not be able to carry out complex peace operations. On the other hand, the desire of 
stronger states to fulfill their own foreign policy objectives through peace-building gives rise 
to doubts about the “good will” of these interveners. Thus, the motives for peace-building 
are likely to support the proposition that peace-building is an enterprise for pursuing states’ 
foreign policy objective, rather than solely the well-being of post-conflict states.
176 The problem lies in contradiction between the requirements of Realpolitik and the necessity to 
comply with the principles of international law. Their correlation will to great extent define the 
moral environment of peace-building.
177 In my opinion, the selective nature of the international attention may be explained exactly by 
the degree of interests in a particular conflict by the international community.
178 Arend, supra note 175 at 119.
179 Wedgwood & Jacobson, supra note 133 at 3.
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ii. Imposing democracy is undemocratic?
Peace-building is in many respects about building democracy. The elements of 
democracy -  government by the people, equality, human rights -  have gained acceptance as 
universal values.180 Some scholars even talk about an emerging international norm for 
“democratic entitlement,"181 which allows an international intervention to prevent human 
rights abuses and protect democracy. It may be said that because everybody is entitled to 
democracy, the implementation of democracy by international administrations in post­
conflict societies is merely a realization of that universal right. Even so, there are several 
problematic issues about the implementation of democracy in post-conflict societies: how 
the peace-builder himself defines “democracy”; how democracy is implemented (imposed or 
built through the consultation with the local population); and what are the motives behind 
the imposition of democracy, (the latter issue was discussed above)
The current peace-building strategies, including democratization, are mainly 
developed if not dictated by Western countries. Scholarly analysis of peace operations is 
carried out mainly by Western scholars. The donor organizations taking part in physical 
reconstruction of post-conflict states are usually Western. Consequently, the methods of 
peace-building reflect a Western outlook. The domination of “Western” outlook in peace­
building strategies entails both practical and theoretical complications for peace-building. 
Theoretically, peace-building may be criticized as imposing Western values. Understanding 
this potential concern, Boutros-Ghali emphasized that the UN cannot impose a new political 
structure or new institutions on post-conflict states. The organization “can only help the 
hostile factions to help themselves and begin to live together again.”182 However, the 
practice of Kosovo shows that the activities of international administration go far beyond 
mere helping the warring parties to live together again. The imposition of solutions is to 
certain extent unavoidable because all the power of decision-making and enforcement is 
concentrated in the hands of an international administration. In this respect, the practice of 
the UNMIK is very interesting. It managed to reconcile the two challenges of having power
180 See, e.g., Bames, supra note 28.
181 John C. Pierce, “The Haitian Crisis and the Future of Collective Enforcement of Democratic 
Governance” (1996) 27 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 477 at 483.
182 Supplement to Agenda for Peace, supra note 5, para. 13-14.
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and not imposing solutions unilaterally. This mechanism established by the UNMIK will be 
discussed in Chapter m .
The practical aspect of “Western type” democracy-building relates to the question 
to what extent particular “Western” democratic principles are suitable and workable in 
post-conflict societies. In post-conflict societies there is little ground for quick 
construction of “Western type” democracy either in terms of institutional structure and 
economic foundation or legal and political culture. The development of a political system 
and civil society requires not only the existence of formal democratic institutions like 
universal suffrage, political parties, elected representative bodies, but also a certain 
political culture, which is consistent with that political system.183 The “Western” model 
of democracy is based on a participant political culture. As Almond and Verba point out, 
in participant political culture members of the society tend to be oriented towards the 
political system as a whole, to both its political and administrative structures. The 
members of the society are oriented to play an “activist” role in the self of the polity.184 In 
a post-conflict, post-Soviet society like Kosovo people are unlikely to be very actively 
oriented towards the political system and participation in it. The lack of such culture 
makes democratization more difficult. If peace-builders concentrate on “Western” 
structure as an exclusive pattern for institutional reconstruction, this may limit their 
creativeness and flexibility in seeking solutions for post-conflict societies and ultimately 
reduce the success of peace-building.
Interim conclusion
The moral factor influences the exercise of peace-building in several aspects. 
First, it facilitates the possibility of institutional and other changes in a post-conflict 
society -  if the involvement of peace-builders in reconstruction and the methods that they 
are using are viewed by the local population as legitimate, the locals are more likely to 
assist the international forces in reconstruction. Second, legitimacy influences the 
sustainability of the changes introduced by peace-builders -  if the new institutions and
183 Gabriel Almond & Sidney Verba, Civic Culture (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1965) at 3.
184 Almond & Verba, supra note 183 at 3.
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procedures developed by peace-builders are not viewed by locals as legitimate, they are 
not likely to be sustained after the withdrawal of the international forces.
In cases of international administrations in post-conflict zones, democracy is built 
not from within, but from the outside, through formative coercive intervention of the 
international community. The unifying force of the international administration is an 
important positive incentive, which promotes cooperation among local elites. However, 
because democracy-building starts from the outside and it is not a result of an internal 
impulse, this process may be more difficult to sustain after the withdrawal of the 
international mission. Political and constitutional evolution in a collapsed state is 
impossible unless it is accepted by the local public as reflecting their history and 
aspirations, rather than treated as an alien solution imposed by the international 
community. Because legitimacy of international activities becomes important, 
international administrations have to identify ways of involving the local population in 
cooperative decision-making.
C. Conclusion to the Chapter
This Chapter completed the analysis of the characteristics of peace-building. In 
addition to the previously defined criteria,185 it has clarified some legal issues of peace­
building. First, peace-building should be based on host state’s consent, which is further 
reaffirmed by the Security Council. In regard to the exercise of a peace-building mission, 
the Security Council Resolution serves the source of the mission’s mandate and of the 
obligations for other member states and international organizations to participate in 
reconstruction. Second, there is no restriction on the participation of international 
organizations in peace-building. According to An Agenda for Peace, international 
organizations can participate in peace-building regardless of the initial purpose of their 
foundation and basic objectives.
Thus, we can summarize the following criteria for peace-building: 1) it is 
comprehensive in nature; 2) it includes institution-building as one of the major 
objectives; 3) it seeks transformation of a society and promotion of its sustainability; 4) it 
is partially based on host state’s consent; 5) it is closely connected with peacekeeping; 6)
185 See, Chapter I, section A(l).
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it involves close cooperation between peace-builders and local parties; and 7) 
participation of international organizations in peace-building is not restricted to regional 
arrangements within the meaning of Chapter VTII. In addition to these features, peace­
building activities have to be generally consistent with UN principles and international 
human rights standards.
I would like to revisit the issue of the close connection between peace-building 
and peacekeeping. The idea of their required connection does not seem very urgent to me. 
First, peacekeepers who can use force only in self-defense and who are, by definition, 
neutral and impartial probably would not be very successful in the intended role of 
preparing ground for peace-builders. It would be very strange to have lightly armed 
peacekeepers deployed first (shortly after the cessation of hostilities, when the situation 
might still require more radical means) and then transfer the authority to peace-builders 
who have greater military and police powers. The idea of requiring a connection between 
peacekeeping and peace-building seems to be an atavism of the previous international 
infatuation with peacekeeping. In my opinion, a close connection between peacekeeping 
and peace-building should not be seen as a mandatory characteristic of peace-building.
In the case of Kosovo, the idea of a connection between peacekeeping preparing 
the ground for peace-building acquired a new form. In a certain sense the KFOR played 
the role of “ground preparator.” This was exercised in several ways: the KFOR played 
the primary role in the initial restoration of order in the Province; the KFOR provided 
security for the international personnel in Kosovo; the KFOR exercised policing until the 
UNMIK Police could assume responsibility for this task.
The discussion of this Chapter started with an implicit assumption that the 
UNMIK is a peace-building mission. Interestingly, a more detailed analysis of the 
theoretical characteristics of peace-building and the actual situation in Kosovo 
demonstrates that generally the establishment of the UNMIK was consistent with these 
requirements, but some of them were not strictly followed. (For example, the role given 
to the Secretary-General in the interpretation of SCR 1244.) These inconsistencies do not 
make the UNMIK any less peace-building in its nature and intent, but highlight the areas 
of peace-building to which more attention should be paid. Some of the legal 
inconsistencies in the establishment of the UNMIK may impact on the moral side of
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peace-building. The more legal inconsistencies there are, the more intensive will be the 
concerns about the neo-colonialist nature of peace-building. The next chapter 
demonstrates how the UNMIK tried to mitigate the legitimacy problem through 
establishing consultative Kosovar organs and implementing the principles of 
consociationalism.
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Development of Self-government in Kosovo
The organization of elections and electoral monitoring are no longer a completely 
new task for international missions. The activities of several peacekeeping missions, 
which exercised electoral monitoring in post-conflict Angola,186 Cambodia,187 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,188 allowed the UN to generate a certain expertise in this area. However, the 
needs of the Kosovo reconstruction are of a qualitatively new level -  development of 
self-government.
In this Chapter I argue that for the completion of this task to be successful, the 
UNMIK has to closely follow the recommendations of consociationalism about 
meaningful participation of minorities in provincial and municipal organs and observe the 
restraints put on its authority through the peace-building concept.
A. Kosovo ethno-political landscape
Before describing the UNMIK approach to the development of self-government, 
it is necessary to characterize the situation in the Province, which served as a context for 
the adoption of the UNMIK strategy.
Two characteristics of the Kosovo society that have a direct impact on electoral process 
and functioning of representative bodies are the ethnic breakdown of the population and 
the division of political organizations along ethnic lines.
186 According to Security Council Resolution 747, the United Nations Angola Verification 
Mission II (UNAVEM H) was given a mandate to observe and verify of the presidential and 
legislative elections. See, Security Council Resolution 747, online: United nations Homepage < 
http://www.un.orp/documents/sc/res/1992/s92r747e.pdf > (date accessed: September 20, 2001).
187 According to the Agreement on the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia 
Conflict, the mandate of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) included the 
organization and conduct of elections. See, to the Agreement on the Comprehensive Political 
Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, supra note 141.
188 Among the tasks of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) was organization 
and monitoring of elections.
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1. Ethnic breakdown o f the Kosovo population 
For many years Kosovo has been a home for a variety of ethnic communities.189 
The Province was traditionally inhabited by Albanians, who constitute the majority, as 
well as Serbs, Turks, Bosniacs, Egyptians, Ashkali and other ethnicities.190
During the years of the conflict the structure of the Kosovo population had 
undergone significant changes largely due to an intensive flow of refugees from the 
conflict zone.191 Although after the conflict the minority population decreased comparing 
to the 1991 census,192 Kosovo still remains a multiethnic Province. (See, Table 2)
According to the results of the 2000 civil registration,193 the Kosovo population is 
estimated at 1 886 589 people.194 The Joint Registration Taskforce did not collect 
information on ethnic affiliation of the applicants, but the OSCE and the KFOR produced 
independent estimates of the numbers of ethnic communities in Kosovo.195 While these 
are only estimates, the figures offer a fairly precise picture about the population 
distribution by ethnicity and the weight of each ethnic group in the total Kosovo 
population. The following table demonstrates the quantitative correlation of ethnic 
communities in each of the 30 Kosovo municipalities.
189 Vickers, supra note 78 at 103, 116-120, 170-171.
190 Ibid., at 116. See, also the discussion in Chapter I, section A.
191 See, Chapter I, Section A.
192 In 1991 82.2% of the Kosovo population was Albanian, 9.9% - Serb, 2.9% - Bosniacs, 2.2% - 
Roma, 0.5% - Turks and 0.4% - Croat. See, Judah, supra note ?? at 313.
193 There was no reliable data about the Kosovo population after the conflict. Thus, civil 
registration was one of the first tasks of the international administration. The registration was 
carried out under the authority of the OSCE and the United Nations Civil Administration. The 
pillars agreed to unite their resources for the civil registration project. The registration was carried 
out by a special organ - the Joint Registration Taskforce (JRT). The registration ran from March 
through August 2000 and embraced applicants both inside and outside Kosovo. The aim of the 
registration was to create a civil registry, which will allow people to be recognized as residents of 
Kosovo and to benefit from the services provided by the Administration. The registry has also 
served a basis of the voter lists for the municipal elections. See, Civil and voter registration starts 
throughout Kosovo, OSCE Press Release, 28 April 2000, online: OSCE Homepage < 
http://www.osce.org/press re172000/04/116-mik.html >; Process begins for Kosovo civil and 
voter registration, OSCE Press Release, 14 April 2000 <
http://www.osce.org/press_rel/2000/04/l38-mik.html >; Press briefing on civil and voter 
registration in Kosovo, OSCE Press Release, 10 April 2000,
< http://www.osce.org/press rel/2000/04/ 149-mik.html > (date accessed: 7 July 2001).
194 KFOR estimates, March 2001.
195 The current situation does not allow for precise figures because of the constant move of the 
population: large numbers of refugees continue returning from abroad, internally displaced 
persons migrate within the Province.
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Table 2. Minority Population per Municipality
Municipality
Albanians Serbs Roma Ashkali Bosniacs Turks
% % % % % %
Gllogovc/Glogovac 48,671 100 0 0 0 0
Malisheve/MaliSevo 51,372 100 0 0 6 0
Skenderaj/Srbica 55,887 99 302 0.5 0 0 120 0.2
Kaqanik/Kacanik 43,215 99 0 0 231 0.5
Podujeve/Podujevo 90,246 98 471 0.5 0 0 1000 1
Suhareke/Suva Reka 69,662 98 799 1 799 1
Shtime/Stimlje 25,709 97 31 0 618 2 400 1
Ferizaj/UroSevac 120,947 96 24 0 1,005 1 4200 3.4
Defan/Decani 30,287 96 30 0 640 2
Rahovec/Orahovac 51,084 96 1,733 3 608 1
Prishtine/PriStina 270,175 95 11,966 4 988 0.3 1000 0.3 100
Kline/Klina 25,244 94 12 0 1,237 5
Vushtrri/Vucitm 75,043 92 3,571 5 290 0.4 130 0.9 300 2.5
Viti/Vitina 54,616 93 3,943 7 43 0
Peje/Pec 109,743 92 1,263 1 2,154 2 6000 5
Mitrovice/Mitrovica 100,121 90 9,057 7 150 0.1 170 0.1 3000 2.6 600 0.4
Gjilan/Gnjilane 89,369 85 13,479 12 400 0.4 2000 2
Istog/Istok 21,148 83 207 0.8 2,125 8 1000 4
Lipjan/Lipljan 58,204 82 10,967 15 1,501 2 15002
Prizren/Prizren 168,047 82 198 0.1 5,424 3 20000 9.3 120005
Fushe
Kosove/Kosovo
Polje 20,922 77 4,819 2 1,500 6 2500 5
Gjakove/Dakovica 18,137 70 18 0 7,695 30
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Kamenice/Kamenica 51,440 69 22,286 30 925 1
Obiliq/Obilic 11,172 67 2,928 17 2,240 14 800 3
Novoberde/Novo
Brdo 2,395 54 2,070 46 0 0
Strpce/Shterpce 3,535 29 8,523 70 0 0
Zubin Potok/Zubin 
Potok 2,924 16 15,795 84 0 0
Dragash/DragaS 1,289 10 0 0 0 0
Zvecan/Zveqan 516 5 9,444 95 0 0
Leposavic/Leposaviq 80 0 16,302 98 200 1 190 1
TOTAL 1,671,200 87.5 140,238 7 30,779 1.6
1181
0 0.6 40000 2 15000 0.8
Source: KFOR estimates and the UNHCR-OSCE Assessment of the Situation of 
Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo.
As seen from Table 2, people of the same ethnicity tend to settle compactly.19616 
out of 30 municipalities have populations which are more that 90% Albanian. The three 
northern municipalities - Zvecan, Zubin Potok and Leposavic - are predominantly Serb 
(more than 84% of the population). Significant numbers of Serbs also live in the central 
and eastern Kosovo (Strpce, Novo Brdo, Kamenica) (See map of Kosovo below). Other 
minorities constitute a significant part of the population only in one or two municipalities. 
For instance, in Prizren almost 10% of the population are Bosniac. In Dakovica 30% of 
the population are Roma. Some municipalities hardly have any minority families (e.g., 
Malishevo, Glogovac, Kacanik).
The trend of territorial concentration of ethnic communities is observed even in 
relatively multiethnic municipalities (Prizren, Gnjilane, Mitrovica, Pristina, Vicitm). For 
example, in Pristina small Roma communities live mainly alongside Kosovo Serbs in
196 This is not to say that there are no minority members dispersed in areas inhabited by other 
ethnicities. For example, considerable part of Roma and Egyptians are dispersed in a number of 
rural areas in Klina and Istok. See, Assessment o f the Situation o f Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, 
supra note 17 at SO.
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enclaves in Gracanica/Ulpiana, Caglavica/Cagllavice, Preoce/Peroc and Laplje 
Sello/Fshati Llap.197 The Askaelia community in Mitrovica is concentrated mainly south 
of the river Ibar.198
I draw special attention to the ethnic composition of the population and its 
distribution among the municipalities because, in my opinion, these two are the key to 
better understanding the electoral results and electoral regulation.199 Because the 
behaviour of the electorate in a divided society is ethnically motivated, the data about 
ethnic distribution allows us to roughly predict what parties will dominate the 
representative organs of a particular municipality. For example, judging only from the 
picture of the territorial distribution of the Kosovo population, we can expect the victory 
of Albanian parties in the majority of Kosovo municipalities and a good chance for 
minority parties to succeed in elections in the districts where a particular minority is 
territorially concentrated.
197 Ibid., at 42.
198 Ibid., at 45.
199 The discussion of these issue is to follow in Sections C and D.
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HCIC Kosovo: Minorities
Minority communities in and around Kosovo
21-Mar-00
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Picture 2. Roma and Serb Communities in Kosovo.
Source: Humanitarian Community Information Center Homepage, online 
http://www.reliefweb.int/hcic/maps/population/minoritv2k.ipg
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2. Political landscape
The division of the population along ethnic lines is observed not only territorially, 
but also in the political life of the Province. Each ethnic community (especially, 
minorities) is concerned with protecting their rights and security. One of the ways to have 
a community’s concerns heard and taken into account is to be represented in the organs 
of government. In turn, to participate in the organs of government, each ethnic 
community must have a political entity which represents that community.
The Kosovo political landscape is diverse in many aspects: ethnic affiliation of 
parties (Albanian, Serb, Turk, Bosniac, Gora, Ashkali),200 different forms of political 
organization (political party, coalition, citizens’ initiative), and different histories of 
particular parties (for example, some parties were founded 9-10 years ago and established 
themselves during the years of the struggle against the Serb oppression. Other parties 
were officially formed only several months before the elections), etc.
The most reliable and comprehensive data on Kosovo political organizations was 
generated before the 2000 municipal elections.201 By August 2000 the Central Elections 
Commission (CEC) certified 19 political parties, 2 coalitions, 3 citizens’ initiatives and 
15 independent candidates to participate in the municipal elections.202 All major ethnic 
communities had their political parties or independent candidates to contest the elections. 
14 out of 19 parties and one coalition were Albanian, three parties were Bosniac, one 
Ashkali, one Turk and one Gora initiative. Egyptian communities had several 
independent candidates registered. No Serb parties registered to contest the elections.203
200 See Appendix 2.
201 It should be noted that the political landscape in the first 6-10 month after the UNMIK 
deployment was not that diverse. The explosion in the formation and legalization of political 
forces started in spring 2000 in anticipation of the October municipal elections.
202 OSCE Annual Report 2000 on OSCE Activities 
http://www.osce.Org/docs/english/misc/anrep00e_activ.htm#Anchor-1 .-41834
203 This does not mean that no Serb parties exist in the Province. A number of Serb parties have 
their branches in three northern municipalities. These parties had their representatives in the 
UNMIK-appointed municipal councils. However, in relation to the municipal elections the Serb 
communities adopted a strategy of non-participation: few Serbs registered to vote and no Serb 
parties stood for elections.
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Chart 2. Parties in Kosovo by their Ethnic Affiliation
Chart 2 demonstrates that the political life of Kosovo (at least in terms of activism 
in contestation of elections) is dominated by Albanian parties. Although the objectives 
and programmes of Albanian parties significantly vary, the parties’ positions 
overwhelmingly coincide on two points. First, an absolute majority of the parties identify 
the independence of Kosovo and European integration as their primary goals. Several 
parties (the LNDSH, the PNDSH, the PRK) advocate closer cooperation or unification 
with Albania. Second, all the municipal programs emphasize the immediate needs of 
reconstruction, such as job creation, education, health services, infrastructure, etc., but 
only some of them204 address the issue of ethnic tolerance and minority rights.
Among Albanian parties the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the Party for 
Democratic Progress (PDK) and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) stand out in 
popularity, resources and organization. During the past years these three parties have been 
the key players in the Kosovo political life. They continue to play important roles in the 
UNMIK structures and organs of self-government. Let us have a closer look at them.
2<M The issues of minority rights and commitment to ethnic tolerance are found in the programmes 
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Since 1989 the LDK was a leader of the Kosovo resistance movement. During 
this period the organization has developed a wide net of regional offices and acquired 
experience in local and international policy-making. The party and its leader Ibrahim 
Rugova have received over 80% of the votes in 1992 and 1998 elections to the Kosovo 
parallel governmental structures.205 Rugova’s leadership was also recognized on the 
international level. He participated in many international negotiations on Kosovo 
(including the Rambouillet talks) and since December 1999 was a member of the 
UNMIK-created Interim Administrative Council (IAC).206
As proclaimed during the municipal electoral campaign, the general aims of the 
LDK are the independence of Kosovo, democratic institution-building, the rule of law 
and respect for minority rights. At the municipal level, the LDK prioritizes development 
of agriculture and infrastructure, job creation, education, and health care.
Another two parties -  the AAK and the PDK -  have their root in the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA). Following the demilitarization of the KLA in 1999, the majority 
of its members joined one of the structures -  the Kosovo Police Service, the Kosovo 
Protection Corps or the newly formed Party of Democratic Progress in Kosovo 
(PPDK).207 In May 2000 the ex-KLA leader Hashim Thaci was elected the party 
president and the name of the party was changed to the PDK.208 Before the emergence of 
other former KLA leaders on the political arena in 2000, the PDK was considered the 
sole inheritor of the KLA and the sole beneficiary of the ex-KLA support.209 This 
position provided the PDK with membership in the IAC.
Among the major goals of the PDK are freedom, independence and democracy, 
ethnic tolerance and European integration. At the municipal level, it seeks to improve 
infrastructure, education, health care, to create jobs and to promote women’s 
emancipation.
Political Party Guide, at 12, online: OSCE Homepage <
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/elections/pdf/ppg-e.pdf> About parallel Kosovo structures see. 
Chapter I.
206 The structure and the role of the IAC will be discussed in the following section.
207 Political Party Guide, supra note 205.
208 Ibid., at 15.
209 j
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The AAK led by another ex-KLA leader - Ramush Haradinaj - is a coalition 
of six smaller parties.210 The majority of the parties united in the AAK actively 
participated in the resistance movement. Two of them closely cooperated with the KLA. 
The AAK prioritizes political and economic reforms. It advocates that politics has to start 
at the grassroots, with the engagement of the people in political and social life at 
individual, family and community levels.
Although Albanian parties form a central segment of the Kosovo political system, 
there are a number of minority parties (Ashkali, Bosniac, Gora and Turk parties). The 
distinction between the Albanian and minority political entities can be drawn not only 
along the line of ethnic affiliation, but also by their political priorities. Albanian parties 
define the Kosovo status, more precisely, Province’s independence as a top priority. 
Minority parties211 view peace, security and minority rights as their main objectives. For 
them security and freedom are much more important than the debate about the future 
status of Kosovo. The emphasis of minority parties on security and minority rights is one 
of clear indicators that currently available protection of minorities is insufficient.212 
Because of the difference in main political goals, minority and majority parties may have 
fewer areas for cooperation and less incentive for the formation of grand coalitions. The 
result of the cooperation will to great extent depend on the willingness of both Albanian 
and minority parties to understand and reconcile each other’s priorities.
There is one positive move in this direction. Two of the largest Albanian parties -  
the PDK and the LDK -  included promotion of ethnic tolerance and minority rights in 
their platforms. This shows that they sought to moderate their positions in order to gain 
support of more than one ethnic group in the elections. Such moderation creates
210 It includes: the Alliance of Citizens of Kosovo (AQK), the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo 
(PPK), the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (LKCK), the Peoples Movement of 
Kosovo (LPK), the Albanian Unification Party (UNIKOMB), and the Albanian Union of 
Christian Democrats (UShDK). See, Political Party Guide, supra, note 205 at 6-8.
211 Here I am talking only about Ashkali, Bosniac, Gora and Turk parties, which took part in the 
municipal elections.
212 The issue of judicial protection will be discussed in Chapter IV.
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favourable ground for the pooling of votes across ethnic lines and opens the door for the 
formation of pre-electoral and post-electoral multiethnic coalitions.213
Interim conclusion
The analysis of the Kosovo ethno-political situation leads us to the following 
conclusions. First, Kosovo may be considered a plural society as defined by Lijphart. The 
Province is territorially and politically fragmented along ethnic lines, that is, the society 
is divided into segments. Second, Kosovo is a society where ethnic majority rule is likely 
to disadvantage minorities and to be a permanent source of instability for the Province. 
Given the superior number of Albanians in the Province, better organization of Albanian 
parties and the refusal of some ethnic communities to participate in power sharing and 
elections (e.g., Serbs), Kosovo will apparently have an Albanian majority rule. There is a 
threat that ethnic majority will use its advantageous position in the organs of government 
in order to strengthen its own protection. At the same time, the high concentration of 
Serbs in Zvecan, Zubin Potok and Leposavic may lead to the exclusion of Albanian 
minorities from administration there and possibly their disadvantaged position in those 
municipalities. The ethno-territorial distinctiveness of the three northern 
municipalities,214 reinforced by political differences (it terms of which parties are in 
power there), may deepen the de facto separation of Kosovo in Albanian-dominated and 
Serb-dominated areas. This stronger separation threatens to intensify the tension between 
Serbs and Albanians and may give rise to attempts of secession of the Serb municipalities 
from Kosovo. Consequently, if this separation is not mitigated, it will constitute a 
continuos threat to reconciliation and stability in the Province.
Taking the above into consideration, it may be concluded that Kosovo needs the 
techniques of consociationalism in order to develop stable democratic government. As 
seen in Chapter I, consociationalism has certain limitations in terms of its application in 
Kosovo. Perhaps only its three elements -  proportionality, grand coalition and mutual
213 Another thing is that Albanian parties do not need inter-ethnic coalitions to win the majority of 
votes. Thus, they are unlikely to enter into multiethnic coalitions unless the incentives for that are 
created through the electoral system.
214 See, section A of this Chapter, Chapter HI at 87, Chapter IV at 149.
215 This can serve as a conformation of our previous conclusion in Chapter I that segmental 
autonomy would not be an appropriate means for Kosovo.
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veto -  would be suitable for the initial stages if democracy-building in the Province. 
Moreover, the success of consociationalism will to a great extent depend on the way it is 
implemented through substantive and procedural rules adopted by the UNMIK and its 
organs. The next sections examine these rules in greater detail.
B. Development of Self-government in Kosovo
The development of local self-government is one of the central tasks of the 
international administration in Kosovo. On the one hand, participation of local parties in 
provincial management is required by SCR 1244.216 On the other hand, it is a practical 
necessity: without the support from local political forces, any reconstruction activity 
would be doomed to failure. Local organs of self-government are necessary, first, as 
partners of the international community in reconstruction of the Province; and, second, as 
a precondition for the gradual transfer of authority from international to local structures.
The self-government of Kosovo is developed in two ways: through elections and 
through the establishment of mixed (intemational-Kosovar) bodies that carry out 
administrative management until all elected bodies are put into operation. The creation of 
representative organs through elections is intended to occur in two stages - elections at 
the municipal level217 and all-Kosovo elections.218 Having opted for the "bottom- up" 
approach,219 the UNMIK has held municipal elections first.
For the period of time until the elections were held and representative bodies were 
put in operation, the UNMIK had to introduce other means by which local communities
216 According to paragraph 11 of SCR 1244, the international civil administration is responsible 
for “organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and 
autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections 
and transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while 
overseeing and supporting the
consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities." 
Emphasis added.
217 Municipal elections took place on October 28,2000.
218 All-Kosovo elections are schedules for November 17, 2001.
219 In the Report on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo the UN 
Secretary-General emphasized that “democracy must take root at the municipal level” and noted 
that all parties and sectors of Kosovo society should be prepared to cooperate with municipal 
assemblies. See, Report o f the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo, S/2000/1196, 15 December 2000 at 17, online: United Nations Homepage 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/da/kosovo/kosovo3a.htm (date accessed: 8 February 2001).
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could participate in the administration of local affairs.220 The establishment of the 
UNMIK-Kosovar organs was adopted as means to promote such participation.
These mixed organs provided an immediate access of local political forces to the 
provincial and municipal decision-making. In contrast to elected organs, the composition 
of the UNMIK-created bodies did not reflect popular will. The representatives to 
provincial and municipal organs were appointed by the SRSG and the UNMIK 
Administrators accordingly. The appointees were chosen from political forces deemed to 
be the most politically influential at that time. To a certain extent, such appointments 
strengthened the leading position of those local forces. At large, the created organs 
reflected the so-called Rambouillet formula (three Kosovo Albanian political parties and 
their leaders who participated in the Rambouillet talks -  Rugova, Thaci and Qosja). In 
addition to that, appointed organs sought to represent the political, religious, and ethnic 
diversity of Kosovo.221
To date the administration of Kosovo includes both appointed and elected 
organs.222 The Section analyzes the powers of the Kosovo organs from two perspectives: 
1) the correlation of the powers of the SRSG and the Kosovar self-government - whether 
the necessary preconditions are created for the development of the responsible and 
independent self-government; 2) the internal structure of the organs of self-government - 
how it reflects the principles of consociationalism and how it facilitates minority 
protection and interethnic reconciliation.
220 Note our previous discussion about the issue of legitimacy.
221 See, composition of the Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC).
222 Here is a quick reference about the system of elected and appointed organs in Kosovo: 
according to the Agreement between the Kosovo Albanian leaders (Rugova, Thaci and Qosja) 
and the SRSG of December 13, 1999 (also know as the JIAS Agreement), the citizens of Kosovo 
participate in management of the Province through the UNMIK appointed Joint Interim 
Administrative Structure (JIAS) at the provincial level and municipal councils at the municipal 
level. In November 2000 municipal boards and councils were replaced by the newly elected 
municipal assemblies. In contrast, there are currently no elected representative bodies at 
provincial level. The JIAS is functioning until the all-Kosovo elections are held in November 
2001.
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1. Constitutional Framework fo r  Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo 
On May IS, 2001 the SRSG promulgated the Constitutional Framework for 
Provisional Self-Government of Kosovo.223 The adoption of the Framework became 
crucial for the future of Kosovo in many respects. First, it more clearly defined the 
objectives of the international reconstruction in Kosovo (the preamble stated the goal of 
developing parliamentary democracy).224 Second, it promoted the further transfer of 
authority from the international administration to Kosovo authorities.225 Third, it clarified 
the correlation of power between the institutions of self-government and the international 
administration.226 Fourth, it proved that leaders of different communities and parties can 
effectively cooperate with each other and with the international officials in the process of 
Kosovo reconstruction.227
The Framework regulates the most urgent issues of constitutional government: 
individual and collective rights, structure and competence of the Kosovo legislature, the 
executive and the judiciary as well as the authority of the SRSG and KFOR, which they 
retain over the provincial affairs.
The Framework provides for the establishment of the Provisional Institutions of 
Self-government, which “shall work ... towards ensuring conditions for a peaceful and 
normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo, with a view to facilitating the determination of 
Kosovo’s future status...”228 These institutions have not been established yet, but their 
formation will start with the all-Kosovo elections in November 2001.
223 The Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government o f Kosovo, 
UNMIK/Reg/2001/9 (2001) [hereinafter Constitutional Framework].
Ibid., preamble.
225 The Framework grants to self-government many responsibilities, which were concentrated 
with the UNMIK, thus allowing the local forces to assume real decision-making power. For the 
discussion of these powers see, below.
226 The Framework distinguishes between the areas of responsibility of the UNMIK and those of 
the self-government. See, discussion below.
227 The text of the Framework was elaborated during the seven weeks of negotiation among 
Kosovo political parties, ethnic and religious communities, civil sector and the international 
administration. It represented a compromise in the position of the local political forces and the 
international administration. See, UNMIK Press Release of IS and 16 May 2001, online: UN 
Homepage < http://un.org/peace/kosovo/press/tempI.pr.581 .html > (date accessed: 20 may 2001).
228 Ibid., preamble.
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a. Competencies o f the Provisional Institutions
The Provisional Institutions will take over the UNMIK-created organs at the 
provincial level. The Provisional Institutions are granted responsibilities over a wide 
range of local affairs, including economic regulation, industry and investment, trade, 
education, health, transport and telecommunications, agriculture, etc.229 They are also 
assigned special responsibilities in judicial affairs, mass media and emergency 
preparedness. However, all international and external contacts are exercised only in 
coordination with the SRSG.
The balance of power among the branches of self-government clearly points to 
parliamentary democracy. The legislative authority in Kosovo will be exercised by the 
Assembly. The Assembly has several key powers: to adopt laws and resolutions on the 
matters within the competence of the provisional self-government; to elect the President 
of Kosovo; to appoint Kosovo officials, including the Prime-Minister and ministers of the 
government; to endorse international agreements; and to decide on a motion of no- 
confidence in the government.230
In contrast to the powers of the Assembly, the President of Kosovo has a rather 
limited role. He is elected by the Assembly. His main powers include proposing the 
candidature of the Prime-Minister, exercising external relations in coordination with the 
SRSG and reporting to the Assembly on the state of affairs in Kosovo.231
The Government of Kosovo has executive authority. It is responsible for 
proposing draft laws to the Assembly and implementing the laws adopted by the 
Assembly. The Assembly can exercise control over the government through its power 
to express no-confidence in it. Given the necessity to have the government functioning, 
the Framework specifies that the Assembly can express no-confidence only if it 
simultaneously appoints a new prime-minister and ministers of the government.233
The division of power in this form of parliamentary democracy creates the generally 
favourable ground for the development of consociationalism in Kosovo. In fact.
229 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, ch.5.
230 Ibid., s. 9.1.26.
231 Ibid., s. 9.2.
232 Ibid., s. 9.3.
233 Ibid., s. 9.3.10.
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parliamentary democracy is considered the only form of government that allows the 
development of consociationalism.234 Thus, the founding preconditions for more inclusive 
democratic government for Kosovo are in place. In the process of successful implementation 
of this model, a lot depends on the chosen correlation of powers between the SRSG and the 
Provisional Institutions (in terms of how much control the international administration 
retains over the developing self-government) as well as on the composition and decision­
making procedures within the Provisional organs themselves.
b. Correlation o f the powers o f the SRSG and Provisional Institutions
When the Framework will be implemented, Kosovo will have a system of 
administration that comprises two structures -  the Provisional Institutions and the 
international administration. Although structurally and in terms of the balance of power 
the Provisional Institutions can be viewed as an independent system of government, they 
are limited in terms of competence. The Framework specifically distinguishes the powers 
of the SRSG and the powers of the Provisional Institutions. In many respects, the 
Provisional Institutions remain under control of the international administration. The 
establishment of the provisional self-government does not affect or diminish the powers 
of the SRSG to ensure full implementation of SCR 1244.235 A wide range of key 
economic and political matters continues to be the exclusive domain of the SRSG. The 
SRSG retains the two most important powers: to issue Regulations and to appoint and 
remove international officials in Kosovo. In addition to that, the SRSG has reserved 
powers in relation to monetary policy, the UNMIK Customs Service, the Kosovo 
Protection Corps, law enforcement and correctional service, international relations, 
administration of state and public property, cross-border transit of goods and other 
matters.236 At the same time, the SRSG has to take necessary steps to facilitate the 
transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Provisional Institutions.237 An interesting 
point is that, on the one hand, the Provisional Institutions are granted a number of powers 
that were previously exercised by the SRSG on behalf of the international administration.
234 See, Lijphart, supra note 41, Van Parijs, supra note 59.
235 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, ch. 12.
“  ibid., s.8.1.
237 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, s. 14.2.
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On the other hand, notwithstanding this transfer, the scope of the powers of the UNMIK 
did not decrease. Rather, I would say, some powers became “dormant” -  they are 
exercised by the Provisional Institutions, but the SRSG can intervene at any time when he 
considers this to be necessary to ensure full implementation of SCR 1244. Interestingly, 
the power to introduce amendments to the Framework is also usurped by the SRSG. He 
can make such amendments on his own initiative or upon a request supported by two- 
thirds of the members of the Assembly.238 Moreover, such an authority of unilateral 
amendment of the Framework is not limited in time and presumably can be exercised 
even when the Provisional Institutions are substantially developed (given that the 
international civil presence continues in the Province).
The power of the SRSG to amend the Framework unilaterally is highly 
controversial. It means that the people whose will is expressed through the Assembly are 
excluded from the government, that they are denied one of the essential rights -  to define 
the way of their future development. In this respect, the unilateral amendment of the 
Framework by the SRSG not only undermines the authority of the developing self- 
government, but also contradicts the earlier affirmed principles of the involvement of 
local parties in decision-making239 and the democratic principles of the UN.240
Many powers of the SRSG and of the Provisional Institutions are closely 
interrelated. Even the normatively stipulated distinction between their areas of 
responsibility may not be a sufficient guarantee against confusion about their respective 
competencies. One of the first concerns is parallel exercise of functions by the SRSG and 
the Provisional Institutions over the same matter and the problem as to whose decision 
takes precedence. For instance, the Provisional Institutions are responsible for economic, 
fiscal and budgetary policy.241 At the same time, the SRSG is the final authority to set 
financial and policy parameters. The problematic point is the interpretation of these two 
provisions in relation to each other. The “final authority” of the SRSG may mean either 
that he can overrule the decisions of the Provisional Institutions or that he can make a 
decision if the Provisional Institutions are incapable of reaching consensus on an issue or
238 Ibid., s. 143.
239 See, SCR 1244, supra note 106, preamble and para 10; the JIAS Regulation, s. 1(a).
240 See, also discussion about moral issues of peace-building in Chapter 11(B).
241 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, s. 5.1(a) and s. 5.1(b).
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both these possibilities. In any event, the “final authority” gives the SRSG power to 
control the decision-making of the Provisional Institutions and even substitute their 
decisions with his own. While the “final authority” of the SRSG may be useful to 
overcome procedural deadlock242 and elaborate more effective financial policy, its 
frequent exercise is likely to be objected to by the Kosovar organs as too interventionist.
Another example concerns the power of the SRSG to appoint and remove judges 
and prosecutors. According to s. 5.3(a), the Provisional Institutions are responsible for 
“making decisions regarding the appointment of judges and prosecutors.”243 At the same 
time, the SRSG has a reserved power of “exercising final authority regarding the 
appointment, removal from office and disciplining of judges and prosecutors.”244 The 
ultimate scope of this “final authority” is not clear. Most likely, this power means that the 
SRSG is in position to remove a judge or prosecutor appointed by the Provisional 
Institutions and unilaterally appoint a new person. The preservation of controlling powers 
of the SRSG is necessary to oversee the newly elected organs and to assist their initial 
activities. At the same time, the frequent use of the broad powers of the SRSG may 
undermine and limit the power of legitimately created institutions of self-government.
On these two examples we have seen that provisions of the Framework can be 
interpreted in a variety of ways, conferring a broader or narrower authority on a particular 
organ. There may be many different opinions on the interpretation of the same provision, 
each of which may be adequate. The question is not in finding a right interpretation, but 
the one which is politically acceptable and provides an equitable result and consistency in 
the approach to self-government and its development. For this reason, there is a need for 
authoritative interpretation of the Framework’s provisions. The SRSG, with his ample 
powers of supervision over the Provisional Institutions also has a final say in the 
interpretation of the Framework. According to Chapter 12, the SRSG can determine 
whether the actions of Provisional Institutions are consistent with SCR 1244 and the 
Constitutional Framework,245 which necessarily involves interpretation of the powers of 
Provisional Institutions and of the SRSG.
242 See, discussion about mutual veto in Chapter I.
243 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223.S. 5.3 (a).
244 Ibid., s. 8.1(g).
245 Ibid., ch. 12.
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None of the characteristics of peace-building directly relates to the limits on the 
powers of the SRSG. The powers of the SRSG should be restrained by the general aim of 
peace-building for the development of sustainability and independence of local organs. 
The usurpation of the power to interpret the Framework by the SRSG, may slow down or 
preclude the Kosovo’s constitutional development -  an area crucial for the well-rounded 
protection and inclusiveness of minorities.
The power of the SRSG to interpret the Framework’s provisions also creates 
certain concerns about the imposition of “Western” values and understanding of the 
reconstruction process. In my view, the legitimate interpretation of the Framework should 
emanate from a judicial organ. In the spirit of the democratic tradition, the Supreme 
Court of Kosovo246 should have the power to interpret the Framework’s provisions. 
However, there is nothing in the Framework that suggests such authority.
c. Composition and decision-making in the Provisional Institutions 
As mentioned before, the functioning of consociationalism to a great extent 
depends on the design of the decision-making procedures and the composition of the 
organs of government. These requirements should be unified by a common aim of 
providing more stable and inclusive government.
The Constitutional Framework establishes special requirements for the 
composition of the provincial organs and decision-making procedures in the Provisional 
Institutions, which reflect some consociational principles. Let us first examine these 
procedures and the potential effect they may have on the protection of minority interests.
The popularly elected Assembly consists of 120 members elected by the 
population. 100 seats are distributed among all parties, coalitions, citizens’ initiatives and 
independent candidates proportionately to the number of votes received by them in the 
elections.247 20 are seats reserved for non-Kosovo Albanian communities. Among them, 
10 seats are allocated to parties representing Serb communities, 4 seats for the Roma,
246 The Supreme Court will have more legitimacy in its interpretation as a collective organ, given 
that it is consociadonally composed.
247 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, s. 9.1.3(a).
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Ashkali and Egyptian Communities,248 3 -  for the Bosniac Community, 2 for the Turkish 
Community and 1 for the Gorani Community.249 Within each category the seats are 
distributed proportionately to the number of votes received by respective parties in the 
elections.
The existence of reserved seats in the Assembly and the method of allocating 
them may be regarded as an attempt to satisfy two principles of consociationalism: 
proportionality and grand coalition. The very existence of reserved seats is a guarantee 
that the leaders of major ethnic segments of the Kosovo society are included in the 
Assembly. Their inclusion is a precondition for cooperation among various leaders, 
which, in turn, may help the formation of a grand coalition. Proportionality used for seat 
allocation ensures that each community has appropriate weight in decision-making.
The composition of the organs created by the Kosovo Assembly is also influenced 
by the principles of proportionality and grand coalition. For example, the Chairmanship 
of the all Committees of the Assembly has to be distributed proportionately among 
parties and coalitions represented in the Assembly.250 The seats of the Budget Committee 
are allocated proportionately among parties and coalitions represented in the 
Assembly.251 The Committee on Human Rights and Interests of Communities has to 
include two members of each Kosovo community elected by the Assembly.
Generally, the decisions of the Assembly, including adoption of laws, are made 
by majority of the present and voting members.252 This threshold is higher - two-thirds 
majority - for the election of the President of Kosovo.253 However, there is no special 
requirement that a candidate for president has to receive minority support. Since most 
likely the Assembly will be more than 2/3 Albanian, there will be no incentive for a 
candidate to moderate his position in order to try to win minority support. Thus, the 
procedure for the election of the president does not seem to increase the chance of having
248 Roma, Ashkalia and Egyptians were often viewed by international actors as interconnected 
and ethnically similar groups. Probably for this reason, they altogether are allocated four seats in 
the Assembly. This seat allocation is likely to produce disagreements among the Roma, Egyptians 
and Ashakaeli groups, which view themselves as distinct communities.
249 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, s. 9.1.3 (b).
250 Ibid., s. 9.1.21.
251 Ibid., s. 9.1.11.
252 Ibid., s. 9.1.33.
253 Ibid., s. 9.2.8.
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a panethnic candidate as a President of Kosovo. Although the president does not have 
significant powers, the very presence of nationalistic politician on this post would have a 
negative impact of the reconciliation processes in Kosovo.
In relation to the adoption of laws, the Framework incorporates a very interesting 
procedure to protect minority interests against being overridden by the ethnic majority of 
the Assembly. Instead of a mutual veto, which threatens procedural deadlock, it 
introduces another procedure, which allows both to escape the deadlocks of the veto and 
to protect the interests of minorities. Within 48 hours from the approval of a law by the 
Assembly six members of the Assembly can submit a motion to the Presidency claiming 
that the law in total or in part violates vital interests of the community to which they 
belong.254 The Presidency of the Assembly designates a panel which examines the matter 
and prepares a “consensus proposal”255 to the Assembly. If the Assembly rejects the 
proposal or accepts a proposal for the rejection of the motion, the law stands as 
previously adopted.256 In my opinion, this model of a moderate veto is a particularly good 
idea which allows to safeguard the interest of minorities, but reduces the risk of deadlock 
or delay in resolution of vital public matters. In this respect, such practice may be viewed 
as contributing a new tool to the consociational model. The veto is utilized only in 
relation to the adopted laws -  the means that have serious impact on the position of 
minorities.
Similar to the Kosovo Assembly, the government is composed sensitively of 
ethnic division. The Framework does not specify the number of ministers, but requires 
that at least two of them be from communities other than the community that has the 
majority in the Assembly.257 At least one of those ministers has to be from the Serb 
community and another from another community. The selection of these ministers is 
exercised during consultation with parties representing non-majority communities. This 
procedure resembles grand coalition decision-making where minorities have to cooperate
254 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, s. 9.1.39.
255 Ibid., s. 9.1.40.
256 Ibid., s. 9.1.42.
257 Ibid., s. 9.3.5.
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and compromise in order to select the most suitable candidates. The decisions of the 
Government have to be reached by consensus if possible.258
Generally, I would assess the composition and the decision-making procedures in 
the Kosovo Provisional Institutions as sound and sensitively incorporating the some 
principles of consociationalism. Some procedures and guarantees are particularly well 
tailored. For example, the moderate mutual veto seems to provide sufficient flexibility for 
both protection of minority interests and effective decision-making. Another important 
achievement is that the incentives for grand coalition and the principle of proportionality 
are incorporated not only in relation to the legislative branch, but also in relation to the 
executive and the organs created by the Kosovo Assembly. This way the application of 
consociationalism becomes fairly well-rounded and coherent. The exception to this 
coherency is the procedure for the election of the President of Kosovo, which does not 
sufficiently guarantee the panethnicity of the head of the Province. On the one hand, I 
agree that not every step of the decision-making should be burdened with the pursuit of 
panethnicity. On the other hand, the President of Kosovo is one of the key political 
Figures in the Province (although he nominally does not have very ample powers) and the 
absence of any consociational-type requirements for his election may become a serious 
impediment for the success of consociationalism in Kosovo.
2. Joint Interim Administrative Structure
The JIAS is an organ that currently provides the participation of Kosovars in the 
decision-making at the provincial level.239 The JIAS was established by the Agreement 
signed between the leaders of the “Rambouillet formula” (Hashim Thaci, Ibrahim 
Rugova, Rexhep Qosja) and the SRSG Bernard Koucher on December 13, 1999. The 
Agreement determined that the citizens of Kosovo “will work in the Joint Interim 
Administrative Structure through participation in the Kosovo Transitional Council, the 
Interim Administrative Council, Administrative Departments, as well as in the different 
administrative structures at the municipal level.”260 The creation of the JIAS sought to 
resolve several problems: eliminate parallel governments, which undermined the
258 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, s. 9.3.16.
259 The structure is intended to be in operation until the Provisional Institutions are put in place.
260 Agreement, 13 December, 1999, http://www.un.org/peaceJcosovo/press/agree.htm
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authority of the UNMIK;261 integrate minorities in governing structures; and promote 
cooperation among local actors as well as between local political forces and the UNMIK.
The main points of the Agreement were subsequently endorsed in the UNMIK 
Regulation 2000/1 on a Joint Interim Administrative Structure, which authorized the 
establishment of the JIAS. The Regulation affirmed that local political forces share 
administrative management of the Province with the UNMIK.262 The JIAS became a 
unified organ of Kosovo administrative management. All Kosovo structures as of 
December 1999, whether they were legislative, executive or judicial, had to integrate into 
the JIAS.*63 Importantly, this also concerned the Kosovo parallel governments - the 
Provisional Government of Kosovo' led by Thaci and the Presidency of the Republic of 
Kosovo' associated with the LDK. On merger in the JIAS, those structures ceased to 
exist.264
The JIAS is placed within the structure of the UNMIK and is headed by the SRSG 
Office (See, illustration 2). No JIAS body has power to issue binding decisions and 
serves only as a consultative body for the UNMIK. The SRSG retains full legislative and 
executive authority in the Province.
The JIAS consists of two bodies: the Kosovo Transitional Council and the Interim 
Administrative Council. The Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC) is the highest 
consultative body of the JIAS. The Interim Advisory Council (IAC) is an executive board 
for the JIAS and an advisory body for the SRSG. The IAC represents the political forces 
of Kosovo, while the KTC is intended to express the voice of the wider Kosovo 
community -  religious and community leaders, NGO sector, independents.
The inclusiveness of local communities and political elites in both organs of the 
JIAS was tailored in light of the grand coalition and proportionality principle. In relation
Agreement, 13 December, 1999, http://www.un.org/peace.kosovo/press/agree.htm 
At the time of the UNMIK deployment, there were two shadow governments in Kosovo: one 
associated with the KLA (the Provisional Government of Kosovo' headed by Thaci) and another 
- with the LDK (the Presidency of the Republic of Kosovo*).
262 Regulation on the Kosovo Joint Interim Administrative Structure, UNMK/Reg/2000/1, s.l(a) 
(2001), online: United Nations Homepage <
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/regO 1 .html> (date accessed: 21 January 
2001).
263 Ibid, s. 1(c).
264 Ibid.
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to the IAC these principles are applied in a “selective” way. The IAC consists of eight 
members, four of which are representatives from Kosovo and another four representatives 
from the UNMIK.265 All the members are appointed by the SRSG. The Kosovo 
representatives should include three Kosovo Albanians and one Kosovo Serb. Currently, 
the IAC includes three Kosovo Albanian leaders (Rugova, Thaci and Qosja -  Rambouilet 
formula), a representative of the Serb National Council (Rada Trajkovic) as an observer, 
four UNMIK representatives and an observer for each side.266 Observers can participate 
in discussions, but do not have a right to vote. Such composition of the IAC may be 
regarded as a grand coalition between the international administration and the main 
(Albanian and Serb) political segments of the Kosovo society, but it does not represent a 
grand coalition of the segments of the whole Kosovo society. I see the explanation for 
this selective inclusiveness in the following. First, at the time of the formation of the 
JIAS it was not possible to ensure the representation of all the Kosovo communities. 
Large numbers of Kosovars remained in refuge abroad or were internally displaced. 
Consequently, there was no opportunity to obtain a clear idea about the numbers of 
particular minorities that required representation. Moreover, many minority communities 
were not organized politically to effectively represent the whole ethnic segment in the 
JIAS. Second, it might have been easier and more efficient to negotiate a political 
agreement with the key Kosovar leaders rather than with a handful of leaders of larger 
and smaller segments.
Regulation on the Kosovo Joint Interim Administrative Structure, supra note 262, s. 4.
366 Interim Administrative Council, online: United Nations Homepage
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/twelvemonths/jias.html (date accessed: 18 November 
2000).
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Picture 3. The Structure of the JIAS.
Source: UN Homepage, United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo 
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/twelvemonths/jiasimages.html
The two main powers of the IAC are to make recommendations to the SRSG in 
regard to the regulations to be adopted or changed and to provide policy guidelines for 20 
Administrative departments. The decision-making procedures of the IAC represent a 
form of a mutual veto: “Members of the Interim Administrative Council shall try, to all
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possible extent, to reach consensus.”267 This formula, on the one hand, requires 
consensus. On the other, it permits derogation from the requirement of consensual 
decision-making, thus, mitigating the danger of deadlock. The Regulation also 
incorporates an additional safeguard against deadlock: the SRSG can make a decision 
himself if the IAC is not able to do so by consensus or by three quarter majority.268 In 
addition to this, the SRSG is able to control the decisions through his another power: 
even if a decision is made by consensus or by three quarter majority of the IAC, the 
SRSG can advise the Council to make a different decision.269 At the same time, the 
concern about deadlock was not very high because the IAC served as a forum for the 
expression of opinions of the local communities, but not as an organ adopting binding 
decisions where outcomes may be vetoed. In this respect, the power of the SRSG can be 
viewed as an expansion of the coercive power of the international administration rather 
than the means to overcome deadlock associated with mutual veto.
Although the IAC does not have power to produce binding decisions that affect 
the Province, the body plays an important role in the more effective exercise of the 
international administration. First, it helps to promote dialogue between the leaders of the 
major Kosovo political forces.270 Second, it is a mechanism for providing greater 
legitimacy to the UNMIK decisions271 and a way of obtaining political support to 
international initiatives among local structures.
The KTC represents the Kosovo political, ethnic and religious groups. It consists 
of 36 members. Among them are 4 Kosovo members of the IAC, 11 representatives of 
Kosovo political parties,272 3 representatives of religious communities,273 10 civil society
267 Regulation on the Kosovo Joint Interim Administrative Structure, supra note 262, s. 6.1.
268 Ibid., s. 6.3. See, the suggestion that was made in Chapter I concerning the possibility of 
international intervention in order to prevent deadlocks associated with mutual veto.
269 Ibid., s. 6.2,6.3.
270 The IAC is not exactly an example of a grand coalition because it includes only the Kosovo 
political elites -  the three parties that participated in the Rambouillet talks -  and a Serb 
representative in recognition of the importance of the Serb segment in the Kosovo society. 
Because of this selective inclusiveness the IAC represents a coalition not of all segments of the 
Kosovo society, but only of those deemed to be the most influential.
271 The UNMIK does not make decisions unilaterally, but consults with the local parties. This 
helps to reduce the criticism of the neo-colonialist nature of an international administration.
272 The following parties have their representatives in the KTC: LDK, PLK, PDK, PRK, LKCK, 
PPK, LBD, PShDK, PSDK. An interesting thing is that all of them are Albanian. The only
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representatives, and 8 representatives of national communities.274 Because of its more 
comprehensive composition (compared to the IAC), the KTC more resembles a grand 
coalition as defined by Lijphart. Interestingly, this grand coalition body has more limited 
competence than the “elite club” of the IAC. The Regulation on the Establishment of the 
JIAS does not spell out the competencies assigned to the KTC. This fact is surprising. 
The UNMIK sought to involve the local parties in provincial management, but it does not 
give any specific powers to an organ which broadly represents Kosovo society. This state 
of affairs is, however, understood from the practical perspective. It was easier for the 
UNMIK to deal with several most influential leaders rather than debate issues with 
numerous leaders of smaller segments.
The JIAS was not intended to serve as an organ of self-government. Rather, the 
structure was designed as means to assist the more effective work of the UNMIK. 
Perhaps due to the “assistant” role of the JIAS, the principles of consociationalism were 
applied to it in a limited way. The proportionality principle - an important precondition 
for a variety of opinions and perspectives - was sufficiently observed only in one of the 
JIAS organs, the KTC. The mutual veto existed in a very weak form in the IAC and was 
not prescribed for the KTC. The weak mutual veto might be seen as appropriate for the 
JIAS, which played a consultative rather than a real decision-making role in the Kosovo 
administration.
The structure of the JIAS allows for both close cooperation between the SRSG 
and Kosovo leaders (through the IAC) and consideration of the opinion of the wider 
Kosovo community (through the KTC). Neither of the JIAS organs has legislative or 
executive authority. Moreover, the SRSG has significant control over the structure by 
virtue of his powers to appoint the JIAS members and influence the decision-making. 
Thus, I see the importance of the JIAS in two areas. First, it has a symbolic nature of 
power sharing between the UNMIK and local political forces. This power sharing confers 
more legitimacy on the UNMIK decisions. Second, it provides an opportunity to obtain 
support for international initiatives by Kosovo political, community and religious leaders.
explanation that I can find for this is that the major part of minority parties was not officially 
formed at that time. However, this explanation does not seem to be convincing enough.
273 Muslim community, Roman Catholic Church, Serb Orthodox Church.
274 Turks, Roma, Serbs, and Bosniacs.
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Through the JIAS, the UNMIK partially resolved one of the controversies of peace­
building -  retaining the full control of the international administration over the provincial 
decision-making, but at the same time securing sufficient legitimacy for its decisions.273
3. Municipal boards and councils
At the municipal level the system of interaction between the UNMIK officers and 
local political forces was designed similarly to the JIAS described above.276 A municipal 
board appointed by an UNMIK Municipal Administrator was put in charge of the 
municipal administration.277 The local parties and communities participated in 
administration through municipal councils also appointed by the Municipal 
Administrator. A municipal council, which represented the citizens of the municipality,278 
served as a consultative body to the Municipal Administrator. The Regulation on the 
Joint Interim Administrative Structure, which also serves as the basis for the structure of 
the municipal administration, does not refer to any consociational-type techniques either 
in regard to the composition or decision-making in Municipal Councils.279
The analysis of the data on municipal councils and boards appointments,280 gives 
rise to the conclusion that representatives to municipal councils were appointed with an 
attempt to proportional representation of each party and ethnic community in a given 
municipality. Although attempts were made to ensure wide representation of political 
parties and other actors in municipal boards and municipal councils, these bodies, as a 
rule, were dominated by the largest ethnic majority parties registered in a municipality.
Since prior to the elections there was no authoritative reference as to the level of 
popular support for a particular party, the appointments from parties representing the
273 I mean that the involvement of the local parties in decision-making mitigates the critique that
peace-builders impose the solutions that they deem appropriate.
*6 Please, note that the structure has changed after the 2000 municipal elections. The discussion
of the current powers of municipalities is to follow.
277 Regulation on the Kosovo Joint Interim Administrative Structure, supra note 262, S . .8 .1.
278 Ibid.
279 The requirement that “the Municipal Council shall represent the citizens of the municipality” 
may be interpreted as a requirement for proportionate representation. However, I am inclined to 
think that this phrase means that the Municipal Councils are working in capacity of representative 
organs for a municipality.
280 Profiles o f the Municipalities in Kosovo, online: OSCE Homepage
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/docuinents/ieports/municipal profiles/ (date accessed: 3 May 2001).
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same ethnic group usually were contingent on the authority of that party within the JIAS 
(and particularly in the IAC). Consequently, in the majority of Kosovo municipalities, the 
LDK and the PDK had more seats than other Albanian parties. Minorities often were not 
sufficiently represented even in multiethnic municipalities.
At the provincial level the UNMIK developed a rather elaborate structure for the 
involvement of diverse elements of Kosovo society in the administration of the Province. 
In contrast, at the municipal level the consociational techniques were given less attention. 
In my opinion, such a step is consistent with the situation in Kosovo in 1999 and early 
2000. The elaboration of a certain political settlement and stability in Kosovo was 
primarily contingent on the agreement between the main Kosovar leaders and the 
UNMIK. In my view, one of the tendencies of Kosovo political life is that authority and 
decision-making flows from the center to the peripheries. The parties’ local offices 
follow the stance of the headquarters, rather than actively participate in shaping the 
party’s position. Thus, obtaining support and consensus of the main Kosovar leaders was 
the main precondition for more or less permanent political settlement. Consequently, the 
UNMIK was more concerned with the functioning of the organs at the provincial than at 
the municipal level.
4. Powers of municipalities
After the 2000 October elections in Kosovo the structure of the municipal 
administration and powers of the municipal organs were altered. The change took place 
according to Regulation 2000/45 on Self-government of Municipalities in Kosovo. The 
Regulation spells out the substantive and procedural details of the “democratic and 
autonomous self-government at the municipal level.”281 Most importantly, it defines the 
powers of municipalities and the relations between the Central Authority and a 
municipality. It also sets up the foundations for minority participation in municipal 
decision-making.
281 Regulation on Self-government o f Municipalities in Kosovo, UNMK/Reg/2000/45, s. 1, 
online: United Nations Homepage <
http://www.un.org/Deace/kosovo/Dages/repuladons/ref045.htnil> (date accessed: 1 June 2001).
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According to the Regulation, municipalities are the basic territorial unit of local 
self-government, which exercise all powers not expressly reserved to the UNMIK.282 
Such autonomy is not precisely segmental autonomy as described by Lijphart. According 
to him,283 segmental autonomy is given to a segment of a society, not merely to a 
territorial unit. In the case of Kosovo, territorial units do not necessarily coincide with the 
territorial concentration of ethnic minority segments. This may be true only for the three 
northern municipalities inhabited by Serbs. In other municipalities minorities are 
concentrated in particular areas. For them, segmental autonomy would be a level of self- 
government lower than municipal (e.g., a district).
The highest representative body of a municipality is the Municipal Assembly284 
elected directly by the people. Municipalities are responsible for a wide range of local 
affairs, including licensing of building and other development; management of municipal 
property; health care; primary and secondary education; public services; social services; 
and control over public utilities, etc.28S Municipalities do not have power over local 
police, which remains under the Central Authority. The responsibility for financial 
administration will not be transferred to municipalities until an independent auditor 
certifies that necessary management systems are in place.286
As a general rule, the decisions of Municipal Assemblies and their organs are 
made by simple majority of present and voting members.287 If they are made by majority, 
it is quite probable that the ethnic majority will be able to make key decisions without 
minority support. However, such important municipal officials as the president of the 
Assembly288 and the Deputy-president are elected by two-thirds majority.289
The Regulation provides for the mechanisms of control over the activities of 
municipal administration (in terms of both general administration and protection of
“ Ibwl. s. 2.
283 Lijphart, supra note 41 at 14.
284 Ibid., s. 10.1.
285 Ibid., s. 3,3.1.
186 Ibid, s. 46.2.
287 Ibid., 14.4.
288 The President of the Assembly is responsible for general supervision of the execution of 
decisions adopted by the Assembly and of the financial administration of the municipality. He or 
she also has other responsibilities assigned to him/her according to the Statute and the Rules of 
Procedure. Ibid., s. 28.
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minorities). Supervision over the actions of municipalities is exercised at three levels: by 
the Central Authority, by the Municipal Administrator and by the Provisional Institutions 
of Self-government.
The responsibilities of the Provisional Institutions in the field of local 
administration will be two fold. On one hand, the Provisional Institutions provide 
guidance and assistance to municipalities. On the other, they supervise municipalities in a 
number of ways. For example, they oversee the municipalities’ compliance with powers 
delegated to them and monitor the quality of municipal services.290
The Regulation on Self-Government of Municipalities reserves the right of the 
Central Authority to exercise administrative supervision over municipalities.291 The 
SRSG can set aside decisions of municipalities if they are in conflict with SCR 1244 or 
do not “sufficiently take into account the rights and interests of the communities which 
are not in the majority in the territory of the municipality.”292 He can remove members of 
municipal assemblies for misconduct and dissolve an Assembly.293 The SRSG can issue 
Administrative Directions to municipalities concerning municipal budgets and 
finances.294
Another important power of the SRSG concerns minority protection. The SRSG 
can co-opt additional members to the Assembly to ensure representation of communities 
according to SCR 1244.295 This power allows the SRSG to exercise post-facto 
"correction” of the electoral results. Section D of this Chapter describes how the SRSG 
used this power in relation to the municipal elections.
The Municipal Administrator, as an agent of the Central Authority, exercises 
immediate control over decision making at the municipal level. He can intervene to 
ensure compliance of the decisions with SCR 1244, including the observance of
289 ibid., s. 24.1.
290 Regulation on Self-government o f Municipalities in Kosovo, supra note 281, s. 5.2.
291 Ibid., s. 3.5.
292 Ibid., s. 47.2. One can argue about the too broad construction of this provision. The 
determination of what remedies “sufficiendy take into account the rights and interests of the 
communities which are not in the majority in the territory of the municipality” may be very 
subjective. It confers wide discretion on the SRSG in interpretation and, basically, creates no 
barrier for his interference at the municipal level.
293 Ibid., s. 47.5.
294 Ibid., s. 47.8
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fundamental human rights and interests of communities.296 An Administrator can suspend 
a decision or refer the matter to the SRSG. He approves the budget and continues to be 
responsible for the administration of municipal property.297
Similarly to the SRSG, the Municipal Administrator has powers in relation to 
minority protection. The Municipal Administrator approves the appointments and the 
dismissal of senior staff to ensure that they fairly reflect the proportion of qualified 
candidates from each community.298 He may also appoint members of the Communities 
Committee and the Mediation Committee299 who are not members of the Municipal 
Assembly.300
In addition to the powers of the SRSG and the Municipal Administrator, the 
Regulation establishes another mechanism of minority participation and protection of 
minority rights - the municipal committees. This may be regarded as a mechanism of 
municipal internal self-regulation. If the committees work well for the protection of 
minority interests, the interference of the Municipal Administrator and of the SRSG may 
be minimized.
According to section 2.1 of the Regulation, the Municipal Assembly appoints the 
Policy and Finance Committee, the Communities Committee and the Mediation 
Committee. The Communities Committee and the Mediation Committee are the core 
structures, which ensure that municipality’s minorities (communities301) are not sidelined 
within the Municipal Assemblies.
The composition and powers of the Committees are designed so as to allow 
meaningful participation of minority communities in decision-making and coordinated 
action for minority protection at the municipal level. The Communities Committee
295 Ibid., s. 47.3.
296 Regulation on Self-government o f Municipalities in Kosovo, supra note 281, s. 48.1.
297 Ibid., s.48.14.
398 Ibid., s.48.12
299 The two committees are entrusted with the promotion of minority participation and minority 
protection in a municipality. Their functions are described below.
Regulation on Self-government o f Municipalities in Kosovo, supra note 281, s. 49.1
301 Interestingly, the Regulation refers not to “minorities,” but to “communities.” As some 
researchers contend, this was made to comfort Serb sensitivity over being called a minority. 
Elections in Kosovo: Moving Toward Democracy? International crisis Group Report, 7 July 2000, 
at 3, online: ICG Homepage < http.7/www.intl-crisis-
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includes both members of the Assembly and representatives of communities (at least one 
representative for each of the communities residing in the municipality).302 Further, the 
community that has the majority in the municipality shall have less than one half of the 
membership in the Committee and the remaining membership shall “fairly reflect the 
number of other communities.”303 The composition of the Committee is tailored with the 
consideration of proportionality ("fairly reflect the number of ... communities”) and 
grand coalition principle (at least one representative for each of the communities residing 
in the municipality).
As stems from the Regulation, the Communities Committee has primarily 
watchdog powers. It ensures that public officials do not discriminate against anyone on a 
ground of language, religion, ethnic origin or affiliation; that everyone enjoys equal rights 
and equal employment opportunities in municipal services; and that the municipal civil 
service has a fair proportion of candidates from different communities.304 Importantly, 
the powers of the Communities Committee are broad enough to embrace, not only the 
protection of minority rights, but also the general promotion of human rights and 
equality. However, the powers of the Committee seem to be limited in another way.
First, the Committee can examine only actions taken “by or on behalf of the 
Municipal Assembly.”305 This means that other instances of violations are not within the 
scope of the Committee’s power. Moreover, because the Regulation mentions only 
“actions” it is not clear whether an act adopted by the Assembly can be challenged by the 
Committee. Apparently, the Committee does not have authority to review the acts of the 
Municipal Assembly. However, it may be useful to give it a power similar to the 
Presidency of the Kosovo Assembly -  to accept a challenge to an act and to make 
recommendations to the Assembly in regard to a challenged act, but to leave the power to 
decide on the rightfulness of such a challenge to the Assembly. Second, the Regulation 
does not provide standing for natural persons or even municipal officials. As stems from 
the provisions, the Committee initiates an examination of a particular matter on its own
grouD.org/proiects/balkans/kosovo/reports/A400Q07 07072000.pdf > (date accessed: IS March 
2001) [hereinafter Elections in Kosovo].
302 Regulation on Self-government o f Municipalities in Kosovo, supra note 281, s.23.3
303 Ibid., s. 23.3
304 Ibid., s. 23.4
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initiative. Third, if a violation occurs, the Communities Committee is not entitled to take 
an action itself -  it has to refer the case to the Mediation Committee. Fourth, I doubt the 
ability of the Committee to be independent and impartial because part of its members are 
members of the Assembly, thus, they may be reluctant to investigate and expose to 
attention wrongful actions “by or on behalf of the Municipal Assembly.”
The Mediation Committee is another organ concerned with the protection of 
communities and its members. It consists of an equal number of the members of the 
Municipal Assembly who are not members of the Communities Committee and 
representatives of communities who do not belong to the community that forms the 
majority in the municipality.306 As follows from the context of the Regulation, the 
Mediation Committee cannot bring a matter itself, but deals with the issues referred to it 
by the Communities Committee.
The Mediation Committee investigates the matter and tries to resolve the problem 
by mediation. It has to submit a report on each matter with recommendations to the 
Municipal Assembly. The Assembly decides what further action to take. If the Municipal 
Assembly does not make any decision within 21 days after the submission of the report, 
or if the Communities Committee is dissatisfied with the decision of the Municipal 
Assembly, it (the Communities Committee) may refer the matter to the Central Authority.
The municipal system of minority protection presupposes close cooperation 
between the Mediation Committee, the Communities Committee and the Municipal 
Assembly. If they function harmoniously, the whole system might work well for the 
protection of communities. However, this mechanism has certain drawbacks. One of 
them is the separation of the authority to investigate from the authority to make a final 
decision about the action to be taken. The Regulation creates a four-step approach to 
investigation and resolution of violations. Initially, the Communities Committee 
examines the matter and refers it to the Mediation Committee. Then, the Mediation 
Committee investigates the matter and tries to resolve it by mediation. If mediation fails, 
the Municipal Assembly has to make a decision about the further action. Next, if the 
Communities Committee is dissatisfied with the decision, it may refer the matter to the
305 Ibid., s. 23.6
306 Regulation on Self-government o f Municipalities in Kosovo, supra note 281, s. 23.3
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Central Authority. The loose time frame for dealing with matters (28 days for the 
Mediation Committee to submit a report to the Municipal Assembly and 21 days for the 
Municipal Assembly to decide on the action to be taken) may result in substantial delays 
in the resolution of urgent matters. This is particularly harmful if the Mediation 
Committee had failed to resolve the matter by mediation and is waiting for the Municipal 
Assembly’s decision to proceed by other means. The above-mentioned drawbacks may 
limit the capabilities of the Municipal structures to deal effectively with the instances of 
violations. It would be advisable to establish a special procedure for dealing with matters 
requiring urgent resolution. It would also be helpful to create a possibility for referring 
the most serious cases to prosecutor or a judge for further investigation.
The Regulation left sufficient discretion for the Assemblies to establish the rules 
of procedure for the organs created by the Assemblies. For example, it did not set the 
decision-making procedures for the Communities Committee and for the Mediation 
Committee. As we have already seen in relation to the Kosovo Assembly, the decision­
making procedure may be an important safeguard for taking into account interests of all 
the communities. Perhaps such delimitation was not necessary because the composition 
of the Committees is itself a safeguard against the domination of majority community 
(e.g., the Communities Committee has to have less than a half of the members of the 
community which forms majority in the municipality). The procedural discretion of the 
Municipal Assemblies opens the door for the development of their responsibility and 
independence. Even more importantly, the survey of the adopted approach by Municipal 
Assemblies will provide the UNMIK with the important feedback about the general 
willingness of the Assembly members to create additional guarantees for minorities 
where it is not legally required.
Interim conclusions
There has been a gradual expansion in the role of local political forces and 
communities from mere consultation with the UNMIK to independent exercise of 
administrative functions. This process evidences the realization of the principal goals of 
peace-building. With the adoption of the Regulation of Self-Government of 
Municipalities in Kosovo, municipalities obtained sufficient powers to administer
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municipal affairs. After the implementation of the Framework, organs of self-government 
will also be established at the provincial level.
While elected organs have primary responsibility for the administration in 
assigned areas, the international administration retains the power to control and supervise 
them. The SRSG can exercise control over self-government through his dormant powers. 
Some of these dormant powers can be exercised without seeming restrictive (for 
example, the SRSG can issue administrative directions to Municipal Assemblies or take 
measures to ensure that the needs of a village or settlement are properly addressed, or 
decide whether measures sufficiently take into account the interests of minorities). Such 
an extensive power may become an impediment to the development of independent self- 
government in Kosovo and may violate the provisions of the peace-building concept.
The system of local organs and the supervision of the international administration 
has to be flexible enough to allow for the development of self-government. The challenge 
for the future is to determine the extent to which international bodies can and should 
continue to intervene in local administration after all representative bodies start 
functioning. It is necessary to carefully balance the need to control self-government in 
Kosovo and the need to develop responsible local organs. Theoretically, any activity 
should be measured by its potential to advance the goals of peace-building -  
transformation and sustainability. After the election of the Kosovar organs on both 
municipal and provincial level, the basic process of transformation may be considered 
completed. After that, the focus has to be shifted to the development of sustainability, 
that is, to the development of independent and responsible self-government. The latter 
goal should serve as a guideline for making a decision about the interference of the SRSG 
in the activities of self-government.
In terms of the implementation of the consociational techniques, the JIAS more 
followed the existing political trends and was more guided by the expediency 
requirement. For example, more powers were given to the “elite club” of the IAC rather 
than to the KTC because it was easier to reach key decisions with the several major 
Kosovar leaders. The legal framework for permanent self-government seeks to reflect 
more fully the principles necessary for inclusive government. The plans include quite 
extensive implementation of consociationalist techniques, such as proportionality and
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mutual veto, at the provincial level. For example, the adoption of laws in the Kosovo 
Assembly allows for some kind of post facto moderate mutual veto. The composition of 
the representative organs and organs created by the Kosovo and the Municipal 
Assemblies follow the proportionality principle.
At the municipal level the principles of consociationalism are incorporated in a 
very limited way. The decision-making procedures of the Municipal Assemblies do not 
include any mutual veto type techniques. The composition of the municipal committees 
follows the principle of proportionality, but this is not enough for the protection of 
minority interests. Similar unequal implementation of consociationalism at the provincial 
and municipal level was observed in relation to the UNMIK-created organs. This may 
evidence a general tendency of the UNMIK to pay more attention to the provincial rather 
than the municipal structure. If this is true, such an imbalance may have an adverse effect 
on the democratization of Kosovo.
The inclusive effect of the rules regulating competencies and functioning of both 
municipal and provincial self-government depends not only on the extent to which these 
rules incorporate the requirements of consociationalism, but also on the “human element” 
in the representative organs. Individual positions and the perceptions of the assembly 
members will have a great impact on the atmosphere in the organs of self-government. 
The tool that can be used to influence the “human side” of representative organs is the 
rules of electoral campaigning and conduct. They are like a filter, which reduces the 
number of radical nationalist elements in representative bodies and creates preconditions 
for more cooperative organs of self-government. The section that follows discusses the 
regulation of the electoral process in Kosovo.
C. Elections in Kosovo
1. Municipal elections
a. Organizational framework fo r  elections
While the UNMIK-created organs are important for immediate involvement of 
local political forces in decision-making, elections are a fundamental step in the 
development of the Kosovo self-government.
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The preparation and conduct of elections was a joint effort of the UNMIK pillars. 
Although the OSCE was assigned a leading role in the electoral preparation,307 other 
international organizations were also involved in one or another stage of this process.
The cooperation among organizations acquired different forms. The UN Civil 
Administration set up the basic rules for elections and participated in the civil 
registration. The KFOR provided secure environment for the OMIK personnel and voters 
during the polling.308 The International Organization for Migration (IOM) assisted the 
OSCE in civil registration of the applicants from outside Kosovo.
The complex process for the organization of elections involves several core 
activities: 1) creation of basic electoral rules -  was provided by the SRSG; 2) technical 
preparation of elections -  civil registration, setting up polling stations, media campaign, 
etc. -  was carried out by the OSCE, IOM, the Civil Administration pillar and Municipal 
Election Commissions (MEC);309 3) supervision of compliance with electoral rules -  was 
exercised by two independent bodies -  the Central Election Commission (CEC) and the
307 This task is carried out through an appropriate organizational structure -  the OSCE mission in 
Kosovo (OMK).The OMIK was established by a decision of the OSCE Permanent Council with 
the purpose to “take the leading role in matters relating to institution- and democracy-building 
and human rights.” To fulfill its mandate the Mission has set up five departments: Police Training 
and Education, Democratization, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Media Affairs and Elections.
308 The OSCE and KFOR have concluded three agreements regulating their cooperation during 
the 2000 municipal elections: the Technical Agreement between the KFOR and the OSCE, the 
General Arrangement and the Local Arrangements for the Exchange of Information. The 
Technical Agreement between the OSCE and the J8 branch of KFOR sets up financial procedures 
regarding KFOR support It defines that the OSCE will seek KFOR support only in regard to 
mission essential tasks and lists the services, which may be provided to the OSCE pending 
subsequent reimbursement. The General Arrangement between the KFOR and the OSCE 
provides further details about the responsibilities of each of the parties. The arrangement affirms 
the importance of successful elections and the necessity to establish procedures for close 
cooperation between the OSCE and KFOR, "with the aim of creating optimal conditions for 
municipal elections." Cooperation between the structures is to be exercised, inter alia, through 
the OSCE/KFOR Joint Elections Operations Center (JEOC). While the OSCE is wholly 
responsible for the organization and preparation of elections, KFOR undertakes to provide a "safe 
and secure environment and freedom of movement for OSCE ...and the UNMIK personnel and 
voters in close coordination with UNMIK police." The Local Arrangements for the Exchange of 
Information between KFOR and OSCE regulate the release of information between the two 
organizations.
309 The Municipal elections Commission (MEC) carried out election administration at the 
municipal level. The responsibilities of MEC included providing information to voters and 
parties, coalitions and candidates concerning the elections, assisting in the technical arrangements 
at the Polling Stations, ensuring proper counting and compiling the electoral results. For details, 
see Electoral Rule 2000/4, online: OSCE Homepage.
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Electoral Complaints and Appeals sub-Commission (ECAC). While each of these 
activities represents an interesting topic for a scholarly discussion, this thesis is primarily 
interested in the content of the electoral rules and their enforcement.310
b. Legal rules
The regulation of the 2000 municipal elections was based on two sets of legal 
rules: Regulations issued by the UNMIK and Electoral Rules issued by the CEC within 
the powers delegated to it by the UNMIK. The UNMIK-created law on preparation and 
conduct of elections includes five core Regulations: Regulation 2000/45 On Self- 
government in Municipalities in Kosovo, Regulation 2000/39 On the Municipal Elections 
in Kosovo, Regulation 2000/21 On the Establishment of the Central Election 
Commission, Regulation 2000/13 On the Central Civil Registry, and Regulation 2000/16 
on the Registration of Political Parties in Kosovo. These Regulations set up the 
foundations for the administration and supervision of the electoral process. In particular, 
they defined the powers of municipalities and their representative organs; set up the 
electoral system; and authorized the establishment of the CEC.
The rules issued by the CEC concern the procedural side of elections, such as 
certification of political parties and coalitions; appeals and complaints procedures; voter 
registration; registration of candidates, etc.
c. Electoral system
UNMIK Regulation 2000/39 defined that the municipal elections were to be held 
according to the proportional system of voting with an “open” ballot (both party names 
and names of candidates appear on the ballot).311 Initially, “open” list was not favoured 
by international officials because it is more difficult to administer.312 However, the 
“open” ballot was ultimately adopted because it provides a voter with more information
310 Please, note that the first part of this section is devoted to the analysis of the 2000 municipal 
elections only. A brief overview of the electoral rules for the all-Kosovo elections is to follow.
311 Regulation on the Municipal Elections in Kosovo, UNMDC/REG/2000/39, online: United 
Nations Homepage < http://www.un.ory/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg039.html> (date 
accessed: 5 June 2001).
312 Elections in Kosovo, supra note 300 at 4.
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about a party and candidates, thus, giving a voter an opportunity to make a more 
conscious choice.
The proportionate system is one of the components of the consociational system 
and a reflection of the principle of proportionality. Theoretically, it is the most suitable 
for ethnically divided societies. It affords each ethnic group a vote proportional to their 
weight in the total population313 (assuming that those ethnic groups have political 
formations, which represent them). The proportional system allows small parties 
(minority parties) to gain access to municipal councils even without getting a large 
number of votes. It was also contended that this was the only electoral system that could 
be applied on the basis of the existing municipal boundaries.314
At the same time, critics suggest that such a system can be toothless against 
majority rule. “Where parties are ethnically based,... list PR is perfectly compatible with 
the domination of some groups by others.”315 A proportionate electoral system usually 
does not provide incentives to create grand coalitions as opposed to majority 
coalitions.316 This effect is also true for Kosovo. As we will see in more detail in section 
D of this Chapter, Albanian parties won an overwhelming majority of votes in the 2000 
municipal elections. No inter-ethnic pre-electoral coalitions were formed. Still, the 
proportionate system allowed several minority parties to get seats in a few municipalities 
with significant concentration of particular minorities (for example, in Dragas, Kosovo 
Polje, Prizren). Unless electoral regulations contain special requirements stimulating the 
formation of inter-ethnic coalitions (and the mentioned UNMIK Regulation did not), the 
proportionate system as such does not promote inter-ethnic dialogue and reconciliation. 
The major positive effect that the proportionate system may have is to secure (under 
favourable circumstances of active participation of minority voters and parties in the 
elections and high concentration of a particular minority in a certain district) a certain 
number of elected representatives for each segment of the society. For Kosovo the 
proportionate system was important in two respects: 1) to guarantee at least the minimal 
possibility for minority parties to obtain seats in the local legislature; 2) to create
313 Barnes, supra note 28 at 9S.
314 OSCE Press Release, “SRSG Signs Municipal Electoral Law,” 10 July 2000.
313 Horowitz, supra note 33 at 2S8.
316 Ibid.
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preconditions for less interference by the SRSG in co-option of minority members. In 
fact, in at least one municipality -  Dragas, Decani, Malishevo -  the proportionate system 
achieved the desired effect. It provided for the election of a sufficient number of 
minority representatives so that no co-option by the SRSG was necessary.
d. Norm-creation: the CEC
The CEC was established by Regulation 2000/21 as an independent and impartial 
body,317 “responsible for the conduct of elections in Kosovo.”318
The SRSG assigned the CEC with competence in two major areas. First, 
preparation of basic electoral rules governing the conduct of elections. The basic rules 
concern the term of office of elected officials, the selection of the electoral system, the 
authority of the SRSG to certify the registration process and the final results of the 
elections. These rules are prepared by the CEC, but have to be promulgated by the SRSG 
as regulations.319
The second area of CEC responsibilities includes the preparation and issuance of 
electoral rules for implementation of the electoral rules promulgated by the SRSG. These 
rules regulate the procedural aspects of elections, such as polling, voter registration, party 
registration, electoral conduct, etc. They do not require promulgation by the SRSG. 
However, the SRSG has authority under SCR 1244 to suspend or revoke any of these 
rules or decisions.320
The Regulation adheres to the “tradition” of mixed Kosovar-intemational 
membership. The CEC consists of nine Kosovars and three international members. The 
Kosovar members include the representatives from the LDK, the PDK and the LBD321 as 
well as representatives of media, NGOs, Slavic Muslim and Turkish communities. The 
place was also reserved for Serbs, but they chose not to participate.
317 Regulation on the Establishment o f the Central Election Commission, UNMIK/REG/2000/21, 
s. 1, online: United Nations Homepage <
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg021 ,html> (date accessed: 7 May 2001).
318 Ibid., s. 4.1.
319 Ibid., s. 4.2.
320 Ibid., s. 4.4.
321 The OSCE required all political party representatives to resign all their leadership positions, 
but they could retain party membership.
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The Regulation on the Establishment of the CEC does not spell out the powers of 
the CEC in great detail. It only distinguishes the areas regulated by the basis rules and 
those governed by the rules of the CEC. The CEC has used its power to issue Electoral 
Rules in order to develop its own powers. In particular, it has established its authority to 
appoint and remove members of MECs and the ECAC;322 to certify the eligibility of 
parties, coalitions, citizens’ initiatives and independent candidates to participate in 
elections;323 to accredit elections observers;324 and to review applications for candidate 
registration.323 In general, the powers of the CEC may be characterized as combining the 
primarily norm-creative function with the responsibility for the general electoral 
supervision.
e. Electoral Rules
The CEC adopted 14 Electoral Rules that regulate various aspects of the 
municipal elections. Rule 1 contains the Code of Conduct for Political Parties, Coalitions, 
Citizens’ Initiatives, Candidates, and Their Supporters.326 Rules 2 and 4 established the 
ECAC and MECs accordingly. The other eleven rules focus on the certification of 
parties, coalitions, independent candidates and citizens’ initiatives; voter registration 
appeals; voter information; election observers; registration of candidates; voters’ lists 
confirmation; conduct of media during elections; finance disclosure of the parties; polling 
and counting of ballots.
Although the regulation of every aspect of the electoral process is important, 
particular attention should be paid to regulation of the conduct of political organizations 
contesting the elections. Their conduct and pre-electoral tactics have a crucial impact on
Electoral Rule 4 & 2, online: OSCE Homepage
http://www.osce.ory/clections/electoralrules.php37rules2 (date accessed: 10 May 2001).
333 Electoral Rule 3, online: OSCE Homepage
httpi/www.osce org/elections/electoralrules.php3?rule=2 (date accessed: 10 May 2001).
334 Electoral Rule 8, online: OSCE Homepage
http://www.osce.org/elections/elcctoralrules.phD37rules2 (date accessed: 10 May 2001).
335 Electoral Rule 9, online: OSCE Homepage
http://www.osce.ory/elections/clectoralrulcs.Dhp37rules2 (date accessed: 10 May 2001).
336 The Code o f Conduct for political parties, coalitions, citizens’ initiatives, independent 
candidates, their supporters and candidates, CEC/Electoral Rule 1/2000, online: OSCE 
Homepage [hereinafter Code o f Conduct].
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the general stability of the electoral campaign and the electoral results. As we have 
noted before, ethnic parties have a tendency to exploit ethnic sentiment (inter alia, 
through making nationalistic statements and otherwise inciting inter-ethnic hatred) in 
their electoral campaigns. The use of such methods of campaigning can, first, have a 
destabilizing effect on the interethnic relations, and, second, help radical nationalist 
parties to legitimately win seats in the legislature. These potential dangers can be 
minimized through appropriate electoral regulation. The supervision of the activities of 
political organizations can be exercised at several levels: 1) when a party seeks to enter 
the political arena -  through registration and certification of parties; 2) during the 
electoral campaign -  through establishment of binding rules of electoral conduct and 
organs for their enforcement; 3) after the elections -  through financial disclosure of the 
expenses on the electoral campaign. Each of the three procedures is intended to monitor 
the activities of parties and to prevent them from exploiting ethnic sentiment and other 
inappropriate techniques in their electoral campaigns. In turn, this monitoring creates the 
foundations for more peaceful electoral processes and potentially more tolerant and 
cooperative representative bodies.
/. Pre-electoral regulation: Certification and registration o f parties, coalitions, 
independent candidates or citizens’ initiatives
According to the existing rules and regulations, the “admissibility” of a political 
party to participate in elections in Kosovo is conditioned on fulfillment of two 
requirements: registration and certification. Registration is exercised according to 
UNMIK Regulation 2000/16 On the Registration and Operation of Political Parties in 
Kosovo.327
Registration allows the exercise of the initial control over a party. One of the 
central aims of such control is to prevent the legitimization of openly nationalist parties. 
This control is exercised, inter alia, through verification of the content of a party’s statute 
and political programme.
327 Please note that registration is required for political parties only, while certification is 
mandatory for parties, coalitions, citizens’ initiatives and independent candidates.
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The Regulation requires that the political objectives of the party “specifically 
include a commitment to democratic principles and the protection and promotion of 
human rights as well as an affirmation of respect, tolerance and understanding for all, 
irrespective of their ethnicity.”328 If a party’s statute and programme is inconsistent with 
the UNMIK Regulations and the applicable law, registration is denied. Registration can 
also be denied if the name of the party may incite hatred or violence or if a party violates 
a prohibition that individuals indicted by the ICTY or any other war-crime tribunal 
cannot hold any elective position in a party.329 However, to date there is no information 
that a party has been denied registration on such a ground. A party may also be 
sanctioned by suspension or revocation of registration if it violates Regulation 2000/16 
during the exercise of its activities.330
Another part of the pre-electoral monitoring is certification of parties, coalitions, 
independent candidates and citizens’ initiatives. To participate in elections a party, 
coalition, independent candidate or citizens’ initiative has to certify its eligibility with the 
CEC. A necessary part of the application for certification is a statement of a party, 
coalition, or citizens’ initiative or an independent candidate that they abide by the 
Electoral Rules, applicable Regulations and Directions and Procedures.331 This statement 
is an express proof of a party’s obligation to honour the rules of the Code of Conduct. As 
we will see below, the ECAC often referred to these statements in its decisions.
ii. Regulation o f the electoral conduct
The Code of Conduct
The Code of Conduct for Political Parties, Coalitions, Candidates and Their 
Supporters can be regarded as the central means for the regulation of the behaviour 
during the electoral campaign. The Code sets up major affirmative standards of the 
electoral campaign and the limits of admissible electoral conduct. The Code is binding on 
all the parties, coalitions, citizens’ initiatives, candidates, and their supporters.
338 Regulation on the Registration and Operation of Political Parties in Kosovo, 
UNMK/REG/2000/16, s. 2.2 (e), online: United Nations Homepage
<http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/iegulations/reg016.html> (date accessed: 9 May 2001).
329 ibid.,
330 Ibid..
331 Electoral Rule 2, supra note 321, s. 3.35
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The Code affirms two of the most important means of electoral campaigning: the 
right of the parties332 to hold large public meetings and the right to publish and distribute 
placards, posters and other materials for the purposes of parties’ electoral campaigns. 
Importantly, political organizations do not need a permit to hold public meetings. 
However, in order to reduce the risk of disturbances of public law and order during such 
rallies, the Rule requires the organizers to give a notification to the International Civilian 
Police (ICP) at least four days prior to the event.333
The Code defines actions prohibited during the electoral process. The majority of 
these prohibitions seek to prevent the promotion of ethnic hatred, violence and voter 
manipulation. In particular, it is prohibited to disturb gatherings of other political parties; 
carry and display weapons at political meetings; destroy placards and other materials 
used by other parties in their political campaign; use language that can provoke violence 
or spread hatred, etc.334 The Code specifically outlaws intimidation and the use of 
violence during the electoral process.335
Additional restrictions on electoral activities are imposed during 24 hours prior to 
polling. The Code prohibits holding meetings, presenting any materials at polling 
stations, use of public address systems and other means that may influence the voters’ 
choice.
The Code is only a part of the control mechanism over the electoral conduct. It 
sets the norms of admissible behaviour, but does not contain any sanctions for violations 
of its provisions. The Code’s standards of behaviour are complemented by enforcement 
mechanisms described below.
Enforcement of electoral rules: the ECAC
Proper election supervision requires rules and an enforcement mechanism to 
ensure that parties comply with those rules.336 Enforcement can be exercised in several
332 For more convenience I will use the term “parties” instead of “parties, coalitions, citizens’ 
initiatives, and independent candidates.”
333 Electoral Rule 2, supra note 321.
334 Ibid., s. 1.10.
335 Ibid.
336 Daniel Bessington, "From Dayton to Sarajevo: Enforcing Election Law in Post War Bosnia 
and Herzegovina" 12 Am U Inti L. Rev. SS3 at SS7.
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ways - either by the political authority itself, like the UN, on an ad hoc basis or by a 
special enforcement body created for that purpose.337
In Kosovo, the main role in the enforcement of electoral rules was assigned to the 
Electoral Complaints and Appeals sub-Commission (ECAC). The ECAC was established 
by the CEC Electoral Rule 2 in May 2000.338 The mandate of the ECAC includes 
“adjudicating all complaints concerning the electoral process as established in all 
applicable Regulations, Administrative Directions and Electoral Rules”339 and 
adjudicating appeals on decisions of the Joint Registration Taskforce concerning voter 
registration.340 The ECAC issues decisions and advisory opinions.
Special procedures ensure that the hearing of complaints is conducted fairly and 
in a timely manner. The ECAC can exercise its power only if a complaint is admissible. 
A complaint must be submitted by a person who has a legal interest or who claims that 
his rights were violated. It must be submitted no later than three days after the violation 
has occurred or become known. The ECAC shall refuse to adjudicate a manifestly ill- 
founded complaint.341
The Rule restricts the standing to individuals who have a legal interest, or whose 
rights have been violated. This requirement has a well-founded practical justification -  to 
prevent overloading the Sub-commission with complaints. At the same time, this 
restriction may have an adverse effect on the protection of electoral rights. Many 
individuals may fear lodging complaints or may merely be unaware of this right. It would 
be advisable to allow the UN and the OSCE officials and electoral observers to bring 
electoral complaints because they are competent enough to realize when a violation has 
occurred and to take appropriate legal action to correct that violation.
Besides the power to hear complaints and appeals, the ECAC has enough coercive 
power to “stimulate” parties to comply with the Electoral Rules. The CEC authorized the 
ECAC to impose penalties on parties, coalitions, citizens’ initiatives and independent
337 Blessington, supra note 336 at 643.
338 Regulation 2000/12 on the Establishment of the CEC expressly provided for the authority of 
the CEC to create an electoral complaints body. S. 4.3(i).
339 Electoral Rule 2, supra note 321, s. 2.0 (a).
340 Ibid., s. 2.25 (a).
341 Note, that the Regulation does not clarify what complaint may be regarded as “manifestly ill-
founded.”
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candidates. Electoral Rule 2 prescribes two types of sanctions that can be imposed for 
violation of Electoral Rules. The first group includes a remedial collection action and 
fines up to 10 000 DM.342 These sanctions are intended for less serious violations of 
electoral conduct and can be imposed by the ECAC alone. The other group is comprised 
of more severe penalties: removal of members of a MEC, Confirmation Centre Staff or 
members of the Polling Station Committee; removal of candidates from the candidate’s 
list; removal of candidates from party lists without the possibility for a party to replace 
him;343 exclusion of a party, coalition, independent candidate or citizens’ initiative from 
running in the elections; exclusion of a candidate or party, coalition, independent 
candidate or citizens’ initiative from taking part in the elections for up to six years.344 
These penalties may be imposed by the ECAC only after the approval of the Chairman of 
the CEC in consultation with the CEC.345
The procedure concerning electoral appeals is similar to the procedure with 
electoral complaints described above. Appeals can be submitted by an individual who has 
a legal interest or who claims that his rights have been violated. The appeal has to be 
submitted within three days after the decision of the Joint Registration Taskforce has 
been communicated to a person.346 An applicant has to exhaust all administrative means 
before filing an appeal with the ECAC.
According to Electoral Rules 5 and 7, the ECAC has the authority to include an 
applicant’s name in the Voters’ List if the ECAC finds that a voter meets the eligibility 
requirements. The ECAC can also impose all the above-mentioned penalties on 
individuals responsible for registration violations. Decisions on electoral appeals are final 
and binding.
The ECAC occupies a special position in relation to the CEC. In terms of 
competence, the CEC and the ECAC are established as separate bodies with distinct 
functions and powers. In particular, the ECAC cannot adjudicate complaints on the
343 Electoral Rule 2, supra note 321, s. 2.20(a).
343 The ECAC usually does not indicate a particular candidate that has to be stricken. This 
decision is left for the party. However, the electoral rules impose a certain restraint on such 
decision: a female candidate cannot be stricken from the list
344 Electoral Rule 2, supra note 321, s. 2.20(b).
345Ibid.
346 Ibid., s. 2.25(b).
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decisions of the CEC.347 The decisions of the ECAC cannot be appealed to the CEC.348 
However, in certain respects the ECAC is subordinated to the CEC. The Chairman of the 
CEC appoints the members of the ECAC.349 The CEC decides on the term of the ECAC’s 
mandate. The sub-commission has to report to the Chairman of the CEC.350
The ECAC is a quasi-judicial body. Similarly to judicial bodies, the ECAC has 
established and affirmed its authority through its decisions. For example, in Advisory 
Opinion No.l, the ECAC affirmed its power to penalize parties, coalitions, independent 
candidates and citizens’ initiatives for violations of applicable laws, regulations and rules. 
It also stated that the ECAC’s powers to investigate and punish violations will continue 
through Election Day. The ECAC will remain in operation, enjoying its full powers until 
all complaints are resolved and the ECAC’s “job is complete.”351
The ECAC has also assumed the power to interpret the Electoral Rules. In 
Advisory Opinion No.2, it decided whether mosques and churches are public buildings 
within the meaning of Electoral Rule 2000/1 sec. 1.10.2.352 The ECAC held that the 
communal use of mosques and churches gives these places a public character. Thus, 
mosques and churches are public buildings within the meaning of the Electoral Rule and 
placing posters or other signs related to the election campaign on them will constitute a 
violation of those rules.
The ECAC has issued decisions on a variety of violations of electoral rules. These 
decisions may be roughly categorized according to the issues that they addressed: 1) 
notification about public meetings; 2) incitement of violence; 3) display of weapons; and 
4) inappropriate behaviour of political parties and their supporters.
1) Notification about public meetings
The ECAC has adjudicated several cases concerning notification about electoral 
rallies, including three similar cases involving the LDK, the PDK and the AAK.
347 Electoral Rule 2, supra note 321.
348 Ibid.
349 ibid
330 Ibid., s. 2.0(e).
351 Advisory Opinion No.l, online: OSCE Homepage <
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/elections/ecacdecisions-e.pho37ns5 > (date accessed: 29 May 2001).
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According to section l.S (b) of the Code of Conduct, parties have to notify the 
ICP about their public meetings/events at least four days in advance. The ECAC has 
emphasized that, according to s. 3.35(a), of the Electoral Rule on the certification of 
political parties, coalitions, citizens’ initiatives and independent candidates parties signed 
a statement that they will abide the Electoral Rules and all applicable regulations.353 
Following the principle that punishment has to be commensurate with the gravity of 
offence, the ECAC distinguished the failure to give proper notification about political 
rally (i.e., notify the ICP about a meeting no less than four days in advance) and the 
failure to give any notification at all. Parties that failed to properly notify the ICP about 
meetings were fined 250 DM per meeting. Parties that gave no notification at all were 
fined 500 DM per meeting.
The decisions of the ECAC included an “incentive” for parties to pay fines 
without delay: if fines were not paid by the deadline, the ECAC reserved a right to 
recommend the removal of one candidate from the candidate’s list.
2) Incitement o f violence
The international organizations working in Kosovo reported numerous acts of 
violence and intimidation during the electoral campaign. Intimidation took varying forms, 
from threats to physical abuse.
The ECAC heard a case concerning verbal threats and incitement of violence 
against the LDK.354 The complaint concerned the statements by the vice-president of the 
PDK - Skenderbe Hebibi. He was reported to declare on at least three occasions that the 
PDK would not allow the LDK to win the elections and that even if the LDK wins, the 
PDK would not allow it to take seats and would resort to violence, if necessary.
Given its authority under Electoral Rule 2, the ECAC summoned Mr Hebibi for a 
hearing to comment on the accusations. Mr Hebibi declared that he had never made such
352 The provision prohibits display of nodces, placards or names and slogans relating to the 
election campaign in or on public buildings.
353 See, section C(l(e)) of this Chapter.
354 Case No. 2000/035, online: OSCE Homepage www.osce.org/kosovo/elections/ecacdecisions- 
e.php3?n=0 (date accessed: 10 June 2001).
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statements and that his party will fully support the implementation of the electoral results, 
regardless of their outcome for the PDK.
The ECAC did not End evidence to prove the accusations. In order to clarify any 
doubts in regard to Mr Hebibi’s political intentions, the sub-Commission obliged him to 
make a public statement that he denounces violence, supports peaceful electoral 
campaign and the outcome of the elections.
Although the ECAC’s decision did not result in any severe punishment, it 
demonstrated that the Sub-commission would monitor and investigate cases of speech 
inciting violence. It was also important that the ECAC obliged an alleged violator to 
make a public statement about the denunciation of violence and support for the results of 
the elections, regardless of their outcome for the PDK. No matter how formal such 
statements are, they help to create a certain attitude335 in regard to the elections among 
party supporters and the electorate in general.
3) Display o f weapons
Carrying and displaying weapons at political meetings was another concern 
during the electoral campaign. The ECAC examined a complaint on the PDK rally in 
Glogovac, where the PDK supporters carried guns and fired them into the air.356 The 
Code of Conduct specifically prohibits carrying and displaying weapons at public 
meetings. Moreover, it obliges political parties to ensure that their supporters abide by 
the Code of Conduct.358 The sub-Commission stressed its disapproval of the presence of 
weapons at political events and declared that it will not hesitate to move against any party 
that fails to comply with Electoral Rules.359 The PDK was found responsible for the 
actions of its supporters and was fined 1 OOODM for violation of the Code of Conduct.
333 By “certain attitude” I mean commitment to support the certified electoral results and their
implementation and awareness of what conduct is admissible. The position that a party takes in
relation to these issues in many respects defines the behaviour of its supporters.
336 Case No. 2000/030, online: OSCE Homepage www.osce.org/kosovo/elections/ecacdecisions- 
e.php3?n=0 (date accessed: 10 June 2001).
3 Code o f Conduct, supra note 325, s.3.2.
338 Ibid., s.l.
339 Judgment in the Matter of a campaign held by the PDK in Glogovac, 26 September 2000, ME 
2000/030, online: OSCE Homepage http://www.osce.org/kosovo/elections/ecacdecisions-
e.php3?n=3
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4) Inappropriate behaviour o f party supporters
Many electoral complaints concerned inappropriate behaviour by the supporters 
of political parties. Such behaviour, for example, included disruption of the rallies of 
political opponents, display of graffiti and placards on public buildings, participation of 
members of Kosovo Corps in political meetings, etc.
One of the cases decided by the ECAC concerned the disruption of the LDK rally 
by PDK supporters in Lipjan.360 The actions of the interveners included chanting “Thaci 
Thaci”, throwing eggs at the LDK candidates and supporters and physical abuse. Having 
examined the photographic and video evidence, the ECAC concluded that the disruption 
was planned and organized beforehand. The actions of the PDK supporters prevented the 
LDK from the exercise of its right to “organize and hold large public meetings/events in 
which they [parties] can freely express their positions in order to gain support from the 
voters.”361 Further, the actions of the LDK supporters involved violence, which is strictly 
prohibited during the election campaign.
Notwithstanding the PDK’s responsibility to ensure that their supporters abide the 
Code of Conduct, the party not only did not stop the actions of its supporters, but 
encouraged the escalation of the situation.362 The ECAC found the PDK to be in violation 
of s. 1.0,363 1.10 (4)364 and 1.13 (a)365 of the Code of Conduct and penalized the PDK by 
striking one candidate from the PDK list in Lipjan.
Similar clashes between the LDK and the PDK supporters occurred in Suva 
Reka.366 Although the LDK supporters provoked the incident, both sides resorted to 
verbal confrontation, followed by physical abuse. Again, the ECAC referred to the 
prohibition to disturb gatherings of other political parties and prohibition of violence 
during the electoral process. The sub-Commission found that both the PDK and the LDK
360 Judgment in the Matter of a rally disruption in Lipjan, case No. 2000/037,25 September 2000, 
OSCE Homepage http://www.osce.org/kosovo/elections/ecacdecisions-e.php37ns0
361 Code o f Conduct, supra note 325, s. 1.5 (a).
362 Judgment in the Matter of a rally disruption in Lipjan, supra note 359.
363 The responsibility of parties to ensure that their supporters abide by the Code of Conduct.
364 Prohibition to disturb gatherings of the other parties.
365 Prohibition of violence and intimidation during the electoral campaign.
366 Judgment in the Matter of a rally disruption in Suva Reka, case No. 2000/043, 22 September 
2000, online: OSCE Homepage http://www.osce.org/kosovo/elections/ecacdecisions-e.php37nsO
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supporters violated these rules. Since the parties failed to ensure that their supporters 
observe the Code of Conduct, both were penalized. The LDK, whose supporters 
provoked the incident, was fined 1 000 DM. The PDK, whose supporters responded to 
the provocation, received a warning.
iii. Post-electoral regulation
The means of post-electoral control over party conduct include the requirements 
on financial disclosure of party’s income and campaign expenditures. According to 
Electoral Rule 2000/12,367 all parties, coalitions, independent candidates and citizens’ 
initiatives that were certified to participate in elections have to file with the CEC two 
financial reports: financial disclosure report, showing all income received and payments 
made and a campaign expenditures report. The financial disclosure report is filed twice: 
prior to elections and 30 days after the electoral results have been certified. The 
campaign spending disclosure report is submitted to the CEC 30 days after the 
certification of the electoral results. The campaign spending limit is established at a 
maximum of one Deutsche Mark per registered voter in each municipality where as party 
stands for elections.368 If either report is not completed in a satisfactory manner, the CEC 
can refer the party, coalition, independent candidate or citizens’ initiative to the ECAC 
for appropriate action.369
The requirements of financial disclosure are an important means to control the 
sources of party’s income and spending. The spending limits put parties on fairly equal 
footing in terms of the scope of their electoral campaigns. Unfortunately, the enforcement 
of the expenditure requirements seems to be somewhat incomplete. As appears from the 
Electoral Rule, the only possible action against violation of financial requirements is to 
refer the case of incomplete report to the ECAC “for appropriate action.” The wording of 
the Rule suggests that punishment is imposed for non-compliance with procedural 
requirements of reporting rather than for the very violation of expenditure limits and 
admissible sources of financing. The Rule also does not define what “appropriate action”
367 Electoral Rule 12, online: OSCE Homepage <
www.osce-org/kosovo/elecUons/electoralrules.phD3??ru:e=l2 > (date accessed: 26 May 2001), s. 
**Ibid, s. 12.5
369 Ibid., s. 12.0 & s. 12.10.
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the ECAC may take. Nor does the Electoral Rule on the Establishment of the ECAC give 
details about penalizing parties for non-compliance for the disclosure procedures. The 
lack of guidance in this area leaves unclear the means available the ECAC to control 
party’s compliance with financial requirements.
Interim Conclusion
To sum up, the ECAC addressed the most typical violations during the electoral 
campaign: disturbing political meetings, incitement of violence, display of weapons at 
political meetings, etc. In its judgements, it did not apply the stiffest penalties, like 
prohibiting participation of a candidate or a party from running in elections. On several 
occasions it struck a candidate from the party list, but in the majority of cases fines were 
imposed. Moreover, in relation to the least serious violations (e.g., non-compliance with 
the requirements of proper notification about their public meetings), the ECAC issued a 
party with a warning and only repetitive violation of the rule led to imposition of stricter 
sanctions.
The practice of the ECAC reveals several common features in the policy of 
enforcing electoral rules. First, the ECAC strictly observed the principle that a penalty 
has to be commensurate with the gravity of offense. Because the majority of the cases 
heard by the ECAC did not involve particularly grave violations of electoral conduct, it 
did not need to resort to the strictest penalties. In this respect, the ECAC managed to 
balance the enforcement and the goal to proceed with elections.370
Second, the ECAC penalized parties for the actions of party supporters. This 
measure prevented Kosovo parties from using the tactics which they otherwise would 
have adopted: to act through their supporters and thereby escape being immediately 
responsible and penalized for the destructive actions.
Third, the ECAC had to provide for special guarantees that a violator will comply 
with an ordered action. In many decisions the sub-Commission reserved the right to 
recommend striking a candidate from the candidates’ list if  a party does not pay an 
ordered fine on time.
370 Enforcement of electoral rule is a balancing act: “rough justice” may lead to boycott of the 
elections; weak regulation may encourage violation of rules.
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In general, although the ECAC cannot be regarded as a too interventionist 
enforcement body, its decisions created necessary “incentives” for the parties to be more 
careful about the methods to promote their electoral campaigns. In turn, these 
“incentives” contributed to fairer and more peaceful competition among parties.
The ECAC’s work did not represent an immediate instance of the implementation 
of consociationalism. It was created to ensure the compliance of political entities and 
public officials with the rules of electoral conduct and procedure rather than to facilitate 
the inclusiveness of minorities in the government. Moreover, by the criteria of 
composition and decision-making procedure, the ECAC cannot be regarded as a 
consociational body. The Electoral Rule on the Establishment of the ECAC does not 
require proportional representation of the major segments of the Kosovo society in the 
sub-Commission. Perhaps no proportionality could be introduced because of the small 
number of members on the ECAC -  three national commissioners and an International 
Chief Commissioner.371 At the same time, given the ethnically sensitive character of 
many violations, the diversity in representation on the ECAC is important for fairer 
decision-making. The decision-making procedure of the ECAC reflects two extremes -  
mutual veto or unilateral dictatorship of the Chief Commissioner: decisions have to be 
adopted by consensus, but if no consensus can be reached, the Chief Commissioner “shall 
decide.”372
The absence of an expressly consociational character in the ECAC does not mean 
that this body has failed to contribute to the broader process of Kosovo democratization. 
To the contrary, many aspects of the ECAC’s activities may be regarded as creating a 
generally more favourable climate for the implementation of the consociational 
techniques. For example, the requirement of stricter compliance with electoral rules will 
motivate parties to look for cooperative ways of winning elections. Instead of relying on 
speculation over ethnic sentiment, or using officials to manipulate the elections, parties 
will have to look for other means to embrace larger numbers of the electorate. In 
particular, they may choose moderating their positions on ethnic issues and creating 
multi-ethnic coalitions.
371 Electoral Rule 2, supra note 321, s. 2.5.
372 Ibid.. s. 2.15.
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The instance of the ECAC’s work demonstrates that democracy in an ethnically 
divided society can be developed through a variety of means, both those that directly 
contribute to inclusiveness and those which have an indirect impact on the formation of 
consociational government. Moreover, not all the organs have to be composed 
consociationally in order to be able to contribute to the development of consociationalism 
and democracy in a society.
2. All-Kosovo elections
The previous discussion concerned only rules applicable to municipal elections. 
In anticipation of the all-Kosovo elections, the CEC prepared a new set of Electoral 
Rules. To date it adopted eight electoral rules: the Code of Conduct, the Rule on 
Certification of Parties, Coalitions, Citizens’ Initiatives and Independent Candidates, the 
Rule on the Establishment of the ECAC, the Rule on the Municipal Election 
Commissions (MEC), the Rule on the Election Observers, the Rule on Voter Information, 
the Rule on Media During the Electoral Campaign and the Rule on The Registration of 
Candidates.373
Basically, the new rules represent a revised version of the rules used for the 
regulation of the municipal election campaign. Since the major objectives and principles 
of the regulation remained the same, I will briefly review only the new and amended 
provisions of the Electoral Rules.
a. The Code o f Conduct
The Code of Conduct remains essentially the same, except two amendments 
concerning the notification about political rallies and conduct of public employees during 
electoral campaign. The first amendment extends the period for notification about 
political rallies (now notification must be given to the police authorities 120 hours prior
373 See, online: OSCE Homepage <
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/elections/regulatorv info/electoral rules-php3 > (date accessed: 24 
August 2001).
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to the event374 as opposed to 96 hours during the municipal electoral campaign). The 
second amendment imposes prohibitions on certain actions by public employees during 
the electoral campaign. No political entity may encourage or take advantage of a public 
employee by using his public position to campaign for a political entity.375 This provision 
was motivated by the experience with the municipal electoral campaign. Numerous acts 
of corruption were reported during the municipal electoral campaign. It was often the 
case that the KLA and PDK-tied officials that held the key positions in the municipal 
administration were able to influence the conduct of the electoral campaign in favour of 
the PDK or the AAK.
Now any use of public position to campaign for a political entity is prohibited. 
The Code provides for broad interpretation of a “public employee.” A public employee 
includes, but is not limited to, a person employed by a local administration whose 
remuneration is received from the Kosovo Consolidated Budget.376 The Code even 
contains an example of prohibited behaviour -  the head of an educational institution 
requiring students to attend a meeting organized by a particular political entity.
It will be interesting to observe how this prohibition will be enforced -  whether 
both an official and a political party for which he campaigned will be penalized or only a 
political party or only an employee. I would suggest that an electoral complaint may be 
filed on both actions of a party and actions of a public employee. The ECAC may regard 
a public employee as a supporter of a particular political entity. According to the Code of 
Conduct, parties are obliged not only to abide by the Code, but also to ensure that party’s 
supporters do not violate its provisions. If a party fails to ensure a supporter’s compliance 
with the Code, that party can be held responsible for this violation. The existing electoral 
rules provide for penalties, which may be readily imposed on political entities as well as 
on natural persons.
Apart from the two mentioned amendments, the rest of the Code’s provisions 
have remained the same. Some of them have been reformulated in a more precise and
374 The Code o f Conduct for political parties, coalitions, citizens’ initiatives, independent 
candidates, their supporters and candidates, CEC/Electoral Rule 1/2001, s.3 (c), online: OSCE 
Homepage [hereinafter Code o f Conduct].
375 Ibid., s.5.
316 Ibid.
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clear manner. For example, the new Code of Conduct not only imposes on political 
entities a duty to abide by its provisions, but also expressly states that any failure to 
comply with the provisions may result in the imposition of sanctions by the ECAC.377 
Another example is the formulation of prohibited actions. The current Code of Conduct 
prohibits “using language, in oral or written form, which incites or provokes, or is likely 
to incite or provoke, another person to commit an act of violence against other persons or 
property...”378 In contrast, the Code that applied to the municipal elections referred only 
to the “use of language which could incite or provoke someone to violence or spread 
hatred.”379
b. The ECAC
Having adopted Electoral Rule 2001/2, the CEC laid the foundations for the 
creation of a new ECAC. The competence of the sub-Commission and the appeal 
procedures remain the same as during the municipal electoral campaign. The Rule 
contains two new provisions. First, it provides more guarantees for broader participation 
of communities in the Sub-commission. The Sub-commission consists of one 
International Chief Commissioner and three national Commissioners. The 
Commissioners should be appointed in a manner that represents ethnic groups and 
national diversity in Kosovo. The Chairperson of the CEC has the discretion to increase 
the number of the Sub-commission’s members to 5 in order to allow broader participation 
by communities.380
Second, the Rule stipulates stiffer penalties for the violation of electoral rules. In 
particular, the failure to take a remedial action ordered by the ECAC, or the failure to pay 
a fine within 7 days of the Sub-commission's decision, is now considered a violation of
377 The Code of Conduct applied to the municipal elections stipulated only that the Code is 
binding on all political entities.
378 Code o f Conduct, supra note 374, s.4 (1).
379 The Code o f Conduct, supra note 326, s. 1.10(10).
380 Compare to a similar provision of the old Electoral Rule on the Establishment of the ECAC: 
“The Election Complaints and Appeals sub-Commission shall consist of one International Chief 
Commissioner and three national deputy Commission members. Members of the Election 
Complaints and Appeals sub-Commission should have appropriate expertise and experience in 
the administration of elections.” See, Electoral Rule 2000/2.
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the Electoral Rule. The ECAC has to notify the CEC about such a violation and can 
impose any of the stiffer penalties spelled out in the Electoral Rule.381
During the municipal campaign, the failure to take a remedial action ordered by 
the ECAC, or the failure to pay a fine within the deadline, was not considered a violation 
under the Electoral Rule. In fact, a prototype of such a norm can be found in the ECAC 
decisions regarding the municipal elections. Those decisions often contained a provision 
that the sub-Commission reserved the right to strike a candidate from the list if the 
applicable fine was not paid on time. Now, not only the failure to comply with the 
ECAC’s ordered correctional actions and financial penalties is a violation, but it can be 
punished by stiffer penalties.
c. MECs and electoral observers 
The MECs are professional and non-political bodies that assist in the conduct of 
elections at the municipal level. They were established by the CEC in June 2000 in each of 
Kosovo's 30 municipalities. One of the significant changes for the MECs is that now all 
members must agree to comply with the Code of Conduct.382 This was seen as a key to 
ensuring that the entire electoral process meets international standards.
Observers are important to provide transparency in the electoral process and to 
develop trust in the elections and their results. More than 6,000 representatives of domestic 
NGOs and political entities participated as observers during the municipal elections.383 
Observers will continue playing important roles for the all-Kosovo elections. The Rule on 
Electoral Observers allows representatives of NGOs and political entities to observe voter 
registration and electoral process. To participate as an observer, a person must be a 
registered voter and sign a statement agreeing to abide by the electoral rules. All observers 
must be accredited by the CEC.
381 Code o f Conduct, supra note 374, s. 5.
382 The Rule on the Establishment of the MECs applied to the municipal elections did not contain 
such a requirement
383 Kosovo Elections: Rules adopted on Municipal Election Commissions and Election 
Observation, online: OSCE Homepage <
http://www.osce.org/news/generate.php37news_idsl800> (date accessed: 17 July 2001).
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In general, the new electoral rules are more precise and stricter. The changes were 
inspired primarily by two factors: the crucial character of the Kosovo-wide elections,384 
and experience from the municipal electoral campaign.383
The new rules adopted by the CEC demonstrate the determination of the 
international administration to require strict compliance with the norms of electoral 
conduct. The adoption of a strict policy that the international community will not tolerate 
violence and other forms of party misconduct creates certain expectations within local 
political structures and may constrain their inappropriate tactics. At the same time, 
coercion should be used carefully, given that most parties are in the early stages of their 
formation.
The balance between coercion and democracy will alter, depending on the stage 
of rehabilitation. Coercion may be more readily applied at the beginning of 
democratization, but reduced over time, when the conditions for democratic government 
become more stable.
The new electoral rules as such are not more consociational than the rules for the 
municipal elections. Generally, the electoral regulation is targeted not so much at 
ensuring the inclusion of minorities, but at providing fairness in electoral competition and 
a reduction in voter manipulation. In terms of the indirect impact that electoral regulation 
has on the formation of interethnic coalitions and moderation of the position of parties, 
the effect of the rules will depend mainly on the determination of the international 
administration to hold to their strict enforcement. The electoral rules for the all-Kosovo 
elections are stricter against the speculation over ethnic sentiment and the misuse of 
public position, so if enforced actively they may stimulate the exclusion of these
384 The main concerns about the upcoming elections are: providing a secure and stable 
environment during the electoral campaign (the electoral campaigns of the parties will inevitably 
include debates over Kosovo independence, which may be destabilizing for Kosovo); ensuring 
legitimacy of the electoral process and the newly created Assembly (It can be expected that when 
seats in the Kosovo legislature are at stake, parties will campaign more actively and use more 
aggressive techniques. This poses a threat of increased violence and corruption); providing that 
the elected bodies cooperate with the international administration; and that the Assembly consists 
of moderate supporters of the Kosovo independence who are not likely to take any unexpected 
actions as, for example, demanding Kosovo independence.
383 The municipal campaign provided important feedback about the effect of the adopted 
regulations. It demonstrated situations in which the regulation was insufficient or ambiguous. As 
a result, the new rules contain more precise and detailed provisions.
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techniques from parties’ electoral tactics and make them turn more attention to 
cooperative means for winning elections.
Interim Conclusion
Electoral regulation has two aspects. Its Erst and primary purpose is to ensure 
maximum stability during the electoral campaign and fair competition among parties. 
Second, carefully tailored electoral rules and their appropriate enforcement facilitate the 
implementation of the consociational techniques and achievement of a consociational 
result.
We have analyzed the rules that regulate the party behaviour at different stages of 
electoral campaigning -  when a party seeks to enter the political arena, during the 
campaigning period and after the elections. The international administration was able to 
create a comprehensive regulatory mechanism, which included both standards of 
behaviour and means to enforce those standards. In their unity the pre-electoral, electoral 
and post-electoral regulation of party conduct plays a crucial role in ensuring more 
peaceful and fairer competition among political parties. This is especially important in a 
post-conflict society where violence and intimidation are still considered justifiable 
means for achieving political goals.
The electoral regulation has far-reaching impact on the composition of 
representative organs and their work: through the registration of parties, authorities can 
prevent the legalization of openly nationalistic parties; sanctions for violation of electoral 
conduct exclude radical parties, which use intimidation, violence and incitement of hatred 
in electoral campaigns, from running in elections. The above-mentioned means prevent 
extremist elements from entering the legislature, thus, making these organs potentially 
more cooperative and more sensitive to minority issues. This, in turn, creates basis for a 
workable grand coalition. This is especially important in the light of previously analyzed 
rules of procedure and decision-making in the Municipal Assemblies. Because many 
decisions can be made by majority and there are no strong mutual veto powers, minorities 
are more vulnerable. The fact whether their interests will be given enough attention to 
great extent depends on how understanding and supportive to minority interests the 
majority members are.
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Although the described means may provide for more cooperative members of the 
Assemblies, these means as such are not intended to facilitate minority inclusion. They 
may only create some favourable grounds for realization of the principles of 
consociationalism -  proportionality and grand coalition. Thus, to mitigate the ethnic 
majority victory in the elections, the international community had to resort to other 
means, in particular, appointment of minority representatives to newly elected legislative 
organs. The next section describes the results of the municipal elections and the 
appointment of minority representatives in Municipal Assemblies.
D. Electoral Process and Electoral Results3**
1. Local peculiarities
As pointed out at the beginning of this Chapter, the electoral process in Kosovo is 
influenced by a number of factors: 1) ethnically motivated behaviour of the population;
2) ethnic distribution of the population among municipalities; and 3) non-participation of 
some minorities in elections. We have briefly discussed what impact these factors are 
likely to have on electoral results.387 Now let us look at the actual situation with the 
elections in Kosovo.
The municipal elections were held throughout all the Kosovo. However, because 
of the Serb’s boycott of both elections and voter registration, the elections effectively 
took place only in 27 out of 30 Kosovo municipalities. In three northern municipalities 
inhabited mostly by Serbs -  Leposavic, Zubin Potok and Zvecan -  the elections were 
held, but their results were not certified because the majority of Serb population neither 
registered nor voted.
The general voter turnover appeared to be high -  79% of voters.388 The turnover 
of minority members varied from community to community. For example, few Kosovo
386 This Section describes only the results of the 2000 municipal elections in Kosovo.
387 See, section A of this Chapter.
388 Press Release, 10 November 2000, online: OSCE Homepage <
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/news/generate.php37news id=1266 > (date accessed: 5 January 
2001).
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Turks and Roma came to vote. At the same time, other communities, like the Kosovo 
Bosniac and Gorani communities showed high levels of participation.389
A negative impact of non-participation on the electoral process can be observed in 
two aspects. First, it denies certain ethnic communities the right to have their 
representatives elected. Second, it requires the use of co-option of minority members by 
the SRSG, thus, making minority representation contingent on outsider regulatory 
interference.
Earlier, we have theoretically predicted that votes in Kosovo will be split along 
ethnic lines. The empirical evidence about the correlation of minority population in a 
particular municipality and the percentage of votes obtained by party based on particular 
ethnic affiliation confirms this proposition. The data is presented both in a table (below) 
and in a graphic format (For graphs, see Appendix 3 and 4).
















389 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo, S/200W1 1%, December 15,2000.
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190 The KTHP did not win any municipal council mandates.





































Source: The data is accumulated from the Kosovo Elections Results, online: 
OSCE Homepage
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/elections/archive/2000/results parties.php3>
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As we see, there is quite a clear correlation between the numeric weight of 
particular ethnic groups in a municipality and the percentage of votes received by parties 
of the same ethnic affiliation. For example, in Pec where the Bosniac community 
amounts to 6 000 people (approximately 6% of the population), the SDA received 2,8% 
of the total votes. Similarly, in Kosovo Polje (the municipality with a substantial Ashkali 
community), the Ashkali party won 4,1% of votes.
Among the parties of the same ethnic affiliation, the success of a party mainly 
depends on the history of its previous activities, rather than its current platform. Among 
Albanian parties, the LDK and the KLA-tied parties have a historical record,391 which 
ensures them popular support. Those who fought for Kosovo independence are most 
likely to vote for the PDK or the AAK. The electoral results show that the PDK won the 
majority of votes in municipalities where the KLA had the strongest influence. For 
example, this is the case in Glogovac. The elderly people and more moderate supporters 
of the Kosovo independence are likely to vote for the LDK.
2. Electoral results
The results of the 2000 municipal elections will be viewed in two dimensions. 
First, we will evaluate the statistical data showing which parties won the elections and the 
number of seats they received. Second, we will consider the number of minority 
representatives appointed by the SRSG and the ethnic balance within the Municipal 
Assemblies and organs created by them. In both cases I will look at the correlation of the 
ethnic breakdown of population in a municipality and the number of representatives from 
each ethnic community in the municipal organs.
Because of the low participation of minority parties, the main competition at the 
elections developed among Albanian parties. The three major Albanian parties -  the 
LDK, the PDK and the AAK -  most actively participated in the electoral campaign. The 
AAK and the LDK stood for elections in 29 out of 30 municipalities. The PDK had its 
candidates in 27. The LDK led by Ibrahim Rugova won a majority in 21 municipalities,
391 See, section A(i) of this Chapter. It should be noted that at the first elections, the electorate’s 
support for the parties de facto in power during the conflict, is not surprising. Rather, it is a 
predictable refection of people’s fears, intimidation and preference to follow the known 
established leader.
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with the total of 58% of votes in the Province.392 The PDK and the AAK together won 
about 35% of the total vote.393




Minority parties stood for elections in 13 municipalities. Representatives of 
minority parties were elected in 5 municipalities. In particular, in Dragas the Gorani 
Citizens’ Initiative (GIG) won three seats and the Bosniac Party of Democratic Action of 
Kosovo (SDA) won two seats. The SDA also won seats in Istok and Pec. The Democratic 
Party of Albanian Ashkaelia in Kosovo (PDAShK) won one seat in Kosovo Polje. In 
Prizren, the Bosnian Party of Democratic Action (BSDAK) won two seats and the 
Democratic Reform Party of Muslims (DRSM) won one seat. Nevertheless, the SRSG 
has co-opted additional minority representatives in all these municipalities, except 
Dragas. This situation demonstrates that the proportionate system ensured the election of 
some minority representatives, but still their number was not sufficient to guarantee 
meaningful participation of minorities in government. Consequently, the co-option of 
minority members by the SRSG became necessary. Let us seen in more detail how this 
process was carried out.
392 Municipal Elections 2000: Final Results, online: OSCE Homepage
http://www.globeandmail.com/gani/ROB/20010312/RAlRR.html (date accessed: January 17, 
2001).
393 Ibid.
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3. Appointments
Because of the non-participation of some minorities in the elections and limited 
success of minority parties even in municipalities with significant minority population, 
the elections did not provide for intended proportional representation of minorities in the 
Municipal Assemblies. To ensure fair representation of all ethnic communities, the SRSG 
had to use his power to co-op minority members to Municipal Assemblies.394
As of 1 March 2001, 123 representatives were appointed. Among 123 appointed 
and 869 elected members of Municipal Assemblies, 91 were Kosovo Serbs, 14 Bosniacs, 
10 Ashkalia, 9 Roma, S Turks, 4 Egyptians and one Croat.395 Minority members were 
appointed in addition to the fully elected Municipal Assembly, thus increasing the 
number of assembly representatives over the figure stipulated by the UNMIK Regulation 
On Self-Government in Municipalities.396 According to the OSCE Report issued in 
March 2001, no nominations were made in Decani, Dragas, Glogovac, Mali she vo, Suva 
Reka and Kacanik. There were either no minorities reported, or very small ethnic 
communities there.
The number of appointees varies from municipality to municipality. (See Table 5)
Table 5. Minority Appointees in Municipal Assemblies
Municipality Serb Appt Rom Appt. Ashk Appt Bosni Appt Turk Appt
s, % Serb a, % Rom all, Ashk acs Bosni s Tbrk
MA aM A % all ac MA
Mbs, Mbs*; MA MA Mbs,
% Mb* Mbs, %
% [ %
Deqan/De• ani 0 N7AV 2 .
Dragash/DragaS 10 N/A 0 14
Ferizaj/UroSevac 3 1 2
394 Under the Regulation on the Self-government of Municipalities in Kosovo, the SRSG has the 
power to co-opt additional members to the Municipal Assemblies to ensure fair representation of 
the local communities.
395 Assessment o f the Situation o f Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, OSCE Report, March 2001, at 22.
396 Regulation on the Self-government o f Municipalities in Kosovo, supra note 281.
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As a rule, minority representatives should be appointed proportionally to the 
number of that particular minority in the municipality’s population. As we can see from 
Table 5, this rule was not always followed. One can notice significant differences 
between the percentage of the minority population and the number of appointed 
representatives in many municipalities. For example, in Mitrovica 7% of the population 
are Serbs, but the number of Serb appointees amounts to 22% of the Municipal 
Assembly. There are 0.5% Serbs in Srbica, but Serb representatives in the Municipal 
Assembly constitute 6%. At the same time, the Roma community in Istok (8% of the 
municipality’s population) did not receive any representation. The absence of a rational 
correlation between the percentage of minorities and the number of minority appointees 
led to numerous complaints about the criteria for appointment. For example, the Turkish 
community in Vucitm (there is an estimated 300 Turks397 there) complained that they 
have not benefited from co-option. They submitted a petition to the SRSG, but no 
appointments were made as of March 2001.398
There is an inconsistency between the theoretical approach to the formation of 
representative organs and its practical implementation. On the one hand, all the basic 
documents issued by the UNMIK399 emphasize fair and proportionate representation of 
communities. On the other hand, when it comes to implementation there is no data about 
the number of ethnic communities that can be used as a criterion for appointment. As 
mentioned, the Joint Registration Taskforce did not collect data on the ethnic affiliation 
of the applicants. Thus, there was no official record on a number of minorities in a given 
municipality. As a result, it was difficult to assess which minorities were under­
397 Assessment o f the Situation o f Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, OSCE Report, September 2000 at 
54, online: OSCE Homepage http://www.osce.org/kosovo/Dublications/Ddf/mibrep.pdf (date 
accessed: February 12,2001).
398 Ibid., at 22.
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represented and what level of co-option they required. Thus, the appointments by the 
SRSG are arguably legitimate because it is not clear what objective standard have been 
used for making decisions. The co-option by the SRSG, on the one hand, advances 
consociationalism by implementing proportionality and creating more preconditions for 
grand coalition. On the other hand, the original consociational model has nothing to do 
with such interventionist techniques as co-option. To my mind, such deviation from the 
original consociational model is justifiable given the peculiarities of the Kosovo situation. 
The power of the SRSG would not contradict the spirit of consociationalism so far as it 
advances more inclusive grand coalition government.
However, from the position of the peace-building concept, co-option by the SRSG 
is more problematic. The lack of clarity about the criteria for appointment creates doubt 
about transparency and objectivity of the decision-making process. In this respect, the 
administration itself seems to violate the two principles that it seeks to introduce in the 
self-governing bodies. In acting so, the UNMIK undermines its own democratic tenets 
and consequently its credibility with the local population.
4. Effect of appointments and elections on minority participation in decision­
making
The appointment of minority representatives is only the first step in ensuring 
minority participation in decision-making. The long-term impact of the elections on the 
formation of consociational democracy and minority protection in Kosovo depends on 
the work of the organs created by Municipal Assemblies.
The powers and policy of municipalities are formulated through the structure of 
its organs. Consequently, the ability of minority representatives to have a real say in 
municipal management depends on the position that they occupy within municipal 
organs. To examine the actual role that minorities may assume in relation to municipal 
organs, let us look at the composition of municipal organs (Appendix 5). It is apparent 
that minority representatives have assumed seats in the Mediation Committee and the 
Communities Committee as required by the Regulation on Self-government of
i m
See, e.g., Regulation on Self-government of Municipalities in Kosovo, the Constitutional 
Framework for provisional Self-government of Kosovo.
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Municipalities. In relation to other organs, where minority participation is not required 
(e.g., the Finance and Policy Committee, the Board of Directors), the seats have usually 
been divided among two or three parties that received a majority of votes in that 
municipality. (See, Appendix 6)
For example, as a result of the LDK victory, it received the position of the 
presidency and deputy presidency in 21 municipalities. The PDK representatives were 
elected presidents of Municipal Assemblies in S municipalities and deputy-president in 6 
municipalities. In Serb municipalities where the SRSG appointed all the members, the 
presidency and deputy-presidency was given to minority parties and independents.
Another two important municipal bodies - the Policy and Finance Committee400 
and the Board of Directors401 -  are also dominated by the representatives of the Kosovo 
Albanian parties in the majority of municipalities. In these organs minorities are 
represented only in five municipalities: Dragas (GIG and SDA members), Gnjilane (one 
Kosovo Serb), Novo Brdo (three Kosovo Serbs), Kamenica (two seats for Kosovo Serbs) 
and Vitina (two seats reserved for Kosovo Serbs). The inclusion of minorities in those 
municipalities may be viewed as a positive trend towards the inclusion of minority 
representatives even when it is not legally required.
E. Conclusions to the Chspter
As evidenced from the Kosovo study, both substantive and procedural legal rules 
play important roles in the general development of democratization as well as in the 
implementation of the elements of consociationalism. The following may be regarded as 
the three most important aims that a legal regime helps to achieve in post-conflict 
democratization:
1) Legal rules define and support goals that international and local actors seek in the 
post-conflict reconstruction. For Kosovo, the most vivid example is the Constitutional 
Framework for Provisional Self-government. It was the first document that, after the two
400 The Policy and Finance Committee is responsible for proposing the budget and formulating 
and researching the future strategic direction of the municipality. See, REgulaiton on Self- 
government o f Municipalities, supra note 281, s.22.1.
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years of international presence, finally defined what institutional model of democracy is 
to be built in Kosovo. The positive effect of such definition is twofold. First, it 
demonstrated that the UNMIK has a clear idea about the model to be pursued in Kosovo 
and, consequently, created certain expectations about the formation of the political 
system, the balance of power between the branches of government and other tendencies 
of political life inherent in the parliamentary model. Second, it has helped to channel all 
the international activities towards an ultimate end -  parliamentary democracy. Third, it 
indicated the system of organs in which the elections had to be held and, thus, allowed 
the planning of the relevant international activities.
2) Legal rules provide a framework for power sharing. For Kosovo, the power 
sharing is exercised in a vertical dimension (division of responsibilities between the 
SRSG and the Provisional Institutions) as well as in a horizontal dimension (separation of 
powers among the branches of self-government). The recently adopted Constitutional 
Framework provides for wider competence of the Provisional Institutions of Self- 
government. At the same time, many core questions of internal administration and 
external relations remain within the authority of the SRSG. Even with the election of the 
Municipal Assemblies and the prospective development of Provisional Institutions, he 
retains his two most essential powers -  to legislate and to appoint and remove all the 
officials in the administration. This situation reveals a contradiction between two trends: 
on the one hand, the UNMIK attempts to promote the accountability of local organs and 
the delegation of powers to them; on the other hand, it facilitates the monopolization of 
power in the hands of an international representative. It is not clear how the international 
administration will develop responsible self-sustainable self-government if the 
administration exercises constant control over the most significant steps taken by local 
bodies. The Framework’s provisions do not establish clear criteria as to the conditions 
under which the SRSG may resort to his dormant powers. Thus, one can only trust that 
the wisdom of the SRSG will not allow excessive use of his powers. In this respect, the 
potential of legal rules to provide guarantees for the development of self-government has
401 The Board of Directors assists the Municipal Assembly and its committees by providing all 
necessary information and reports for the decision-making process; assists the President and the 
Chief Executive Officer, and implements all decisions of the municipality. See, ibid., s.31.2.
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not been used fully. The rules might have been more precise about the limits of the 
interference by the SRSG.
From the point of view of the peace-building concept, the existence of such powers 
of the SRSG may be acceptable. The contradictions may arise at the stage of the 
enforcement of these powers. Though the control of the SRSG over self-government is 
necessary, it is important that it is not abused. Otherwise the functioning of the Kosovo 
administration will remain contingent on external interference and local political parties 
will not be ready to maintain the created structure after the withdrawal of the 
international presence. One of the most difficult points in this respect is to define a clear 
and objective criterion which would allow one to judge when the intervention by the 
SRSG is appropriate and when it threatens to usurp the decision-making power of the 
self-government organs.
3) The legal regulation of the electoral process has two aspects: 1. The design of the 
electoral system is stipulated in legal rules. This helps to create the preconditions for 
minority inclusion in representative bodies, for the creation of interethnic coalitions, and 
for moderation of positions of political parties. 2. There are also rules regulating the 
electoral conduct and ways of its enforcement. This side of regulation provides an 
important contribution to the general stability of the situation in the Province during the 
electoral campaign, for fairer competition among the parties, and for the creation of more 
cooperative representative bodies.
The elements of consociationalism are mainly implemented through legal rules, 
which stipulate the design of the electoral system, the composition of state organs and the 
decision-making procedures in those organs. On the one hand, the existence of an 
international administration in Kosovo offers some avenues for the implementation of 
consociationalism. Due to the coercive power that the UNMIK has in the Province, it 
makes possible the implementation of consociational techniques, which are otherwise not 
likely to be adopted by the parties. On the other hand, because the maintenance of those 
consociational techniques is dependent on international pressure, the crucial question is 
how to make the existing system of organs and rules sustainable.
Here is a brief summary of how the elements of consociationalism were 
implemented in Kosovo. Its principles were used to a different extent at the provincial
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and at the municipal level. At the municipal level, proportionality was used for the 
electoral system, for appointment of co-opted minority members and for the allocation of 
seats in some organs created by the Municipal Assemblies (e.g., the Communities 
Committee and the Mediation Committee). At the provincial level, proportionality was 
employed as a basis for the electoral system and as a guideline for allocation of seats in 
some organs created by the Assembly. Through the proportional allocation of seats 
among majority and minority communities, the international administration sought to 
achieve inclusiveness of the ethnic segments of Kosovo society. The existence of such 
participation is a precondition for the creation of grand coalitions. Another precondition -  
willingness of the segment leaders to cooperate - was to a certain extent ensured through 
the rules of electoral conduct. This helped to prevent more openly nationalistic parties 
entering the legislature.
Mutual veto as a means to protect the interests of minorities is also used differently 
at the municipal and provincial level. The rules regulating the functioning of the Kosovo 
Assembly create a very beneficial moderate mutual veto. In contrast, at the municipal level 
minorities have no veto power. On the one hand, a mutual veto is appropriate only for 
resolution of the most important matters concerning the whole Kosovo population or 
particular minority groups. A mutual veto at the municipal level might be regarded as an 
unreasonably complicated system of decision-making. Moreover, the municipal committees 
may be viewed as sufficient guarantees for the protection of minority interests. 
Unfortunately, the municipal committees have limited powers and, in my opinion, cannot 
provide sufficiently effective protection of minority interests. The lack of such protection 
means that more responsibility for monitoring and minority protection will be put on the 
provincial institutions, including the SRSG. hi turn, the more interference by an 
international administration is required, the less the chances are for the development of 
responsible and sustainable self-government, which contradicts the goal of peace-building. 
Thus, I would recommend some model of a moderate mutual veto to be adopted, not only at 
the provincial, but also at the municipal level.
In relation to the Kosovo Assembly there is a imbalance in the application of the 
elements of consociationalism to different organs. For example, the rules for the election of 
the Kosovo President do not require him to receive minority support. Given the symbolic
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nature of the president’s office, it is important to ensure that he is considerate of the minority 
interests. Thus, in relation to the electoral procedure, the available tools of consociationalsm 
were not utilized to full extent. At the same time, such an element as proportionality is 
excessively used as a requirement in the composition of the Assembly’s committees. I have 
some doubts if proportionality will not override the criterion of individual merit. Because 
much of the work of the Assembly is done through its committees, it is important to ensure 
that they are composed of people with an appropriate level of expertise.
In general, the very implementation of the elements of consociationalism through 
substantive and procedural rules may be viewed as a good precondition for minority 
incisiveness and mitigation of the tensions among the majority and minorities. Some 
mechanisms are particularly well-tailored and constitute an important contribution to the 
development of the practice and theory of consociationalism; others were not elaborated 
with necessary care. There is still a search for the happy medium between more minority 
protective consociational techniques and techniques that are politically acceptable to 
international and local actors.
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Chapter IV
Re-establishment of the Judiciary and the Police
One of the necessary requirements for successful peace-building is coherency in its 
strategy. This, inter alia, means that certain principles, like those of consociationalism, are 
introduced in relation to all branches of government and all institutions where applicable. 
Lijphart considered that minority and majority inequality can be resolved mainly through the 
representative branch of government and, accordingly, addressed his recommendations to the 
legislature and partially to the executive. I argue that, similarly to proportionate 
representation of minorities in the government, multi-ethnic judiciary and police contribute to 
meaningful participation of minorities in governmental structures and to the sense of their 
inclusiveness in social and political structures. Thus, special consociational techniques are 
also necessary for the judiciary and the police. I do not automatically apply to the judiciary 
and the police the principles of consociationalism which were developed specifically for the 
representative branch. Rather, I try to show the particular way in which courts and the police 
can contribute to the meaningful inclusiveness of minorities in society and how 
consociational techniques can reinforce their role in this process.
In this Chapter I look at the institutional structure of the judiciary, the applicable law 
and the actual application of that law by the courts. In addition to that, I dedicate a separate 
section to the activities of the law enforcement authorities in Kosovo and their cooperation 
with the courts. My task here is not to describe all the inconsistencies in the application of 
law by judges and prosecutors, but rather to review the most common violations and to 
project their effect on the democratization of Kosovo. The ultimate purpose of this analysis 
is to reveal the role of the institutional structure of the judicial and police systems and of the 
applicable law in ensuring equal protection to members of all ethnic communities, as well as 
strengthening their inclusiveness in state structures.
135
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A. The role of the judiciary and police in ethnically divided societies
1. General Observations
Many political science scholars402 who analyzed the preconditions for stable 
democratic governance in ethnically divided societies have concentrated their attention 
primarily on the role of representative bodies in providing inclusiveness for all ethnic groups. 
In this respect, the judicial and police systems seem to be unreasonably ignored. Similarly to 
representative bodies, courts and police are subject to the influence of ethnic division. Courts 
dominated by ethnic majority judges may be biased or perceived as biased against minority 
defendants. The ethnic composition of the police affects how it performs its duties, how 
willing it is to accord equal protection to members of all ethnic communities or to 
discriminate against them. Further, control over organs of law enforcement may often be a 
guarantee for continuation of the dominance of the ruling group. Because of that, “[ejthnic 
groups who are underrepresented in state security forces see the military-police imbalances 
as reflections of their overall political vulnerability.” 403 Since in a long-term the composition 
and functioning of the judicial and police systems becomes a factor that can solidify ethnic 
exclusion and inter-group tension, particular attention should be drawn to the founding 
principles and functioning of the judiciary and the police.
The role of the judiciary in a post-conflict society is several fold: 1) supporting the 
rule of law and contributing to the maintenance of order and security; 2) providing 
inclusiveness of minorities through their fair treatment and representation in the judiciary; 3) 
providing policy guidelines through constitutional adjudication and interpretation concerning 
the balance of power among the branches of government, the scope of individual and 
collective rights and limits on the authority of the state to interfere with the exercise of those 
rights, etc.404 In sum, the role of the courts falls within one of two broad categories -  policy­
making or the routine resolution of practical matters.405 During the first years after a conflict, 
courts usually have to concentrate primarily (if not exclusively) on the resolution of practical
402 Horowitz, supra note 33 & 35; Lijphart, supra note 41; Wippman, supra note 58.
403 Cynthia H. Enloe, Police, Military and Ethnicity (New Brunswick: Transactions Inc., 1980) at 146.
404 hi one way or another each of these issues has an impact on the position of minorities in society.
405 In a common law system decision of any case may be regarded as a policy making development. 
Here, I would like to distinguish the high profile policy making by the Supreme court which is likely 
to have effect on all levels of government from the minor, local, potentially policy-making role of 
lower courts.
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matters. Commonly, one of the primary concerns of an international mission is restoration of 
law and order. For an international mission, “[t]he failure to address past and ongoing 
violations promptly and effectively, and to create a sense of law and order, can impede the 
broader objectives of the operation.”406 The lack of adequate law enforcement can undermine 
the authority of the mission and negatively affect the willingness of the population to respect 
law. Thus, criminal adjudication and general law enforcement become one of the immediate 
priorities of an international administration.
Only with time will the development of the courts’ power of constitutional 
adjudication take place. Because immediately after a conflict the policy-making role (through 
constitutional adjudication) of the highest court is usually absent (at least that was the case 
with Kosovo), the pressure to provide inclusiveness and equality shifts to routine criminal 
and civil adjudication.
Generally, courts contribute to the inclusiveness and protection of minorities is 
several ways. First, through the composition of courts. For all types of adjudication, the 
diversity of the judiciary is important as a precondition for overcoming stereotypes and 
biases. The representation of different perspectives in the judiciary, including the one 
stemming from particular ethnic affiliation, is important for a more flexible and open-minded 
judicial process and decision-making.407 Such diversity is particularly important for supreme 
courts that play an active role in policy-making.
Second, courts contribute to inclusiveness through actual decision-making, 
application and development of law. Through constitutional adjudication courts provide 
policy guidelines for other branches of government and in this way influence minority 
inclusiveness and the protection of collective minority rights at the national level. Criminal 
and civil adjudication works more at the level of individual and local community and is more 
concerned with individual rights and protection. To date, the practice of the Kosovo courts 
has primarily targeted the resolution of criminal matters. Thus, criminal adjudication will be 
the context for the assessment of the role of the courts in providing inclusiveness.
406 Hansjorg Strohmeyer, “Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations 
Mission in Kosovo and East Timor” (2001) 95 AJ1L 46 at 47.
407 See, e.g., R. Devlin, A. Wayne MacKay & N. Kim, “Reducing the Democratic Deficit: 
Representation, Diversity and the Canadian Judiciary, or Towards a ‘Triple P” Judiciary” (2001) 38 
Alb. L. Rev. 734 at 792-808.
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The role that the re-established or newly created courts assume in a post-conflict 
society is largely defined by a combination of three factors: the approach of the international 
administration to the re-establishment of the judicial system (principles on which the 
judiciary is built, the definition of the applicable law, the time frame for the re-establishment 
of the court structure, etc.); the composition of courts and courts’ willingness and ability to 
utilize applicable law; and the attitude of the population to the court system.
In the first months after a conflict, an international administration plays a founding 
role in relation to the court system. It not only provides the structure and jurisdiction of 
courts, but also specifies what laws should be applied and how. In addition to that, the 
international administration monitors the compliance of the courts with established standards 
of fairness, independence and impartiality. However, some areas, like the ability and 
willingness of judges to utilize applicable law, are difficult to control by legal means. I 
support a view that judicial decisions are not solely the result of a judge’s logic and 
rationality, but also a result of the judge’s personal and professional characteristics. After a 
deadly ethnic conflict, judges will not always be willing to put law and human rights above 
personal fears, intolerance or hatred. Those feelings find their expression in judicial bias, 
which is likely to have tremendous impact on court procedures and decisions. This trend is 
especially dangerous at the initial stages of the reconstruction when the law enforcement 
system operates in emergency mode (i.e., the rules imposing stricter penalties or extended 
detention, etc. are introduced). The prioritized activity of restoring order may, to a certain 
extent, interfere with the exercise of the second function of the courts -  fair treatment and 
protection of minorities. The emergency powers of the courts and law enforcement organs 
may sometimes be utilized by biased officials as tools to discriminate against minority 
members. This question will be discussed in the following sections.
Another factor in the functioning of courts is the ability of judges to apply human 
rights standards. In states exhausted by a lengthy conflict, judges may often lack knowledge 
of law and up to date legal training, especially in the field of human rights. Moreover, in 
many post-socialist states human rights laws have never been applied before and, 
consequently, the judiciary does not have the necessary knowledge in this field.
The functioning of courts in the first years after cessation of hostilities is likely to 
have significant impact on the population’s perception of the court system. The certainty in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
139
protection and non-discrimination, the belief in court system as legitimate, independent and 
impartial is one of the founding stones for political and social stability.
Having described the importance of the judicial system in general, I would like to 
proceed to a more detailed analysis of the Kosovo situation.
2. Kosovo peculiarities
In order to fully understand the challenges of establishing and administering the 
judiciary and police in Kosovo, one should be aware of the security situation in Kosovo in 
the first months after the UNMIK deployment.
The security situation in Kosovo was shaped by a number of factors. The Yugoslav 
and Serb police forces were withdrawn from the territory of Kosovo according to the 
requirements of SCR 1244.408 The Yugoslav and Serb forces stopped functioning or were 
withdrawn before the international security presence assumed effective control over the 
Province. This temporary security vacuum resulted in a deteriorated security situation.409 In 
the absence of effective state authority, Kosovo military and criminal groupings attempted to 
expand their influence over the province’s territory,410 competing for the areas of influence. 
For example, the KLA was able to establish de facto control over the majority of Kosovo 
municipalities.411 Thus, the situation was difficult to control and the UNMIK had to reconcile 
its power with the de facto authorities. The security challenge was reinforced by the 
unregulated return of refugees412 and constant move of internally displaced persons. 
According to the Report of the Secretary-General of 12 July 1999,650,000 refugees returned 
to Kosovo in June-July 1999.413 Because of limited resources the returnees had literally to 
compete for housing and material support. They often resorted to violence and intimidation 
to satisfy these needs, thus increasing instability in the Province.414 At that time, the KFOR 
was not capable of dealing with multiple security challenges because it was still in the
408 Security Council Resolution 1244, supra note 106, para 3.
409 Report o f the Secretary-General o f 12 July 1999, supra note 107, para. 5 at 2.
410 Strohmeyer, supra note 406 at 52.
4I! Assessment o f the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, OSCE Report, September 2000, supra 
note 295 at3.
412 The conflict produced an estimated 800,000 refugees and 500,000 internally displaced persons. 
See, Report o f the Secretary-General o f 12 July 1999, supra note 107, para. 5.
413 Ibid., para 9 at 3.
414 Strohmeyer, supra note 406 at 48.
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process of building up its forces.415 The limited capacity of the KFOR and the UNMIK 
Police in law enforcement made it possible to respond only to the most serious crimes. These 
circumstances explain the focus and the development of the judiciary and the police towards 
the resolution of criminal matters.
At the time of the UNMIK deployment, not only law enforcement institutions were 
not functioning, but the judicial system collapsed. Thus, the crucial link between law 
enforcement and the judiciary was broken. Even after the establishment of the Emergency 
Judicial System (EJS) the coordination between the courts and law enforcement organs was 
not very effective. The four provisional courts of the EJS were overloaded with work and 
were not able to hear the cases in a timely manner. Thus, more detainees were kept in 
custody for extended periods of time often without a possibility to challenge the lawfulness 
of their detention.416 Moreover, there were hardly any mechanisms to monitor the fairness of 
procedures in the courts. For example, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights reported 
that in many instances the release of the arrested was ethnically motivated or pressured by 
the KLA or other influential groups.417
Given the combination of the mentioned security challenges, the Erst task of the 
UNMIK was to create a police force and a court system of sufficient capacity to resolve 
numerous security concerns. At the same time, the procedure for their re-establishment had 
to include mechanisms providing for their legitimacy, impartiality and independence.
B. Institutional structure off the judiciary
As I mentioned in the introduction, the institutional structure of the judiciary and of the 
police (composition and principles of their re-establishment) may be one of the factors that 
influences people’s perception about these organs. I specifically look at the methods that the 
UNMIK employed in order to ensure multi-ethnicity of the judiciary and the police.
To understand the challenges of providing judicial protection in Kosovo, it is necessary 
to trace the stages of the development of the judicial system. Because the judiciary had to be
415 Report o f the Secretary-General o f 12 July 1999, supra note 107, para. 6 at 2.
416 This question will be discussed in detail in section C of this Chapter.
417 A Fragile Peace: Laying the Foundations for Justice in Kosovo, Report of the Lawyers Committee 
for Human Rights, October 1999, online: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights Homepage 
h t tp : / /w w w .lc h r .o r f /D u b s /k o s o v o f i i l l  1099.htm (date accessed: 20 May 2001).
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established from scratch, initially, it was not able to function at full capacity, that is, to provide 
civil, criminal and constitutional adjudication.
The development of the judicial system and affiliated institutions in Kosovo took 
place in two stages -  the establishment of the Emergency Judicial System and its further 
transformation into the Regular Judicial System. The Emergency Judicial System (EJS) had 
extremely limited functions and, basically, provided only immediate response to the 
deteriorating security situation. The Regular Judicial System (RJS) assumed wider functions 
of criminal and civil adjudication. Ultimately, with the adoption of the Constitutional 
Framework for Self-government in Kosovo preconditions were created for the development 
of constitutional adjudication. At each of the three stages, the judiciary provided different 
levels of protection for individuals -  from very basic during the EJS to more comprehensive 
after the implementation of the Constitutional Framework.
1. Principles of re-establishing judiciary
The international administration had to re-establish the judicial system from scratch.
In the Report of 12 July 1999, the UN Secretary General defined the principles and stages of 
the reconstruction of the judiciary and related institutions in Kosovo. The major objective 
was to create “an independent, impartial, and multi-ethnic judiciary.”418 The initial steps in 
this process included the establishment of a court hierarchy as well as the organs providing 
technical and administrative support to the courts. In particular, the institution-building 
priorities comprised re-establishment of the Supreme Court of Kosovo, which was abolished 
in 1991; re-establishment of the correctional system; revival of the Kosovo Bar Association; 
and establishment of a technical advisory commission on the administration of the judiciary 
and the prosecution service.419
2. Organs providing technical and administrative support to courts
SCR 1244 has granted the international administration ample powers over the 
provincial affairs, including the authority to administer the judiciary.420 This task is
418 Report o f the Secretary-General o f 12 July 1999, supra note 107, para 66 at 10.
419 Report o f the Secretary-General o f 12 July 1999, supra note 107, para 70-73 at 11.
420 Ibid.
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cooperatively managed by two UNMIK pillars -  the UN-led Civil Administration and the 
OSCE-led Institution-building pillar.
Both pillars established divisions specifically responsible for various aspects of 
judicial affairs. The OSCE Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law is responsible for 
monitoring, protecting and promoting human rights. It develops mechanisms to ensure that 
the police, courts, administrative structures operate in accordance with human rights 
standards.421
The three divisions of the Department of Human Rights are responsible for support of 
the judicial system. The Judicial Support Unit provides logistical and technical support to 
newly established courts in Kosovo. The Training Unit is responsible for running a Kosovo 
Judicial Institute 422 The Legal System Monitoring Section (LSMS) oversees the functioning 
of the judicial system. The Monitoring Section plays a particularly important role in 
assessing the applicable law and overall functioning of the Kosovo courts. The LSMS 
consists of independent monitors who do not represent either the Civil Administration or any 
group or individual.423 The Section regularly produces reports on the state of the judicial 
system in Kosovo and provides recommendations for its improvement.
The UN-led Judicial Affairs Office deals with the four core areas of judicial affairs: 
the administration of courts, prosecution and prisons; the development of legal policy; the 
review and drafting of the legislation; and the assessment of the quality of justice in 
Kosovo.424
In September 1999 the SRSG established a Technical advisory commission on the 
judiciary and prosecution service.423 It includes 10 local and 5 international members 
appointed by the SRSG. The Commission assesses the needs of Kosovo in levels and
421 Annual Report on the OSCE Activities (2000), online: OSCE Homepage < 
http://www.osce.org/docs/english/misc/anrepOOe activ.htm#Anchor-1 .-41834 > (date accessed: 7 
July 2001).
Zlbi(LUpdate on the Expiration o f Detention Periods for Detainees, LSMS Report No. 4, March 18, 
2000, online: OSCE Homepage < http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/lustice/ > (date 
accessed: 25 June 2001).
424 Report o f the Secretary-General o f 12 July 1999, supra note 107, para 67 at 11.
425 Regulation on Recommendations fo r the Structure and Administration o f the Judiciary and 
prosecution Service, UNMIK/REG/1999/6, s.l, online: UN Homepage
http://www.un.org/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg6.htmi (date accessed: 16 August 2001).
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categories of judicial bodies and advises the SRSG on the structure and administration of the 
judiciary and prosecution in Kosovo.426
In March 2000 the SRSG established another structure for managing the judicial 
system and correctional service - the Administrative Department of Justice within the JIAS 
structure. It is responsible for the overall management of the judicial system and the 
correctional service.427 It implements the guidelines provided by the LAC and gives 
recommendations to the IAC about the overall strategy in the development of the judicial 
system. Other responsibilities of the Department include cooperation with other departments 
and organizations on matters of the judicial system and correctional service, provision of 
courts with appropriate resources, assistance in training of judges, prosecutors, lawyers and 
other judicial personnel, internal prison inspection, etc.428
3. Emergency Judicial System
The Emergency Judicial System (EJS) of Kosovo was put in operation in June 1999 
and ran its activities approximately until the end of 1999. The system had limited structure 
and exercised only minimal judicial functions. The EJS provided an immediate response to 
the deteriorating security situation in Kosovo. The main task of the EJS was to conduct pre­
trial hearings of persons arrested by the KFOR. No civil hearings were held until spring 
2000.429 Given the limited functions of the EJS, it is reasonable to look at its contribution to 
minority inclusiveness mainly through its composition.
There were only four provisional district courts and prosecutors’ offices set up in 
Pristina, Prizren, Mitrovica and Pec. The Pristina district court had mobile judicial units, 
which covered all other areas where courts were not set up.430
*-*lbuL, s. 1,5.1.
427 Regulation on the Establishment o f the Administrative Department o f Justice, 
UNMIK/REG/2000/25, s. 1.1.
428 Ibid., s.2.2.
429 The Development o f the Kosovo Judicial System (10 June through 12 December 1999), LSMS 
Report, 17 December 1999, online: OSCE Homepage: <
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice/> (date accessed: 25 July 2001) [hereinafter 
Development o f the Kosovo Judicial System].
430 Criminal Justice System in Kosovo, LSMS Report, July 2000, online: OSCE Homepage < 
www.osce.org/kosovo/publications/law/crjustice.pdf> (date accessed: 28 July 2001) [hereinafter 
Criminal Justice System].
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Because at the time of the UNMIK deployment there was no functioning judiciary, 
the first task of the international mission was to select and appoint judges and prosecutors. 
Given the importance of such appointments for the future democratization in Kosovo, it was 
essential to tailor a transparent selection procedure, which would give legitimacy to the 
newly appointed courts.431 The selection and appointment had to be based on fair criteria of 
experience, training and moral integrity of the candidates. Another two criteria kept in mind, 
were political acceptability of the candidates and ethnic balance within the re-established 
judicial system.432
The UNMIK established a special body -  the Joint Advisory Council on Provisional 
Judicial Appointments (JAC) -  to screen and select candidates for judicial positions. The 
main task of the JAC was to advise the SRSG on the matters related to the provisional 
appointment of judges, prosecutors and other judicial personnel.433 As the EJS itself, the JAC 
was created as an organ of temporary nature. The duration of its existence was defined by 
two factors: the fulfillment of the purpose of its creation -  advise the SRSG on appointments 
of the judicial personnel - and the establishment of a permanent commission for the selection 
of judges and prosecutors.434 The initial term of the JAC members was limited to two 
months.
Like the majority of the UNMIK-created organs, the JAC included both local (4 
members) and international (3 members) experts. The composition of the Council had to 
reflect ethnic diversity of the Province. It consisted of two Kosovo Albanians, one Bosniac 
and one Serb.435 All the members were appointed by the SRSG.
The JAC was responsible for reviewing the applications from Kosovo legal 
professionals and making written recommendations to the SRSG on candidates for 
appointment to judicial office.436 The SRSG had final authority to approve or reject a 
candidate recommended.
One of the major difficulties for the international administration was finding qualified 
candidates who were willing to apply for positions. Many Kosovo Albanian lawyers who
431 Strohmeyer, supra note 406 at 51.
432 Strohmeyer, supra note 406 at 52.
433 On Joint Advisory Council on Provisional Judicial Appointments,Emergency Decree 1999/1, art.1.
434 Ibid., art. 9.
435 The Development o f the Kosovo Judickd System, supra note 429.
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were persecuted during the Serb regime had escaped before the deployment of the UNMIK. 
Those who left were considered collaborators of the Serb regime and their appointment was 
vigorously apposed by Kosovo Albanian political forces. A significant number of Kosovo 
legal professionals have not been practicing law and were not able to update their legal 
knowledge for almost a ten-year period.437 In making appointments, the international 
administration had to maneuver between political considerations, professional requirements 
and the desire to achieve a certain ethnic balance within the judiciary. Given the limited 
number of candidates, this was a difficult task and many appointments were compromised in 
order to most fully meet the three objectives.
By the end of June 1999, the SRSG was able to appoint nine judges and prosecutors 
(among them three Serbs).438 The judges and prosecutors of the Emergency Judicial System 
were appointed for a three-month renewable period.
Between June and September 1999 the SRSG appointed 55 judges and prosecutors.439 
Among them 42 were Kosovo Albanians, 7 Serbs, 4 Muslims, 1 Turk and 1 Roma.440 All the 
appointees have previously served as judges and prosecutors, but most of them have not 
practiced law in the preceding ten years.441 During July-October most of the Serb judges and 
prosecutors resigned because of the lack of security, discrimination and insufficient 
remuneration.442 As a result, by mid-December 1999 only 47 judges and prosecutors 
remained in the system.443
The process of the formation of the EJS shows that two concerns of peace-building 
and consociationalism were attempted to be addressed: 1) legitimacy of the re-established 
judiciary and participation of the local parties in its re-establishment; and 2) inclusiveness of 
minority members in the judiciary.
436 On Joint Advisory Council on Provisional Judicial Appointments, supra note 431, art 6.
437 A Review o f the Criminal Justice System (1 September 2000 — 28 February 2001), LSMS Report, 
March 2001, at 1, online: OSCE Homepage < http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice/ 
> (date accessed: 25 June 2001).
| 4 A
Criminal Justice System, supra note 430.
439 Ibid.
440 Ibid.
441 The Development o f the Kosovo Judicial System, supra note 428.
442 Ibid.
443 Ibid.
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From the position of the peace-building criteria, the establishment of the JAC was 
important and necessary for the legitimate process of selecting judges. This organ assisted in 
the formation of a professionally qualified, impartial and diverse judiciary -  a foundation for 
fair and equal treatment of defendants. In turn, fairness of court procedures raises the 
population’s faith in the court system and the confidence of minority communities in being 
protected. The sense of protection and confidence of minorities in being treated fairly and 
impartially is a part of their general feeling of being included in a society and of being its free 
and equal members.
Given the difficulty of the post-conflict situation, the UNMIK may be regarded as 
having coped with the task of nominating a multi-ethnic judiciary sufficiently well. While at 
the stage of selection a lot of effort was dedicated to attracting applications from minority 
professionals, much less support was provided to help keep them in the system once 
nominated. The lack of such mechanisms was one of the reasons why many minority judges 
and prosecutors left the system. Thus, being initially quite diverse, the courts and the 
prosecutorial office have gradually lost the desired multi-ethnic characteristic.
4.Regular Judicial System
a. Appointments
By the end of 1999 and the beginning of 2000, the EJS had been gradually 
transformed into a regular judicial system. The regular judicial system contains not only a 
more elaborate judicial structure with wider functions, but also a new organ responsible for 
the selection of candidates for judicial appointments - an Advisory Judicial Commission 
(AJC).444 In October 1999 the AJC replaced the JAC of the Emergency Judicial System. 
Similarly to the JAC, the Commission reviews applications, selects candidates and 
recommends them to the SRSG.
During November-December 1999 the AJC carried out the selection of candidates for 
judicial positions. Starting November 1999, the AJC received 700 applications and
444 Regulation on Appointment and Removal from Office o f Judges and Prosecutors, 
UNMIK/REG/1999/7, online: UN Homepage <
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg7.html> (date accessed: 16 June 2001).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
147
conducted approximately 560 interviews.445 The AJC encouraged minorities to submit 
applications for judicial positions, but these efforts had limited success.
In December the AJC selected 301 professional judges, prosecutors and lay judges.446 
Initial swearing in was held in January 2000. A number of appointed judges and prosecutors, 
especially those from minority communities, did not attend the swearing in ceremonies. 
Among 301 appointed judges and prosecutors, only 245 judges and 42 prosecutors were 
actually sworn in.447 Among them, only 8 were minorities, including Kosovo Serbs. Among 
42 prosecutors, only 2 were representatives of minority communities. As of July 2000, 230 
judges, 235 lay judges and 41 prosecutors worked in the system. Further appointments were 
made in August 2000.
With the adoption of Regulation 2000/34, the SRSG obtained power to appoint 
international judges and prosecutors.448 As of September 2000, six international judges and 
two prosecutors were appointed.449 The involvement of international judges and prosecutors 
is not a consociational technique. However, because of the objective sought through the 
assignment of international judges and prosecutors -  fairness of procedure -  it may be 
regarded as contributing to the protection and inclusiveness of minorities and, thus, 
supporting the important goals of peace-building.
b. Structure o f the regular judicial system
District Courts were established in each of the five Kosovo regions: Pristina, Prizren, 
Pec, Gnjilane and Mitrovica. Now the majority of municipalities has a court of minor 
offences and a municipal court (See table 6). Compared to the rest of municipalities, the three 
predominantly Serb regions - Leposavic, Zubin Potok and Zvecan - have somewhat distinct 
court system. According to the OSCE Municipality Profiles,450 by the summer of 2000, no 
legal courts functioned in those municipalities. However, former municipal courts and minor 
offences courts still existed. The municipal court in Leposavic was even funded by
445 Criminal Justice System, supra note 430.
446 Ibid.
447 Ibid.
448 International judges may be appointed to any court throughout Kosovo. They have the authority to 
select and take responsibility for new and pending cases in the court where they were appointed.
449 Criminal Justice System, supra note 430.
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Belgrade.451 Although the judges in Leposavic and Zubin Potok were re-appointed, they did 
not swear in or otherwise officially assume their positions. The distinct character of the 
judicial system in Serb dominated municipalities and their maintained connection with Serbia 
strengthen the de facto division of Kosovo in predominantly Serb and predominately 
Albanian areas.
The jurisdiction of the Kosovo courts is differentiated. District courts adjudicate 
criminal cases that lead to a sentence of more than five years. Municipal courts adjudicate 
cases, which carry a sentence of up to five years. The minor offences’ courts adjudicate cases 
that carry up to two months of imprisonment452 Although criminal matters remain an issue 
of primary concern, courts have also started adjudicating civil matters. For example, the 
municipal court in Klina deals with all civil cases, except divorces, which are dealt by the 
District Court.453 The municipal court of Lipjan also deals with both criminal and civil cases.
At the Kosovo level, Pristina hosts the highest courts in the hierarchy: the Supreme 
Court of Kosovo, which is the highest appellate body, the Highest Court for Minor Offences 
and a Commercial Court.
The Supreme Court of Kosovo454 was re-established by the UNMIK Regulation in 
September 1999. It has the powers of the Supreme Court, which exercised its jurisdiction in 
Kosovo before 1991, as regards appeals against decisions of district courts in criminal 
matters and detention terms.455 The five judges of the Court are appointed by the SRSG, in 
consultation with the JAC.
Table 6. Kosovo Courts




450 Municipality Profiles, online; OSCE Homepage < http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/ > (date 




454 Formally known as the Ad Hoc Court of Final Appeal.
453 Regulation on the Establishment o f an Ad Hoc Court o f Final Appeal and an Ad Hoc Office o f the 
Public Prosecutor, UNMK/REG/1999/5, s.l, online: UN Homepage <
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg5.html> (date accessed: 8 August 2001).
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no plan foi 
municipal court 
system; cases are 
dealt with by the 
Pristina courts
Gjakove/* akovica Yes 7KA
Yes 5KA (4 
women) Yes 4 KA
Gllogovc/Glogova
c Yes 5 KA Yes 3 KA
Gjilan/Gnjilane
Yes -10  KA,
2 international 
judges Yes 1 Turk Yes 10KA yes
Istog/Istok
Yes -  all Kosovo 
Albanian







viq Yes 5 KS
Yes - all Kosovo 
Serbs




a Yes Yes Yes Yes










There has never 
?een a court 
system in Obilic 






Yes - all Kosovo 
Albanians
Yes - all Kosovo 
Albanians
Yes - all Kosovo 
Albanians
Yes - all Kosovo 
Albanians
Prizren/Prizren
Yes - 6KA, 1 
Turk, 1 Roma, 1 
Bosniac
Yes - 9KA, 
1 Bosniac
Yes - 4 KA, 1 
Turk Yes
Rahovec/Orahovac Yes 5KA Yes - 3KS, 4KA
Shtime/Stimlje
cases are dealt 




no court system 
by summer 2000
Peje/Pe» Yes Yes Yes Yes
Suhareke/Suva
Reka Yes 5KA Yes 6KA
Viti/Vitina Yes Yes
Vushtrri/Vu» itm Yes Yes




Yes - All 
Kosovo Serbs Yes
Zve* an/Zve$an Yes
Source: OSCE Municipality Profiles.
As we can notice from the table, the Kosovo judiciary is predominantly Albanian. 
Among the municipalities only Prizren courts can be regarded as multiethnic. Their 
composition fairly reflects various ethnic communities of Prizren.
However, the general trend is that in predominantly Albanian municipalities (that is, 
the major part of Kosovo), an absolute majority of the judges are Albanian. In Serb- 
dominated municipalities courts are dominated by Serbs. Such ethnic composition creates 
doubts about the ability of those courts to be objective in deciding cases involving minorities 
in respective municipalities. As the illustrations from the practice of the Kosovo courts will 
show, these concerns have sufficient grounds.
At the level of the Kosovo Supreme Court, the High Court for Minor Offenses, and 
the Commercial Court all judges are Albanians. Taking into account the potential policy­
making role of the highest courts, there may be serious concerns about the ability of purely 
Albanian courts to be sensitive enough to the needs of minorities. At this point, the courts’ 
composition cannot be characterized as sufficiently contributing to the inclusiveness of 
minorities.
c. Constitutional framework
As we already know,456 the Constitutional Framework for Self-government of Kosovo 
established important guidelines for the further development of the institutions of self- 
government in the Province. According to it, the government in Kosovo will be exercised 
through three branches of government -  the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. The 
intended judicial structure includes the Supreme Court of Kosovo, District Courts, Municipal 
Courts and Minor Offense Courts.457 The international judges will continue to serve within the
See Chapter m.
437 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, s. 9.4.4.
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Kosovo judicial system according to the rules established by the SRSG.458 The composition of 
the judiciary has to reflect the diversity of the people of Kosovo 459 Interestingly, the Framework 
does not provide any guideline about what are the criteria to judge if the judiciary sufficiently 
reflects the diversity of the people of the Province and what standard should be applied to ensure 
such diversity.
Currently the administration of the judiciary is exercised by the SRSG and other organs 
of the international administration. As intended by the Framework, the Provisional Institutions 
of self-government will soon assume many of those responsibilities. In particular, they will be 
responsible for the organization and proper functioning of the courts; for maintenance of court 
and prosecutorial services; for appointing, training and disciplining members of judicial support 
staff; for coordination between the judicial system and the correctional service; for providing 
information and statistics relating to the functioning of the judicial system and correctional 
service, etc.460 The Provisional Institutions will also have the power to decide on the 
appointment of judges and prosecutors.461 Because the Framework refers to the Provisional 
Institutions in general, it is not clear which organs -  the Assembly, the President, the 
Government or other organs -  will be responsible for each of the mentioned matters.462 In any 
event, one of these organs, most likely the Kosovo Assembly, will decide on judicial 
appointments and, thus, define the composition of the courts and the prosecutorial office. 
Because no special procedures and criteria are spelled out in the Framework, appointments are 
left to the political process, for the discretion of the majority vote. In such a situation, there 
exists a threat that the Albanian majority parliament will effectively resist the nomination of 
minority (first of all, Serbian) judges. Another problem may be the formation of monoethnic 
segments of the judiciary in particular territories of the Province -  nomination of mostly Serbs 
in predominately Serb municipalities and mostly Albanians in predominantly Albanian areas.
At the same time, the SRSG retains powers over the judicial affairs, which he had 
according to the UNMIK Regulations. In particular, he decides on requests about assignment of
458 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223.
459 Ibid., s. 9.4.7.
460 Ibid., s.5.3
461 Ibid., s. 5.3 (a).
462 For example, will the Assembly have power to appoint judges and prosecutors or will the 
Government be responsible for maintenance of courts and correctional service.
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international judges or prosecutors and change of venue;463 exercises control over law 
enforcement institutions and correctional service; 464 and exercises the final authority in regard 
to the appointment, dismissal and disciplining of judges and prosecutors.465 According to section 
9.4.8, judges and prosecutors will continue to be appointed by the SRSG from the list of 
candidates proposed by the Kosovo Judicial and Prosecutorial Council and endorsed by the 
Assembly.
There seems to be a contradiction about the power of the SRSG to appoint judges and 
prosecutors and power of the Provisional Institutions to make decisions on appointment of 
judges and prosecutors. “Making decisions” reasonably suggests competence to decide whether 
a candidate is appointed or not. However, as a result of section 9.4.8, the powers of the 
Assembly are limited to the endorsement of candidates only. This constitutes a controversially 
restricted interpretation of the powers of the Provisional Institutions, which potentially can 
impede the development of sustainable self-government and contradicts the principles of the 
peace-building concept.
The Framework affirms the right of individuals to judicial review of the legality of a 
decision of the Government or other executive agency.466 This provision gives courts the power 
of constitutional adjudication. The provision does not specify the court in which an act can be 
challenged. We can assume that an application for review can be Hied with a municipal or 
district court. This seems to be an implication for establishment of a decentralized system of 
judicial review characteristic of common law countries. Thus, the Kosovo courts at all levels can 
potentially be policy-makers. Then, the composition of the courts becomes even more 
important. Diverse backgrounds and affiliations of judges create an opportunity for them to 
examine issues from a variety of perspectives of its members, to be more flexible in choosing 
solutions and more successful in overcoming ethnic and other biases and stereotypes.
Unfortunately, the area of constitutional review in regard to an individual complaint is 
limited to the executive branch only. An individual cannot challenge either an act adopted by the
463 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, s. 8.1(h). This power is spelled in more detail in the 
Regulation On Assignment of International Judges/Prosecutors and/or Change of Venue.
464 Ibid., s. 8.10).
Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, s. 8.1(g).
466Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
154
Kosovo Assembly or the actions and decisions of the UNMIK. Perhaps, the possibility to 
challenge legislative acts will be provided in the future.
The Framework also contains important foundations for the development of the Supreme 
Court’s power of constitutional review and interpretation. This function is particularly 
important as a tool to resolve numerous contradictory provisions467 in the Framework. The 
Framework confers on the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court powers to decide:
(a) At the request of the President of Kosovo, any member of the 
Presidency of the Assembly, any Assembly Committee, no fewer than five 
members of the Assembly, or the Government, whether any law adopted by 
the Assembly is incompatible with this Constitutional Framework, including 
the international legal instruments specified in Chapter 3 on Human Rights;
(b) In the event of disputes between or among Provisional Institutions 
of Self-Government, or between a Provisional Institution of Self-Government 
and an Assembly Committee, one or more members of the Presidency of the 
Assembly, or one or more members of the Assembly on the extent of their 
rights and obligations under this Constitutional Framework;
(c) At the request of any independent body or office referred to in 
Chapters 10 and 11, whether a decision of a Provisional Institution of Self- 
Government infringes upon the independence and responsibilities of the 
relevant independent body or office; and
(d) At the request of the Office of the Public Prosecutor, whether an 
act by a member of the Assembly, a member of the Government or the 
President of Kosovo constitutes an official act and as such is covered by 
immunity under this Constitutional Framework.468
As one can notice, the Chamber has power of judicial review and interpretation only in 
relation to the Provisional Institutions. Nothing in the Framework suggests that the Chamber can 
decide on the scope of the SRSG competence or resolve controversies regarding the competency 
of the SRSG and the Provisional Institutions. At the same time, the Framework contains 
sufficient grounds to suggest that the SRSG has authority to resolve such disputes. According to 
the Framework, the SRSG oversees the Provisional Institutions and can take measures if the 
actions of the Institutions are inconsistent with SCR 1244 or the Framework. Definition of
467 See, discussion in Chapter HI, section B(l).
468 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, s. 9.4.11.
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consistency with the Framework presupposes the power to interpret the Framework’s 
provisions, including those relating to the power of self-government and the SRSG.
Another question is whether the authority of the SRSG goes as far as judging on the 
compatibility of the Chamber’s action with the Framework. Such a case may, for example, 
include a situation in which the Chamber has allegedly exceeded the limits of its constitutional 
jurisdiction.
Interim conclusion
In less than a year, the UNMIK managed to resurrect the Kosovo judiciary. The re­
establishment of the judiciary is itself a significant achievement. However, the judiciary will 
advance the long-term goals of peace-building only if it provides fair and impartial hearings and 
an equal protection for all minority and majority members.
The development of the judiciary was achieved through several stages starting from the 
limited functions of the Emergency Judicial System to prospective constitutional adjudication. 
At each stage the international administration sought to tailor the transparent and objective 
process for the selection of judicial personnel. The purpose of such a process is to guarantee the 
legitimacy of the re-established organs and develop the credibility of the system with the 
population. (Unfortunately, the intention of creating a multi-ethnic judiciary have not been fully 
reached in practice.) The UNMIK also gradually created preconditions to allow the court system 
to function at full capacity, that is, to provide not only civil and criminal, but also constitutional 
adjudication. The adoption of the Constitutional Framework served a serious step in the 
expansion of the courts’ role to the area of constitutional adjudication -  a field crucially 
important for the development of individual and collective rights and clarifying checks and 
balances within the self-government. The expansion of the role of the judiciary to the area of 
constitutional adjudication is an important precondition for a fuller role of the courts on 
consociational government. When courts exercise only criminal adjudication, the inclusiveness 
is provided mainly through the composition and fair application of law to all defendants. 
Constitutional adjudication provides the policy protection for whole communities.
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C. Law and Its Application in Kosovo
The structure and the composition of the courts is one factor which influences 
people’s perceptions about the justice system and their expectations of such system. Another, 
even more important, factor is law and its actual application by the courts. Because the major 
focus of the court proceedings in Kosovo is the trial of criminal cases, I will concentrate on 
legal guarantees for criminal defendants. In particular, I will look at the three most important 
rights of the detained and accused -  the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention, the 
right to defense counsel and the right to a fair trial.
1. General characteristic of the applicable law
SCR 1244 does not expressly address the issue of the law applicable in Kosovo, but it 
confers on the international administration all the legislative and executive authority in the 
Province.469 The provisions of the Resolution were further spelled out in the Report of the 
UN Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo. The Report 
stipulated for the precedence of human rights standards and regulations of the SRSG over the 
laws of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia. The UNMIK respects the laws of the FRY and 
of the Republic of Serbia “insofar as they do not conflict with internationally recognized 
human rights standards or with regulations issued by the SRSG.”470 The SRSG may “change, 
repeal, or suspend existing laws to the extent necessary for the carrying out of his functions, 
or where existing laws are incompatible with the mandate, aims and purposes of the interim 
civil administration.”471
After the deployment, one of the first steps of the international administration was to 
define what law was applicable in Kosovo. On 25 July 1999 the SRSG issued Regulation 
1999/1, which provided that the law applicable in Kosovo will be “laws applicable in the 
territory of Kosovo prior to 24 March 1999” insofar as they do not contradict the 
international human rights standards.472 The practical reasons for such a decision were, first, 
to avoid a legal vacuum at the initial stage of the transitional administration; second, to avoid
469 Report o f the Secretary-General o f 12 July 1999, supra note 107, para 34.
470 Ibid., para 35.
471 ibid., para 39.
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the need for local lawyers to be introduced into entirely new legal standards which local 
professionals did not know.473
As noted before, the main laws that were applied by courts during the first month of 
the international administration in Kosovo were criminal laws and rules of criminal 
procedure. The law applicable according to Regulation 1999/1 included the FRY Criminal 
Code, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Criminal Code, and the Socialist 
Yugoslav Republic of Serbia Criminal Code. The Kosovo judges and prosecutors willingly 
conducted proceedings under the FRY Criminal Code and the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia Criminal Code, which were both in force before Kosovo was deprived its 
autonomous status.474 The Socialist Yugoslav Republic of Serbia Criminal Code, which 
replaced the Kosovo Penal Code (KPC) after Kosovo became a part of Serbia, was regarded 
by Kosovar judges and prosecutors as “Serbian” discriminatory law and was associated with 
the Milosevic regime.475 Consequently, many of them refused to apply the Socialist 
Yugoslav Republic of Serbia Criminal Code and applied the KPC instead.476 This situation is 
a very vivid illustration of the influence of psychological factors on professional behaviour. 
Interestingly, the KPC and the Serbian Code are similar in many respects,477 but their value 
for the judiciary is measured not by the content, but by their symbolic connection to the 
“statehood” of Kosovo.
The unsanctioned application of the KPC had a negative impact on the legality of 
proceedings and respect for the rule of law. In December 1999, the SRSG promulgated 
Regulation 1999/24478 (later amended by Regulation 2000/59), which repealed Regulation 
1999/1 and reinstated the laws applicable during the time of the Socialist Autonomous 
Province of Kosovo.
Currently the law in Kosovo is comprised of the following sources:
472 Regulation on the Authority o f Interim Administration in Kosovo, UNMIK/REG/1999/1, online: 
UN Homepage http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/Dages/regulations/regl.html (date accessed: 19 May 
2001).
473 Strohmeyer, supra note 406 at 58.




478 Regulation on the Law Applicable in Kosovo, UNMK/REG/1999/24, online: UN Homepage 
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg24.html (date accessed: 20 April 2001).
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- regulations promulgated by the SRSG;
- the law in force in Kosovo on March 22 1989;
- the law on force in Kosovo between March 22, 1989 and June 10, 1999 (the date
when Regulation 1999/24 is deemed to enter into force); if a subject matter is not 
covered by UNMIK Regulation, or the law in force on 22 March 1989, but is
covered by the law in force after 22 March 1989, courts can apply that law given
that it is not discriminatory and complies with the international human rights 
standards;
- international human rights standards.479
All persons undertaking public duties and holding public offices in Kosovo are bound 
by international human rights standards that are reflected in the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; 
the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against; the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; and the 
International Convention on the Rights of the Child.480
Regulation 1999/24 sets out only basic guidelines about applicable law, leaving 
several points unclear. First, it does not answer the question whether the UNMIK Regulation 
or law in force in Kosovo take precedence over one another if they both regulate the same 
matter and both are consistent with human rights standards. Second, the Regulation does not 
specifically spell out the laws or identify the elements, which are inconsistent with human 
rights standards 481 Rather, it places the burden of interpretation on local lawyers who are 
usually unfamiliar with human rights law.482 Human rights law has never been applied in 
Kosovo before. The use of the case law, which serves as a guideline for the practical 
application of human rights standards, is unknown. The Supreme Court of Kosovo have not 
yet assumed powers under the Constitutional Framework, which would allow it to provide
479 Ibid., s. 1-3.
480 ibid., s. 1 (3).
481 Strohmeyer, supra note 406 at 59.
482 Ibid.
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guidance about the applicability of constitutional standards in Kosovo. These ambiguities 
impede the ability of the Kosovo courts to apply laws effectively.
2. Guarantees of the ECHR and the ICCPR
Criminal matters were and are the major concern for the Kosovo courts. In this 
respect, particular attention should be drawn to the human rights standards in relation to trials 
and detention. Among the conventions applicable in Kosovo, the ECHR and the ICCPR 
contain the most comprehensive list of guarantees for fair criminal procedures. The relevant 
international standards are spelled out in Articles 9, 10, 14 of the ICCPR and Articles 5,6 of 
the ECHR. The right to challenge the lawfulness of detention, the right to defense counsel, 
and the right to fair trial are the core guarantees for fairness and non-arbitrariness of the 
criminal proceedings. Let us briefly review these guarantees and their enforcement.
As I pointed out before, I do not seek to analyze the applicable law in great detail. 
Rather, I use the content of the regulation and instances of their misapplication to highlight 
the areas of concern in the development of a legal framework for Kosovo and the treatment 
of minorities.
a. Right to challenge lawfulness o f detention
The ICCPR, the ECHR and the Yugoslav domestic law contain special guarantees 
against arbitrary detention. According to Article 9(1) of the ICCPR and Article 5(1) of the 
ECHR everyone has a right to liberty and security. No one can be deprived of his liberty 
except on the grounds and according to procedures established by law.483 Further, both 
Conventions provide for the right of detained persons to challenge the lawfulness of their 
detention.484 The right to review the ordered detention is a limitation on state authorities to 
ensure that detention is absolutely necessary for effective exercise of the criminal
483 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.171, Can. 
T.S. 1976 No.47, 6 I.L.M. 368, art. 9(1) (entered into force 23 March 1976, accession by Canada 19 
May 1976) [hereinafter I.C.C.P.R.].
484 Ibid., art. 9(3).
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proceedings, that trial takes place within a reasonable time and the investigation is conducted 
with expedition.485
The FRY Code of Criminal Procedure provides that within 24 hours of detention, a 
judge must deliver a decision to a detainee whether he is to be held in custody. In 
extraordinary circumstances a detainee may be kept for 72 hours before a judicial review. 
According to Article 182 (1) of the FRY Law on Criminal Procedure (LCP), pre-trial custody 
may be ordered as a special measure to guarantee the presence of a defendant and the 
successful exercise of the proceedings. In particular, under Article 197 of the FRY Code of 
Criminal Procedure (CCP), a judge can order a one-month pre-trial detention. Further, a 
panel of judges may extend detention to a maximum of 2 months.486 In proceedings where a 
defendant is charged with a crime carrying a sentence of more than five years of 
imprisonment, the Supreme Court of Kosovo may extend pre-trial custody for up to three 
months. Thus, according to Article 197, the maximum period of pre-trial detention will be 6 
months.487
UNMIK Regulation 1999/26 allows further extension of pre-trial detention. On 
recommendation of an investigating judge or prosecutor, the Ad Hoc Court of Final Appeal 
can extend pretrial custody by three months, with a subsequent extension of no more than 
three months.488 Thus, if extensions under both Article 197 of the FRY CCP and under 
Regulation 1999/26 are applied, a person may spend in total one year in pre-trial detention.
According to the findings of the OSCE Legal Monitoring Section, orders to release 
suspects or to hold them in custody are often motivated by ethnic considerations.489 The 
biased application of law is most frequently targeted at Kosovo Serbs. On many occasions 
Kosovo Serbs were treated in a stricter way than Kosovo Albanians. For example, several 
Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs were suspected of involvement in the murder of a 
Kosovo Albanian. Pending investigation, Kosovo Serbs were detained, while all Albanians
485 Neumeister v. Austria (1979-80), online: European Court of Human Rights Homepage < 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/ViewRoot.asp?Item=0&Action=Html&X=1014221939&Notice=0& 
Noticemode=&RelatedMode=Q > (date accessed: 3 May 2001).
486 Criminal Justice System, supra note 430.
487 Ibid.
488 Ibid.
489 The Treatment o f Minorities by the Judicial System, OSCE Report, August 1999 -  March 2000, 
online: OSCE Homepage < http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice/ > (date accessed: 
23 June 2001).
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were released.490 Given the fact that at that time no fact-finding had been carried out and all 
participants were equally under suspicion, there was no justifiable reason to release Kosovo 
Albanians and detain only Kosovo Serbs. This gives rise to the conclusion that the detention 
was ethnically motivated.
Other cases demonstrate that Kosovo Serbs were detained even when there was 
insufficient evidence of their involvement491 while no detention of Kosovo Albanians was 
ordered notwithstanding compelling evidence of their involvement in crime.492
Because pre-trial detention may often become a tool of ethnic persecution, it is 
particularly important that detainees have a right to challenge the lawfulness of detention. 
While Article 197 spells out the right of a detained for review at each instance of the custody 
extension, Regulation 1999/26 does not stipulate such a right. It can, thus, be asserted that 
habeas corpus procedures will not be available to detainees whose custody was extended 
under the Regulation. The question is whether Regulation 1999/26, which fails to provide a 
right to challenge the lawfulness of detention, should be regarded as unlawful or whether the 
standards of the ICCPR and the ECHR apply regardless of the wording of the Regulation. 
The O M K  Legal Monitoring Section has dedicated two reports to the analysis of Regulation 
1999/26 and its application. The Section declared this Regulation to be unlawful and 
recommended its amendment.493 Some Kosovo courts adopted another approach. For 
example, the Gnjilane District Court established that the ECHR gives courts authority to hear 
the challenges of pre-trial detention.494
Adoption of Regulation 1999/26 is an interesting example of the international 
administration trying to balance the demands of an emergency situation and legality of court 
proceedings. On the one hand, pre-trial detentions may be necessary for quicker restoration 
of law and order. The few courts of the Emergency Judicial System would have not been able 
to cope with hearing numerous challenges on detention. Thus, from a practical point of view,
490 Criminal Justice System, supra note 430.
491 In one of the cases neither of the witnesses was able to identify the suspect (Kosovo Serb) as a 
man who they saw committing a crime. Nevertheless, he was put in custody. The Treatment o f 
Minorities by the Judicial System, supra note 489.
492 According to the OSCE Report, compelling evidence was presented to a judge concerning a 
Kosovo Albanian suspected in kidnapping two Kosovo Serb teachers, but the judge found no reason 
to hold the suspect in custody. Ibid.
493 Criminal Justice System, supra note 430.
" 'ib id .
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the reason for introducing pre-trial detention without habeas corpus procedures is understood. 
At the same time, these practical considerations cannot justify derogation from human rights 
standards.
The indirect impact of the insufficient enforcement of the right to challenge the 
lawfulness of detention, first of all, will result in disbelief of the population in the fairness of 
the judicial system. For many minorities, this will be one of the many instances of 
discrimination that contributes to the general sense of instability and lack of protection and 
will defeat the objective of inclusive government.
b. The right to defense counsel 
Among the minimum standards for treatment of suspects and detainees, the ICCPR 
and the ECHR stipulate for a right to legal assistance.495 According to the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights, states are under a positive obligation to provide effective 
legal assistance.496 This assistance has to be qualified and experienced.497 Adequate time and 
facilities have to be provided for the preparation of a defense.498
The OMIK legal monitors have revealed that in practice these guarantees are not 
observed properly. Having interviewed 198 detainees in five Kosovo regions, the monitors 
found out that none of them had access to defense counsel while in detention before the first 
detention hearing.499 For Kosovo Serb detainees the problem is exacerbated by several 
factors. There are few Serb lawyers available to take court appointments.500 Courts also often 
fail to appoint Serb lawyers even if they are available. In some Kosovo regions, the security 
situation does not allow Serb lawyers to travel to detention facilities to meet their clients.501
495 1.C.C.P.R., supra note 483, art. 14(3).
496 Artico v. Italy (1974), online: European Court of Human Rights Homepage <
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/ViewRoot.asp?Item=0&Action=Html&X=1014222249&Notice=0& 
Noticemode=&RelatedMode=Q > (date accessed: 3 August 2001).
497 Biondo v. Italy (1983), online: European Court of Human Rights Homepage (date accessed: 3 
August 2001).
498 Can v. Austria (1981), online: European Court of Human Rights Homepage <
http://hudoc.ec hr.coe.int/hudoc/ViewRoot.asp?Item=0&Action=Html&X=1014222642&Notice=0& 
Noticemode=&RelatedMode=0 > (date accessed: 3 August 2001).
499 Access to Effective Counsel, LSMS Report No.7, May 2000, at 6, online: OSCE Homepage < 
httD://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/iustice/ > (date accessed: 23 June 2001).
m  Ibid.
501 The Treatment o f Minorities by the Judicial System, supra note 489.
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In respect to available Albanian lawyers, there is significant criticism about their ability to do 
their best as defense counsels for Kosovo Serbs.
Many detainees complained about the ineffectiveness of defense counsels. In 
particular, detainees reported that they were rarely visited by counsel during the investigation 
stage; that counsel’s visits were 10-15 minutes long, which does not allow detailed 
discussion of their case; and that they were not kept informed about the course of the 
investigative proceedings, etc.502 The confidentiality of the communications between 
detainee and a defense counsel was often violated. 23 out of 35 detainees in Gnjilane 
reported that their meetings with defense counsel took place in the presence of a detention 
facility representative.503
There can be many more examples of poor observation of a right to legal assistance. 
The main point here is that necessary guarantees are incorporated into the applicable law, but 
courts and the international administration are not doing enough to provide their appropriate 
enforcement.
c. The right to fa ir trial
Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 14 of the ICCPR guarantee a right to a fair trial. 
According to Article 6 of the ECHR, “everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within 
a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”504 The right 
to a fair trial comprises two sides -  fairness of procedure and impartiality and independence 
of a tribunal.
In a post-conflict society, concerns about the impartiality of courts are raised by a 
number of factors. First, being subject to threats and intimidation,505 judges and prosecutors 
may often ignore the interests of justice in order to protect their own well-being. Second, 
many current judges and prosecutors have directly or indirectly suffered from the brutality of 
the Serb regime and, thus, may seek “redress” through applying more severe measures to 
Serbs. Under these circumstances the impartiality standards may arguably be violated, for
302 Ibid., at 4-5.
503 Ibid., at 4.
504 Convention for the Protection o f Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 October 1950, 
online: Council of Europe Homepage < http://conventions.coe.int/Treatv/EN/CadreListeTraites.htm > 
(date accessed: 27 July 2001).
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example, in cases where a mono-ethnic tribunal tries a member of minority community.506 
Let us look at the case of Bozur Bisevac and Miroslav Vuckovic, which involved an issue of 
impartiality.507 Bisevac and Vuckovic are two Kosovo Serbs indicted for genocide. The 
defense counsel applied for the exclusion of the judging panel, inter alia, on the grounds of 
failure to guarantee panel’s impartiality. The defense argued that the judges could not be 
impartial in the case because they all were Kosovo Albanians -  members of the same ethnic 
group, which the defendants have allegedly tried to destroy. The defense also stated that the 
presiding judge could have been regarded as an “injured party” because his office and home 
had been burned during the conflict. This case demonstrates that the composition of a court 
shapes the people’s perception about that court as either likely to be biased or likely to be 
more impartial.
The international administration established a special mechanism - assignment of 
international judge or prosecutor and change of venue -  to ensure fairness and impartiality of 
proceedings.
Regulation 2000/64 allows for a change of venue of the criminal proceedings and for 
an assignment of an international judge or prosecutor in a case.508 To ensure independence 
and impartiality of the court, a prosecutor, an accused or a defense counsel can petition the 
Department of the Judicial Affairs about the assignment of a judge or prosecutor or for a 
change of venue.509 Petitions can be submitted at any time during the proceedings. On the 
basis of the petition or on its own motion, the Department of Judicial Affairs submits a 
recommendation to the SRSG for the assignment of international judges/prosecutors or/and 
change of venue. The Regulations does not establish a time frame for the Department of the 
Judicial Affairs to proceed with the petition. This creates a danger that issues will not be 
resolved in timely manner.
505 See, Criminal Justice System, supra note 429 at 47.
506 Ibid.
507 Criminal Justice System, supra note 429.
508 Regulation on Assignment o f International Judges/prosecutors and/or Change o f Venue, 
UNMIK/REG/2000/64, s.1.1, online: UN Homepage <
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/repulations/reg064.html > (date accessed: 28 July 2001).
509 It is not clear what criteria should be used to decide when the fair administration of justice needs 
the assignment of an international judge or prosecutor. Trial records are not a reliable source of 
information about the fairness of procedure because trial records reportedly lack accuracy and 
precision. - Criminal Justice System, supra note 429.
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The SRSG has authority to approve or reject the recommendation. The SRSG assigns 
an international investigating judge and/or a panel composed of at least two international 
judges, one of which should be presiding judge.510 This way a trial is conducted by a majority 
international panel that provides a sufficient guarantee for the proper administration of 
justice. The greater involvement of international judges and prosecutors in adjudication is a 
significant development to prevent actual or perceived bias against Kosovo ethnic minorities, 
especially Serbs. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that using international judges 
and prosecutors is not a consociational technique and it even to certain extent increases the 
dependence of the Kosovo judiciary on the outside interference. Nevertheless, I think that 
such a measure is justifiable at least during the first years of the Kosovo reconstruction.
Interim conclusion
The re-establishment of the judiciary and its supportive structures falls within the 
necessary task of institution-building. As an integral element of peace-building, the re­
establishment of the judiciary and the delimitation of the applicable law are directly subject 
to the constraints and requirements of the peace-building concept. The concept, however, 
does not provide any specific guidelines for the establishment of the judiciary. In this respect, 
the central test of the “correctness” of the international activities for the administration of the 
judiciary is whether the judicial reforms advance the two main goals of peace-building -  
transformation and sustainability. If courts come to be viewed as legitimate fora for the 
resolution of disputes, more people may prefer to resort to adjudication instead of nursing an 
ethnic grievance or resolving a matter through violence.511
The analysis of the Kosovo judiciary can be conducted in two dimensions: 1) the 
vertical dimension of the administration of justice -  a test of compliance with the 
characteristics of peace-building; 2) the horizontal dimension of the structure and operation 
of the judiciary itself -  a test to what extent the principles of consociationalism are 
incorporated in the judicial structure.
510 Regulation on Assignment o f International Judges/prosecutors and/or Change o f Venue, supra 
note 508, s. 2.1.
511 Jennifer Widener, “Courts and Democracy in Post-conflict Transitions: A Social Scientist’s 
Perspective on the African Case” (2001) 98 AJIL 64 at 70.
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1) All key appointments and decisions in regard to the administration of justice 
continue to emanate from the SRSG. He appoints judges and prosecutors, decides on the 
change of venue and assignment of international judges or prosecutors, and exercises 
authority over law enforcement and correctional services. Moreover, the authority to “ensure 
full implementation of the UNSCR 1244”5*2 gives him almost unlimited power over any 
branch of the local government. The SRSG cannot interfere with the very exercise of justice, 
but he can influence the work of the courts through defining applicable law and making 
appointments. Generally speaking, this influence of the SRSG is unavoidable because all the 
power of the UNMIK is concentrated in his hands. Theoretically, the SRSG does not 
prejudice the work of the courts through his indirect influence and does not break the limits 
of the peace-building concept unless he sets up standards of treatment that promote ethnic 
discrimination.
From the practical perspective, the approach of the UNMIK to the administration of 
judicial affairs reveals a somewhat contradictory trend. On the one hand, the international 
administration tends to retain control over the administration of the judicial system. On the 
other hand, the international administration does not use its power effectively enough. For 
example, the UNMIK Regulations about applicable law and procedure often lack clarity. The 
UNMIK is not able to ensure that law enforcement organs fully comply with human rights 
standards.
2) The horizontal level -  the structure and functioning of the judiciary itself. The 
functioning of the courts has far reaching direct and indirect impact on the state of affairs in 
the Province. First, through the protection that the courts provide to individuals. Second, 
through their institutional structure (first of all, multi-ethnic composition) and equal 
treatment of defendants of different ethnicity, courts can indirectly contribute to the 
inclusiveness of minorities in social and political life. This, in turn, could facilitate the 
meaningful participation of minorities in government and social life and lead to the 
mitigation of ethnic tension and majority rule.
Three major factors shape the contribution of the courts to minority inclusiveness: I) 
the institutional structure — whether minorities are included in the system, whether reasonable 
effort is made to facilitate their inclusion; and how minorities are treated within the system;
512 Security Council Regulation 1244, supra note 106.
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2) the applicable law -  whether there are special mechanisms that protect defendants from 
judicial bias based on ethnicity; 3) and how courts apply the law — whether courts are 
actually biased in the application of general standards of treatment to defendants of various 
ethnic affiliation.
These three factors influenced the protection of minorities in Kosovo in the 
following way:
1) The institutional structure. From the very start of its activities in Kosovo, the
UNMIK emphasized its commitment to establishing multi-ethnic judiciary. Both during the 
Emergency Judicial System and Regular Judicial System, the UNMIK bodies made 
reasonable efforts to facilitate inclusion of minorities in the system and were conscious of 
ethnic factor during selection and appointment of judges and prosecutors. The Commissions 
on Judicial Appointments invited applications from minorities and encouraged their 
participation in the re-established judiciary. However, the UNMIK was not able to hold 
minority judges and prosecutors in the system. Many newly appointed minority judges and 
prosecutors resigned because of discrimination within the judiciary, intimidation and other 
security concerns. As a result, currently the absolute majority of judges and prosecutors are 
Kosovo Albanian. We have already demonstrated that this composition of the judiciary may 
partially account for the perception of the judiciary as biased and ineffective. Thus, from the 
point of view of the institutional structure, there are certain concerns about the ability of the 
Kosovo judiciary to provide impartial trial and equal protection to representatives of all 
ethnic communities.
2) The applicable law. From a theoretical perspective, the law applicable in Kosovo 
contains all the minimum guarantees for fair and equal treatment of detainees and suspects. 
Special mechanisms are introduced to combat ethnic bias (e.g., the UNMIK Regulation on 
assignment of international judges and prosecutors and/or change of venue). At the same 
time, some regulations are not sufficiently clear and are even contradictory to human rights 
standards. Their ambiguous and arbitrary nature results in additional problems in their 
application.
3) The application of the law. The OMIK Monitoring Section reported instances
when application of the law was inconsistent with human rights standards. Both the general 
misapplication of law and biased treatment of minority victims and defendants took place.
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The most widely spread discrimination is observed in relation to Kosovo Serbs. The 
discrimination takes place in several forms. For example, officials are reluctant to punish 
Albanians for crimes committed against Serbs; Serbs receive more severe punishment that 
Albanians for the same offences.513
Currently, neither the composition of the courts nor the treatment of defendants by 
courts can be regarded as contributing to the protection and inclusiveness of minorities. The 
techniques applied to the re-establishment of the judiciary were consociational in character, 
but their implementation fell short providing a consociational result. Rather, the practice of 
the courts contributes to the general picture of discrimination of minorities. The judicial bias 
and lack of protection facilitate dissatisfaction of minorities with their position and are likely 
to intensify their political struggle for inclusion or even raise claims for separation.
D. Police
The restoration and maintenance of order is one of the necessary tasks of international 
missions in post-conflict zones. Immediately after the deployment, control over the security 
situation is usually carried out by the military as well as the police. As a rule, the 
normalization of the security situation takes several stages (See picture 3). At the very 
beginning, military troops intervene to stop hostilities and separate the warring parties. Once 
violence is brought under control, the involvement of the military decreases and security 
responsibilities are gradually transferred to the police force. The transfer from the military 
monitoring to civil policing can take several years, especially if an international mission has 
to re-establish the police structure.
st3 Assessment o f the Situation on Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, OSCE Report, October 2000, at 12, 
online: OSCE Homepage < http://www.osce.org/kosovoAdocuments/ieports/minorities/ > (date 
accessed: 12 May 2001).
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Picture 4. Stages of security building in post-conflict societies. Source: Tom 
Woodhouse & Oliver Ramsbotham, Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution (Portland, OR : 
Frank Cass Publishers, 2000) at 83.
Providing law enforcement in post-conflict societies is a relatively new task for 
international administrations. Traditionally, peacekeepers relied on existing police structures. 
However, in Kosovo, the Yugoslav and Serb police forces were withdrawn and no law 
enforcement structure existed at the time of the UNMIK and KFOR deployment. The 
international administration had to assume responsibility, not only for a short-term task of 
providing public security, but also for the establishing local police structures.
1. Police structure
The police and security function in Kosovo is exercised by several institutions. 
According to SCR 1244, both the international security presence (KFOR) and the 
international civil presence (UNMIK) have responsibilities regarding public safety, law and 
order. Following the cessation of the NATO bombing the KFOR, as a military force, took the 
lead in the security area. According to SCR 1244, it was responsible for ensuring withdrawal 
of the FRY military and police; for the demilitarization of the KLA; for the establishment of 
a secure environment for returning refugees; for ensuring public safety until the civil 
presence would be able to take responsibility for this task; for conducting border monitoring,
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etc.514 After minimal order was established, the UNMIK could take over the responsibility 
for the policing of the Province.
The UNMIK responsibilities include maintaining civil law and order and establishing 
local police forces.515 In particular, the UNMIK Police carries out investigations, undertakes 
street patrols, maintains public order, and polices borders. In addition to that, it provides 
security escorts for money transfers, public transport, courts, judicial personnel, members of 
minority communities. It is primarily responsible for criminal investigations.516
The KFOR and the UNMIK Police are composed from the international contingent, 
which bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in the Province. 
However, as an integral part of the process of institution-building, the UNMIK also initiated 
the formation of locally composed security structures. In addition to the UNMIK Police, the 
international administration established two Kosovar structures -  the Kosovo Police Service 
(KPS) and the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) - that assist the maintenance of security and 
order in the province.
The KPS is a special sub-section of the UNMIK Police. According to the 
Constitutional Framework, the KPS functions under the authority of the SRSG.517 The main 
objectives of the Service is crime prevention, public protection and safety maintenance. With 
time, the KPS is supposed to assume additional responsibilities in the area of law and order.
The recruitment to the KPS is exercised with consideration of demographic criterion. 
The policy is to include 15% representation by minorities in Kosovo Police Service. Women 
constitute about 25% of the recruites.518 The Kosovo Police Service also provides 
employment for qualified members of the KLA who constitute about 50-55% of the
519recruites.
Another structure that provides employment for the former KLA members is the 
Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). According to the terms of the KLA demilitarization, the 
KLA was transformed into a civilian agency charged with providing emergency response and
suSecurity Council Resolution 1244, supra note 106, para 9
515 Ibid., para 11(1).
516 UNMIK Police, online: UN Homepage http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/inmikl2.html (date 
accessed: 15 June 2001).
517 Constitutional Framework, supra note 223, ch.6.
518 Ibid.
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assistance in reconstruction services in Kosovo.520 The KPC operate under the authority of 
the SRSG. Its day-to-day operation is directed by KFOR according to the guidelines of the 
SRSG.521 The SRSG has final authority over the selection (10% of the members have to be 
from minority communities), appointment and dismissal of the members of Kosovo Corps.
The KPC does not have any role in law enforcement or maintenance of law and 
order.522 It provides disaster response, performs search and rescue, demining and assists the 
reconstruction of public utilities and other social projects.523 Only a limited number (200) of 
the KPC is authorized to carry weapons.
According to the OSCE Report of June-July 2000, almost every Kosovo municipality 
hosted brigades of the KFOR, the UNMIK Police, the KPC and the KPS. (see, Table 7).
Table 7. International police and military presence in Kosovo
Municipalities













Ferizaj/UroSevac 169 Kosovo 
Albanian











60 international 200 Norwegian





520 Regulation on the Establishment o f Kosovo Corps, UNMIK/REG/1999/8, s. 1.2, online: UN 
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Gjilan/Gnjilane 167 Kosovo 
Serbs & 
Albanians







31 international 112 Kosovo 
Albanian
40 Norwegian
Istog/lstok 60 Kosovo 
Albanians
35 International 52 Kosovo Alb. 600 Spanish
Kline/Klina 9 Kosovo 
Albanian
12 international 52 Kosovo 
Albanian
300 Portuguese
Kaqanik/Ka• anik 52 Kosovo 
Albanian






1 Kosovo Serb 17 international 740 Belgian
Lipjan/Lipljan 47 Kosovo 
Serbs(9) & 
Albanians (38)























1 Kosovo Serb 4 international 40 US




40 international 52 Kosovo 
Albanian
Norwegian
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Podujeve/Podujevo 83 Kosovo 
Albanian
45 international 120 Kosovo 
Albanian
600 UK















Rahovec/Orahovac 2 Kosovo 
Albanian
42 international 52 Kosovo 
Albanian
German/Dutch
Shtime/Stimlje 26 Kosovo 
Albanian
6 international 134 Finnish





90 59 international 200 450 Austrian
Viti/Vitina 2 Kosovo 
Albanian
25 international USA
Vushtrri/Vu* itm 137 Kosovo 
Albanian





3 Kosovo Serbs 46 international Danish
Zve* an/Zveqan 13 international 250 Danish
Source: Municipality Profiles, online: OSCE Homepage
The authority over the organs providing order and security in the Province continues 
to be concentrated in the hands of the international presence: from the Table above we can 
see that each municipality has a heavy military presence (KFOR) and a considerable number 
of the UNMIK Police. The two Kosovar structures -  the KPS and the KPC -  are also placed 
under the authority of the international administration. Moreover, all the security duties are
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entrusted primarily with the international contingent of the UNMIK Police or of the KFOR. 
The locally composed KPS and KPC are viewed only as assisting the international forces. 
The UNMIK seem to be reluctant to give more responsibilities to the local structures because 
of a fear that they will either fail to provide effective protection to the population or use their 
authority as a means of repression against minority members. In this respect, the security area 
differs from the judicial and representative branches of government, where the UNMIK 
initiated gradual transfer of responsibility to local organs.
2. Police powers
The KFOR and the UNMIK Police were entrusted with a wide range of complex 
security tasks. To achieve these objectives, the police and military in Kosovo are granted 
necessary coercive authority. Among their main powers are the authority to arrest and to 
detain and to exclude a person from a certain territory.
a. Arrest and detention
Even after the two years of international presence in Kosovo, the KFOR remains 
active in exercising detentions and arrests. The KFOR broadly interprets its powers under 
paragraph 9(d) of SCR 1244.524 In conversations with the representatives of the Amnesty 
International, the KFOR officials argued that they have authority to hold persons in detention 
indefinitely.325 They also claimed power to continue detention notwithstanding court order to 
release a person.526 The OSCE Legal Monitoring Section reported that the KFOR, in fact, 
often exercised those extraordinary powers. In many instances the KFOR continues to detain 
individuals subject to criminal investigation, notwithstanding court orders to release them.527 
For example, the suspects Shaban Beqiri and Xhemal Sejdiu were ordered to be released by a 
judge. However, they were held in detention by an order of the KFOR Commander.528
524 The paragraph reads that the international security presence is responsible, inter alia, for “ensuring 
public safety and order undl the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task.”
25 Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia (Kosovo), Amnesty International Report, March 2000, online: 
Amnesty International Homepage http://www.web.amnestv.org/ai.nsf/index/EUR70013200Q (date 
accessed: 28 April 2001).
326 Ibid.
527 Criminal Justice System in Kosovo, supra note 429.
528 Ibid.
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The instances of such detentions raise two concerns. The detention contrary to a court 
order for release is a violation of the prohibition on arbitrary detention. A person can be 
deprived of his liberty only on grounds and according to procedure established by law.529 
Although the KFOR was granted authority under SCR 1244 to provide security in the 
Province, it was not given power to violate human rights standards. When the KFOR 
continues to detain a person notwithstanding the court order to release, the KFOR not only 
violates the law, but also undermines the authority of the judiciary. Although the SRSG 
enjoys ample powers in the Province, he cannot exercise its authority over the military 
presence, KFOR, and consequently cannot control the action of the KFOR. The remedy 
against the KFOR actions, which contradict human rights standards would be to allow 
challenging their actions in Kosovo courts.530
The KFOR as a military force continues to utilize techniques more appropriate for 
cases of civil insurrection rather than for the exercise of policing. For example, in regard to 
the KFOR detection of 49 people in Mitrovica in February 2000, a representative from the 
UNMIK police told the Amnesty International that “[f]rom a military point of view there 
may have been a good reason to detain these persons, however, from a police point of view 
there was no probable cause.”531 This means that the KFOR still heavily relies on rigid 
means of controlling public order, which may be considered excessive and disproportionate.
b. Exclusion o f a person
Another recent development of the powers of the KFOR and the UNMIK Police is the 
authority to issue exclusion orders.532 In the interests of security, the law enforcement 
authorities can issue an order requiring a person to leave or to stay away from a particular 
area if there are grounds to suspect that he has participated in preparation of acts that threaten
529 1.C.C.P.R., supra note 483.
330 Currently, the KFOR personnel is immune any civil or criminal suit in the courts of Kosovo. See, 
Regulation on the Status. Privileges and Immunities o f KFPR and (JNMIK and Their Personnel in 
Kosovo, UNMDC/REG/2000/057, online: UN Homepage <
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg047.html > (date accessed: 25 August 2001).
531 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo), Amnesty International, supra note 525.
332 Authorized by Regulation On the Exclusion o f Persons for a Limited Duration to Secure Public 
Peace, Safety and Order, UNMIK Regulation 2000/62, online: UN Homepage <
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg062.html > (date accessed: 17 July 2001).
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peace within or outside the Province.533 The exclusion is authorized for up to 30 days. A 
violation of an order is punished by 2 month of imprisonment.534
On the one hand, the Regulation constitutes an extension of the powers of the police 
and military. On the other, it introduces exclusion as a “softer” alternative to arrest or 
detention. Most importantly, the Regulation expressly provides for the right to challenge the 
lawfulness of an exclusion order before an international judge. A person to whom an 
exclusion order was issued can lodge a petition for a review. A petition is Hied with the 
district court of a region from which a person was excluded.535
The petition is examined by an international judge. An international judge has to 
provide an opportunity of an adversarial debate between a person who is subject to the order 
or his representative and a prosecutor or representative of the authority that issued the 
order.536 In deciding the issue, a judge has to consider three factors: whether there are 
grounds to suspect that a person was involved in the commission or preparation of acts that 
threaten peace within or outside the Province; the person’s link with the territory from which 
he is prohibited; and whether an order may subject him to persecution within the meaning of 
the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees.537
Interim conclusions
The institution of the police is entrusted with an important task of providing law and 
order. The role of the police in a post-conflict society can be observed in at least two ways:
1) maintenance of law and order; 2) contribution to minority inclusiveness through both a 
multiethnic composition and the guarantee of equal treatment for everybody regardless of 
ethnic affiliation.
533 Ibid., s.2.1.
534 Regulation On the Exclusion o f Persons for a Limited Duration to Secure Public Peace, Safety and 
Order, supra note 532.
535 Ibid., s. 3.1.
536 This requirement strictly conforms with the requirements of habeas corpus proceedings set up by 
the case law of the European court of Human Rights: in Toth v Austria the European Court of Human 
Rights held that such hearings have to be adversarial and that authorities must ensure the detainee 
equality of arms.
33 On the Exclusion o f Persons for a Limited Duration to Secure Public Peace, Safety and Order, 
supra note 532, s.3.3
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1) The way in which law and order are exercised will to a great extent define the 
stability in the country and influence both the confidence of the public in the quality of peace 
in the post-conflict zone and the commitment of the government to respect it.538 In this 
respect, the powers of the KFOR and the UNMIK Police may be somewhat problematic. On 
the one hand, they may be recognized as necessary for providing law and order and are 
generally consistent with the tasks of peace-building. On the other, some powers, like the 
KFOR “holds,” may now seem excessive given the relative stabilization of the situation in 
the Province. Again, the peace-building concept does not provide any guideline in this 
respect. Thus, the only test of the consistency of the measures with the requirements of 
peace-building would be whether the measures advance the goals of the UNMIK.
Another question about the international policing of Kosovo is why the KFOR still 
continues its active role in law enforcement. In Chapter I I I  concluded that the KFOR played 
a role of “ground preparator” for the UMNDC. In my view, after two years of international 
presence, this task may be considered complete. Moreover, according to SCR 1244 the 
KFOR has already transferred the tasks of maintaining law and order to the UNMIK Police. 
The continuation of the active role of the KFOR seems to be inconsistent with the pattern 
prescribed in the UN documents on peace-building. The heavy KFOR presence in the 
Province raises some concerns about what might be the underpinning motives for the 
continuation of the KFOR deployment. Is it really necessary for the maintenance of stability 
in the Province or is it a way to maintain and strengthen the Western influence over Kosovo?
2) The composition of the police force and its ability to provide equal treatment to 
everybody regardless of his/her ethnic affiliation also contributes to minority inclusiveness. 
The analysis of the situation in Kosovo does not confirm that the police are able to 
sufficiently meet either of these two objectives. Even if the activities for the maintenance of 
law and order are to be considered sufficiently effective, they are carried out primarily by the 
international contingent. There is no basis for judging how effective the locally composed 
structures would be and how their multiethnic composition will help them to be fair and 
impartial.
338 Rama Mani, “Contextualizing Police Reform: Security, the Rule of Law and Post-Conflict 
Peacebuilding” in Peacebuilding and Police Reform at 10.
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E. Conclusions to the Chapter
The courts and the police are integral elements of the institutional structure for 
attainment of the rule of law. As parts of this structure and as elements of the broader system 
of government, the judiciary and the police must also be built with consideration for the 
principles of consociationalism. The contribution of the judiciary and the police to more 
inclusive government is of a different nature from the inclusiveness provided through 
representative organs. The legislative branch allows for the direct influence of minority 
representatives on the formation of the general legal framework for protection of minorities. 
In contrast, the courts and the police contribute to the inclusiveness in a more indirect way. 
They work at a community and individual level. The police and the courts are in a certain 
sense the agents of the representative branch, which put into life the directions of the 
legislature regarding minority policies.
In the process of adjudication a judge relies on his expertise as a professional and as 
an individual. The subjectivity of a judge should be controlled and limited by the principles 
of law, professional ethics and procedural rules. Several examples from court practice in 
Kosovo (see, e.g., the application of the KPC) show that the judiciary does not see itself 
controlled by legal or professional principles. Neither are there sufficient outside control 
mechanisms to preclude ethnic bias and other forms of unprofessional conduct. One of the 
remedies for fairer trials is a possibility to change a venue and/or require assignment of an 
international judge or prosecutor. This mechanism is good as a short-term measure. It allows 
for prevention or correction of injustice in an individual case. However, in the long run it 
does not help to make the judiciary more tolerant or professionally correct. This mechanism 
does not change the perception of a biased judge about defendants of other ethnicities. Thus, 
such a judge is likely to continue the exercise of partial adjudication in the future cases. One 
of the factors required to change perceptions and the inner characteristics of the judicial 
process is to have multi-ethnic courts, which will help to develop the interaction among 
perspectives of professionals with different ethnic and educational backgrounds. Currently, 
the Kosovo judiciary is not ethnically diverse. The most disturbing fact is that the highest 
courts, those which have the most active policy-making role, are purely Albanian. Taking 
into consideration the described instances of ethnic bias and subjectivity in adjudication, I am
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inclined to think that the recommendations of such courts will also be targeted primarily for 
protection of the ethnic majority group.
Because the composition of the judiciary is important, a vital practical question is 
how diverse should the judiciary be to be considered multi-ethnic? I cannot advocate 
proportionality because a requirement of certain assigned quota may: first, lead to lower 
quality appointments -  on account of the lack of sufficient numbers of a minority qualified as 
legal professionals, the requirement of proficiency may be compromised to satisfy numbers. 
Second, given the small population of some minorities and the absence of a protective 
mechanism like mutual veto for the legislature, proportional representation in the judiciary 
will provide no more than symbolic inclusiveness.539 For the minority participation in the 
judiciary to be meaningful, there should be some protective mechanism similar to the mutual 
veto applied to the representative branch. Alternatively, the composition of the highest courts 
should be based on proportionate representation if possible and include more than a half of 
legal professionals from non-ethnic majority communities.
As can be seen, the implementation of consociationalism in the judiciary is 
significantly different and perhaps more complicated than in relation to the legislature. While 
the approach of the UNMIK to tailor the structure of the legislature was sufficiently creative, 
the development of a consociational judiciary needs further attention.
There is a concern that the failure of the judiciary and the police to provide 
inclusiveness and protection to the communities and individuals will intensify the 
dissatisfaction of minorities with their position in a society and lead to their more active 
struggle on the political arena and attempts to “revenge” ethnic majority members by 
discriminating against them in the area where they are in minority.
539 Devlin, MacKay & Kim, supra note 407 at 835.
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Chapter V 
Making Ends Meet
The discussion of the Kosovo reconstruction began with two implicit assumptions 
about the relevance of theoretical models and past experience to the resolution of 
contemporary conflicts. The first assumption is that each type of conflict has particular 
features and trends; the knowledge of these trends assists in developing a concept of 
“treatments” for conflict situations. Second, knowing the theoretically available treatments 
and the result of their application in the past we can predict the effect of similar measures in a 
current situation. This line of reasoning led to the idea of applying the peace-building and 
the consociational model in Kosovo and was the basis for the analysis of the institutional 
arrangements adopted there.
The principles for general peace-building are provided through the concept of peace­
building developed in several UN documents. The peace-building concept is already serving 
a practical guideline for international activities. However, there are no specific 
recommendations for approaching reconstruction in an ethnically divided society. The 
guidelines for the new missions in divided societies are primarily derived from the expertise 
gained in past operations. In particular, the practice of some missions (e.g., in Bosnia) 
demonstrates that the international community includes ethnically sensitive mechanisms in 
the range of “treatments” for post-conflict societies. The consociational model that was used 
for the analysis in this thesis reflects many aspects of the mechanisms actually adopted in 
Kosovo and Bosnia. Thus, the chosen theoretical framework -  combination of peace-building 
and consociationalism - largely follows the current practice of peace opserations, but, at the 
same time, introduces a broader and more comprehensive vision of international activities.
The relationship between the peace-building and the consociational concepts is 
complex. The successful implementation of one concept is dependent on the implementation 
of the other. Peace-building in an ethnically divided society is not likely to provide long-term 
stability unless special attention is drawn to the meaningful participation of minorities in 
government. Consociationalism is not likely to be adopted by the local parties unless backed 
by the coercive power of an international administration. The two concepts promote and 
strengthen each other’s implementation, but, at the same time, they impose restrictions on
180
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each other. For example, because consociationalism develops within the framework of peace­
building, each activity intended to develop consociationalism has to comply not only with the 
principles of consociationalism, but also with the limits of peace-building. In turn, the 
political rationality of peace-building may sometimes require deviation from the 
requirements of consociationalism. For instance, the idea of consociationalism requires 
broader inclusion of all segments of the society in decision-making. However, the necessity 
to achieve conciliatory results quickly may motivate an international administration to 
negotiate only with the most influential local leaders. For example, the UNMIK negotiated 
the most important decisions with the IAC, which included only the Kosovar key leaders, 
rather than with the pluralistically composed KTC.
In certain respects, the relationship between peace-building and consociationalism is 
somewhat unequal. Peace-building is the principal activity. It defines the aims of the 
international reconstruction and serves as a general framework within which consociational 
democracy is developed. Consociational democracy is, basically, one of the means for the 
advancement of the goals of peace-building.
Peace-building is a hybrid of political and development activities.540 The political 
aspect reveals itself at every stage and level of social reconstruction: in the motives and the 
ways of establishing an international administration, its interaction with the local parties and 
its operating through international organization. In Kosovo, for example, UNMIK’s political 
activities took the form of negotiating political settlements among the warring parties, 
creating incentives for inter-ethnic dialogue between various ethnic segments of the Kosovo 
society, preparing a constitutional framework for the Province, etc.
At the initial stages of state reconstruction the peace-building concept and its first 
goal -  transformation -  dominate. For instance, in the first months of post-conflict 
rehabilitation in Kosovo all the power was concentrated in the UNMIK. The international 
administration was determined to use pressure and primarily rely on its own judgement about 
appropriate means (as opposed to consultation with the multiple local parties as required by 
consociational approach) in order to start the stabilization and transformation of a post­
conflict society. With time, the second goal of peace-building -  development and 
sustainability -  acquires a status of priority and this is when consociationalism comes into
540 Brahimi Report, supra note 6, para. 4.
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play. For example, in Kosovo consociationalism was applied in a limited way to the 
temporary UNMIK-created organs and in a more sophisticated and complete manner to self- 
government. For instance, if we admit the primary role of peace-building at the initial stages 
of state reconstruction, the leading role of the SRSG at the first stages of reconstruction can 
be viewed as acceptable.
Both consociationalism and peace-building seek to achieve stability and democracy in 
a post-conflict society. Consociationalism seeks stability through the development of 
inclusive government in which all segments of a society have an opportunity to participate in 
the formation of state policies. National political institutions are designed according to four 
principles - grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality and segmental autonomy -  which 
ensure minority participation in governing the society.
Peace-building addresses another level of political activism -  interaction between an 
international administration and local de jure or de facto authorities. Peace-building includes 
the following elements: 1) partially based on host state’s consent; 2) seeks transformation of 
a society and promotion of its sustainability; 3) requires close cooperation between peace- 
builders and local parties; 4) is comprehensive in nature; 5) includes institution-building as 
one of its major objectives; 6) closely connected with peacekeeping; and 7) permits 
participation of international organizations in peace-building by regional arrangements 
without restriction to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The first three requirements have a 
direct impact on the legitimacy of a peace-building mission. The last three primarily 
influence the effectiveness of a mission.
The implementation of the peace-building and the consociaitonal concept means that 
institutional structures, the constitutional framework and the behaviour of political actors are 
shaped and exercised according to particular mandatory principles. At the same time, it is 
important that conceptual standards do not preclude the development of more efficient means 
for the treatment of a conflict situation. Certain deviations from theoretical standards that 
contribute to the positive effect of the reconstruction should be permitted. The threshold for 
permissible deviations from the standards of the peace-building and of the consociational 
concepts is different. Because peace-building is a general framework, within which other 
activities, including consociationalism, are developed, the compliance with its requirements 
should be stricter. For example, derogation from the first three requirements of peace­
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building should not be permitted because it has serious impact on the long-term objectives of 
a concrete mission as well as on the future of peace-building in general. At the same time, an 
international mission should be given some discretion in deciding on the necessity of 
absolute or partial compliance with the rest of the requirements. In relation to these 
requirements the decision should be based on what combination of means will be the most 
efficient and, at the same time, the least questionable from the point of view of the peace­
building concept.
At least two significant deviations from the requirements of the peace-building 
concept took place in Kosovo. The first is the leading role assumed by the Secretary-General 
in the interpretation of the UNMIK’s mandate. His interpretation of Security Council 
Resolution 1244 served the basis for the UNMIK structure and mandate. Basically, the 
legitimacy of his interpretation has a direct impact on the legitimacy of the UNMIK. There is 
no explicit basis in the peace-building concept for the authority of the SRSG to interpret the 
competence of a mission beyond what is expressly provided in the resolution. Because of 
arguable legitimacy of the interpretation by the SRSG, another mechanism might be needed 
for the future peace-building missions.
The second instance represents a deviation from requirements that affect the efficacy 
of the mission rather than its legitimacy. It is the utilization of the KFOR instead of a 
peacekeeping mission as required by the peace-building concept. The utilization of a 
peacekeeping mission instead of the KFOR would not likely advance the goals of peace­
building and, thus, the deployment of the KFOR seems to be a necessary and beneficial 
change to the UN scenario.
The peace-building concept is vague on many aspects of the international activities in 
administered territories. The ambiguity of the standards creates certain problems in 
determining which forms of international interference in internal decision-making are 
necessary and which are excessive. For example, the peace-building concept requires the 
international administration to cooperate with the local parties in the process of finding a 
solution for a reconstruction of the state and society. Cooperation does not always mean 
equality of parties in negotiation. The international administration has enough power and 
resources to push for certain solutions and the local actors often do not have a choice but to 
accept the proposed solutions. Pressure by the international administration may be a
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necessary and acceptable tool to draw local parties to negotiation and to introduce the 
ethnically sensitive mechanisms. At the same time, an open-ended formulation of a peace­
building concept gives room for certain usurpation of power by the international 
administration, even after the local self-government is put in operation. For example, the 
Kosovo Constitutional Framework gives the UNMIK wide supervisory powers over 
provincial and municipal self-government. These powers are dormant and can be exercised 
only for the purpose of providing full implementation of SC Resolution 1244 and ensuring 
sufficient protection of minority interests. Such a formulation, basically, imposes little 
restrictions on the powers of the SRSG because almost any step in self-government may be in 
one or another way interpreted as insufficient fulfillment of SC Resolution 1244 
requirements. The only possible restriction against retaining too much power by an 
international administration are the goals of peace-building -  transformation and 
sustainability. If the concentration of power within the international administration precludes 
the development of independent self-government, such power should be restricted. This 
seems to be the only available test to set up limits on the SRSG powers. However, such a test 
has several problems. The first is its rather general and imprecise character. A second 
problem is the issue into who makes a decision which instance of the exercise of the SRSG’s 
power may be regarded as necessary and which one as excessive. Obviously, such decisions 
have to be made by a body or an official other than the SRSG; perhaps a UN commission or 
panel of international experts. The decisions that the SRSG activities impede the 
development of independent government can be made only if a clear pattern of excessive use 
of powers by the SRSG has been observed for a period of time.
In practice, it is always difficult to draw a line between the supervision that is 
necessary and that which is excessive. James Madison noted that “[i]n framing a government 
which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first 
enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control 
itself.”541 Although this statement was made in a different context, it is particularly relevant 
for Kosovo. On the one hand, the “leash” for self-government must be not be too tight and 
short in order not to stifle its development and to allow it to exercise control over the
341 The Federalist No. 51 at 3S6 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed. 1974).
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governed. On the other hand, while self-government is still not able to control itself 
effectively, certain international supervision is necessary.
Thus, it is possible to conclude that the observation of the requirements of the peace­
building concept is essential not only for the legitimacy of a peace-building mission, but also 
for its generally more effective work. While derogation from certain peace-building 
characteristics can be acceptable and even beneficial, no exceptions to the first three 
principles should be allowed.
In contrast to some requirements of peace-building, the consociational techniques 
should be tailored creatively and with sensitive consideration given to local peculiarities. 
Because of heavy reliance on inclusiveness, quotas and proportions the original concept of 
consociationalism contains a number of contradictions and under certain circumstances may 
impede the development of one of the central features of democracy - competitiveness and 
opposition. Then, the advantage of consociationalism lies in elaborating a flexible solution, 
which reduces the adverse effects of consociational techniques. While the principles of grand 
coalition, mutual veto, proportionality and segmental autonomy should be the main 
guidelines for peace-builders, the institutional arrangement for their achievement must be 
tailored individually. In many respects the practice of the Kosovo mission represents an 
instance of individually tailored consociationalism.
Peace-building and consociationalism complement each other in the ways they 
approach democracy-building. Peace-building concentrates on the democracy-building at the 
level of the international administration and local leaders. Consociationalism works at the 
level of population. Even a successful political settlement between the segmental leaders will 
not guarantee long-term stability, unless the population is involved, understands and supports 
the changes.542
Generally, there are three levels of successful democratization. First is the very 
formation of institutional structures according to universally accepted (or deemed to be 
universally accepted) democratic principles. Another level involves an attempt to create
542 The involvement of the population in reconstruction and its acceptance of the solutions proposed 
by an international administration is one of the necessary features of peace-building. See, Brahimi 
Report, supra note 6.
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social and intellectual conditions that can serve as an anchor for democracy.543 The tie 
between these two levels is provided through democratic political culture.544 Political culture 
allows a two-way connection between the institutional structures and “anchors” of 
democracy. It provides a possibility for democratically oriented personalities to make their 
way to the institutional structures and facilitates the contribution of the institutional structures 
to the formation of democratic personalities. Interestingly enough, neither the peace-building 
nor the consociational concept expressly discuss the issues of developing political culture 
consistent with the new democratic institutions.
Political culture affects the performance of democracy.545 It defines what kind of 
leaders the population is likely to elect and what kind of tactics would have the most effect 
upon these elections - speculation over ethnic sentiment or elaboration of sound political 
programs. In tum, the functioning of the re-established self-government, judicial and police 
systems creates certain perceptions within ethnic communities and individuals about their 
place in the political system and in society as a whole. It shapes the orientation of groups and 
individuals towards political system and, thus, the political culture.546 In my view, the 
orientation of the population towards political entities and towards its own participation in 
the political process can be developed, inter alia, through the consociational techniques 
because those techniques seek and provide inclusiveness. Meaningful inclusiveness creates a 
feeling among minority groups that they are not mere subjects of the majority governed 
political process, but that they can influence the formation of governmental policy. The belief 
that their participation matters may facilitate the more activist orientation of minorities 
towards the re-established political and governmental system. This, in tum, may help to 
resolve one of the difficulties faced by the UNMIK in the first years of the reconstruction -  
the reluctance of certain minorities to cooperate with the UNMIK and other segments of the 
society and boycott of democratic procedures, like elections.
Political culture, unlike institutional structures, takes much longer to develop. In my 
opinion, the institutional structures in a post-conflict society play the primary role in the
543 Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia? Harry Eckstein (ed.) (Lanham, Md. : Rowman 
& Littlefield, 1998) at 279.
544 Ibid.
545 Ibid., at 358
546 Here, I understand political culture as defined by Almond and Verba. See, supra note 183.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
187
formation of political culture. This is one of the reasons why special attention should be paid 
to the design of governmental structures and ways of their operation. Let us briefly sum up 
the arrangements in Kosovo.
Although the UN did not adopt any specific concept for the reconstruction of 
ethnically divided societies and Kosovo, in particular, we can And many consociational type 
arrangements implemented in the Province. The consociational principles of proportionality, 
mutual veto and grand coalition can be clearly traced in the organization of self-government 
and to lesser extent in the judiciary and the police. Generally, the elements of 
consociationalism were adopted extensively enough and in certain respects grew beyond the 
original consociational framework.
One has to recognize all the difficulties of establishing state institutions from scratch 
in a ruined post-conflict society. Nevertheless, there are several inconsistencies in the 
UNMIK approach to the utilization of ethnically sensitive mechanisms that could have been 
avoided.
First, the implementation of the consociational techniques differed, depending on the 
level of government: the provincial organs are operating on the basis of proportionality, 
mutual veto and grand coalition, while there is no mutual veto and less preconditions for 
grand coalition at the municipal level. This difference, on the one hand, may exemplify a lack 
of a balanced approach to institution-building. On the other hand, I also see it as an 
illustration of the dilemma between the necessity to address the ethnic factor and the danger 
of overemphasizing it. All organs and decision-making procedures cannot and should not be 
based on the consideration of the ethnic factor. Rather, it should be taken into account in the 
design of the central policy-making institutions and in relation to the most important 
questions of communal concern.
Second, in relation to some institutions consociationalism was used somewhat 
excessively, while in another insufficiently. For example, proportionate distribution of the 
committees’ chairmenship in the Kosovo Assembly seems to be too inclusive of minorities 
and threatens to undermine the principle of meritocracy in the election process. Moreover, 
because chairmen are not likely to play particularly influential roles, proportionate 
distribution does not contribute much to the stronger position of communities in the 
Assembly. At the same time, the election of such an important official as the President of
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Kosovo does not provide any mechanisms to increase the chances of him or her being a 
panethnic figure. This inconsistency may ultimately reduce the overall effect of 
consociationalism in Kosovo.
Third, while sufficient preconditions are created for the inclusiveness of the segments 
of society at the level of representative organs, little inclusiveness is provided through the 
judiciary and the police. For inclusiveness to be achieved, the consociational approach should 
be adopted in a coherent manner in relation to all branches of government. In particular, the 
multi-ethnic composition of the judiciary and the police essentially contributes to general 
inclusiveness of minorities. The representation of minorities in the courts and the police is a 
form of achieving “full membership in a larger society.”547
The very idea of a multi-ethnic judiciary is not new, but finding an effective way to 
implement it is difficult. Even in stable democracies, serious questions arise about which 
criteria should be used for the selection of judges, and what level of inclusiveness is 
sufficient.548 The current police and judicial structures in Kosovo cannot be regarded as 
contributing to minority inclusiveness either through their composition or through the way 
they exercise their functions. Thus, there is an apparent misbalance between the 
implementation of consociationalism in relation to different branches of government. The 
insufficient judicial and police protection may lead to a situation in which minorities shift the 
struggle for their rights from adjudication to personal resolution of matters through the use of 
force or other inappropriate techniques.
On the basis of the analysis of the Kosovo mission, several recommendations can be 
made in regard to the general UN policy in peace-building. First, the practice of Kosovo and 
Bosnia demonstrates a clear trend that ethnic factor is taken into consideration in design of 
the new democratic institutions. Nevertheless, there is no unifying approach to the issue what 
weight ethnicity should have in an institutional design of a state. For example, the Bosnian 
mission was criticized as overemphasizing ethnicity and, thus, deepening the gap between 
monoethnic communities.549 Kosovo might be different in this respect. Although each post­
547 Devlin, MacKay & Kim, supra note 407 at 808.
548 See, ibid.
549 See, e.g., Bosnia's November Elections: Dayton Stumbles, ICG Report, 18 December 2000, online: 
ICG Homepage < http://www.intl-crisis-group.orp/proiects/showreport.cfm?reportid= 116 > (date 
accessed: IS March 2001).
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conflict situation is peculiar in its modalities, there should be a theoretical model that 
provides guidelines for consistent and integrated planning and assessment of international 
peace-building activities in divided societies. The UN should adopt a set of principles that 
will guide future international activities in the reconstruction of ethnically divided societies.
Second, a more clear determination of the limits of peace-building is necessary. In 
particular, it is important to decide whether the role of the Secretary-General in defining the 
structure and mandate of peace-building missions is an acceptable pattern for the future 
missions.
Third, because of the concerns that international administrations in post-conflict 
territories may preclude the development of independent self-government, some international 
body should be given power to monitor activities of international administrations and their 
officials. This body may also be instance to challenge the actions or decisions of international 
administrations by the local population. A possibility of such a challenge is important to 
promote the accountability of missions to the population, which they intend to assist. For 
example, currently the UNMIK and the KFOR enjoy immunity in Kosovo.550
It has been observed that the “successful democracy syndrome" requires, among other 
characteristics, that societies are generally not “plural.”551 Hopefully, this observation is not 
true, but it once more demonstrates the controversy surrounding the very possibility of 
building a democracy in a divided society. The analysis of the institutional solutions adopted 
by the UNMIK suggests that the self-government arrangements have a good potential to be 
successful in providing certain level of minority inclusiveness. However, the success of 
promoting inclusiveness through the judiciary and the police is quite doubtful. At this point, 
there are enough reasons for both skepticism and optimism in regard to the UNMIK activities 
and there is no choice but to wait for the empirical evidence to confirm or dismiss these 
conclusions.
530 See, Regulation on the Status, Immunities and Privileges o f KFOR and UNMIK and Their
Personnel in Kosovo, supra note 530. 
sst Eckstein, supra note 543 at 367.
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Appendix 1 











Kosovo obtains a status of an autonomous region within Serbia
“Albanization” of political and social life in Kosovo, discrimination 
against province’s minorities, growing demands of Kosovo Albanians 
for the republican status of Kosovo
Kosovo autonomy is abolished 
Milosevic becomes president of Serbia 
The LDK is formed
The Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Serbia dissolves the 
Assembly of Kosovo.
A secret referendum held in Kosovo, where the independence of 
Kosovo is established. Albania recognizes the self-declared republic.
Election to the Kosovo “parallel” structures are held. Rugova is elected 
president of the Kosovo republic.
The KLA is created.
The KLA starts massive reprisals against the Serb police and security 
forces.
The KLA intensifies its attacks on police stations, patrols and 
residences. The Serb police responds by series of raids in Drenica 
region, where houses are burnt and dozens of Albanians are murdered.














The ethnic tension grows.
The Security Council adopts Resolution 1160 where condemns the 
excessive use of force by the Serb police and imposes an arms embargo 
on the FRY.
The Security Council adopts Resolution 1199, which demands the 
cessation of hostilities in Kosovo and withdrawal of the Serb forces 
from the province; NATO prepares to military intervention.
Milosevic agrees to withdrawal of the FRY forces from Kosovo.
The Security Council adopts Resolution 1203, which endorses the 
deployment of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM)
Rambouillet talks (failed because of the Serb refusal to accept the 
agreement)
The 78-day NATO air strikes campaign starts.
The FRY accepts terms brought to Belgrade by EU envoy Ahtisaari and 
Russian envoy Chernomyrdin and demands the cessation of bombing.
The Military Technical Agreement is signed between the FRY and 
NATO
Solana calls a suspension of NATO air strikes. UN Security Council 
adopts resolution 1244 authorizing the deployment of the international 
security and civil presence in Kosovo.
The deployment of the international security presence - Kosovo Force 
(KFOR) -  starts.
Special Representative ad interim  Sergio Vieira de Mello arrives in 
Kosovo.





The withdrawal of the FRY forces from Kosovo is completed.
NATO and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) officials sign a 
disarmament agreement
Special Representative for the UN Secretary-General, head of the 
UNMIK, Bernard Kouchner arrives in Kosovo
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Democratic Party of 
Kosovo
PDK Hashim Thaci 27 27.3 267
Liberal Centre Party of 
Kosovo
PQLK Naim Maloku 16 0.8
_4.
5.
Liberal Party of Kosova PLK Gjrgj Dedaj 19 0.6











7. Republican Party of 
Kosova
PRK Feti Grapci 12 0.3










LNDSH Kajtaz Fazlia 0.1 0
11 Party of Democratic Action 
of Kosova
SDA Numan Balic 0.5
12 Green Party of Kosova PGJK Daut Maloku 0.2 0
13 Albanian Republican Party PRSH Skender Hoti 0.1
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Bosniacs Party of 
Democratic Action of 
Kosova
HilmoKandic
Turkish People’s Party of 
Kosova
KTHP Sezair Saipi 0.1 0
Democratic Reform Party 
of Muslims
DRSM Dezair Murati 0.3










Citizens’ Initiative of Gora GIG 'Ibisi Rustem 0.3
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Representatives -  
K/Albanian
19LDK; 10 AAK; 2 PDK 
10 LDK; 6 POK 
29LDK, 11 PDK; 1AAK 
13 LDK; 4 PDK; 3 AAK
26 LDK; 7 AAK; 4 
PShOK; 3 PDK; 1 PLK
27 LDK; 11 PDK; 2 AAK; 
1 POLK
27 PDK; 4 LDK 
22 LDK; 5 PDK; 3 AAK
16 PDK; 12 LDK; 2 AAK;
1 PRK
19 LDK; 0 PDK; 3 AAK
17 LDK; 10 PDK; 2 AAK;
2 PShDK
16 LDK; 13 PDK; 2 AAK 
16 LDK; 13 PDK; 1 AAK; 
1Indep.
26 LDK; 11 PDK; 1 AAK 
6 PDK; 7 LDK; 1 AAK
12 LDK; 5 POK; 4 AAK 
28 LDK; 8 AAK; 4 PDK
28 LDK; 10 PDK; 3 AAK 
36 LDK; 11 PDK; 4 AAK
24 LDK; 10 PDK; 2 AAK; 
1 PShDK; 1 PNDSH 









Appointed MAMambara flw  oUo ■>n iiip v n
Sworn In
m LDK; Mehmet Bojcaj
N/A LDK; Halim Shpmshedini
1 Ashkali (PDAShK); Pending: 1 Rom/Ashkali LDK; Adem SMihej
Pending: 4 KS;1 Ashkali? LDK; SkenderZOgaJ
2 Egyptians LDK;Aq»Shehu
1 Turk (TDP); 1 Rom; Pending: 6 KS LDK; Lutii Hazki
m PDK; Izet ttxahimi
1 Egyptian; 1 Bosniac (SDA?); Pending: 1 KS LDK; Fad* Ferati
N/A PDK; Tahir Qaka
1 Rom; Pending: 11 KS LDK; Shaip SurduHi
1 Rom; Pending: 1 KS LDKjtsmetRrad
14 KS; 1 Bosniac (JUL); Pending: 2 KA Nenad Radoeavt(evio
1 Ashkali (PDAShK); 1 Rom; 1 Croat; Pending: 5KS LDK;BasriDemiri
N/A LDK;JakupKastrati
1 Bosniac; Pending: 11 KS LDK; Fan* Spahiu
1 Rom; Pending: 12 KS (6 sworn in?) PDK; Emin Gerbeshi
1 Ashkali (PDAShK); Pending: 5 KS, 1 Rom/Ashkali LDK; RexhapKeiani
1 Rom; 1 Egyptian; 1 KS/SPS; 1 Bosniac? Pending: 1 LDK; AfiLaJqi
KS/SNC
1 Ashkali LDK; Agim Veiki
1 Ashkali (PDAShK); 1 Bosniac (BSDAK)?; Pending: LDK; SeUh Gashi
5 KS, 1 Turk; 1 Rom
1 Turk (TDP); 1 Rom; 1 Bosniac (indep.); Pending: 1 LOK; Eqrem Kryeziu
Turk (KTHP)
1 KS; 1 Rom; (1 additional appointed KS has LDK; EsatHaxhltya
declined)
Deputy Praaldant
AAK; Nazmi Setmonaj 
LDK; Aslian ZejnuHahu 




PDK; Xheladin Gashi 
LDK; Ferat Hajzeraj 
PDK; Gjabir Zharku
LDK; Nexhat Rexha 
LDK; Prank Ojetaj
Dragisa Krstovic
LDK; Mevlide ShamoNi 
LDK; Mrs.Remzije Thaqi




























11 PDK; 9 LDK; 1 AAK 
27 PDK: 4 LDK




LDK; Ahmeti Ahmedi 
PDK: Ahmed UW
9 PDK; 8 LDK Pending: 17 KS PDK; Bahri Hyseini
30 LDK; 7 POK; 2 AAK; 
2 POLK
N/A LDK;Uke8ytyqi LDK; Vitor Markaj
19 LDK; 8 PDK; 2 AAK; 
1 PShOK; 1 PLK
2 KS; Pending: 2 KS LDK;SametOalipi PDK; NexhmedinArifi
20 LDK: 9 PDK; 2 AAK Pending: 3 KS LDK: HaizerKrasniai LDK: Ibush Januzi
15 KS; 2 KA
12 Seibs (+ 3 accepted but not yet sworn in); (2 
appointed KA withdrew before taking the oath)
appoints by UNMIK] by UNMIK]
This is an unofficial working document -  for internal OSCE use only -  comprising information from OMIK Democratisation Officers in FOs and RCs, the HQ DD Advisor on 



















Appendix 6 -  Progress Report on the Formation of Municipal Structures Updated 20 March 2001
Municipality
l i l i i
jS j i i I1?
f i l l
Defan/De* ani LDK " 4 LDK; 2 AAK; 1 PDK T " ' ' V LDK
aft.
LDKDragash/DragaS LDK 3 LDK; 2 PDK; 1 GIG; 1 SDA 1 SDA (chair); 1 GIG; 1 LDK 2 PDK (chair); 1 GIG; 1 SDA; 1 







7 LDK; 3 PDK; 1 AAK
4 LDK; 1 PDK; 1AAK; Vacant 
seat: 1 Appointed
1 LOK; 1 POK; 3 Vacant 
seats
V









" 6 LDK; 2 AAK; 1 PShDK; 1 
PDK; 1 PLK
6 LDK; 3 PDK; 1 AAK/PQLK
1 Rom; 1 Egyptian; 1 
Bomiao; 1 LDK; 1 PShDK
2 LDK; 1 PDK; 3 Vacant seat
4 LDK; 1 AAK; 1 PShDK; 1 
Egyptian








PDK 5 PDK; 1 LDK i*' , . ‘ 2 PDK; 1 LDK PDK
LOK 5 LDK; 1 PDK; 1 AAK 2 LDK; 2 Bosniac; 1 AAK; 1 
Egyptian: 1 KS










5 LDK; 1 AAK; 1 PDK; 1 Rom. 
Vacant seat: 1 KS
2 LDK; 1 PDK; 1 Rom. 
Vacant sept: 3 KS
3 PDK; 2 LDK; 1 PRK; 1 
AAK/AQK










2 LDK; 2 PDK; 1 AAK; 1 
PShDK
V
1 Ashkali; 1 Rom; 1 LDK 
V (KA vacant)









5 LDK; 3 PDK; 1 AAK
4 LDK; 3 PDK; 3 community 
representatives
MitrovicA/Mitrovic lDk 7 LDK; 3 PDK; 1 AAK V
Novobdrdfi/ PDK 2 PDK; 1 AAK; 1 KS; 1 1 PDK: 1 LDK; 1 AAK; 1 2 LDK; 2 PDK; 1 KS V PDK
4LDK;2 AAK; 1POK; 1 indsp. , 
indep.fKA?!: 2  [affiliation?]
™WpSW>K
7 LOK;2 P8M>^1AAK
2 UJK; 1 A^K; 1 PShpj&l,, . 
indeo.: Vacant seat I KS
7 LOtty! AAK: . / r -" . ' ;
6Diiacto»;'p«fKlinflr3' :‘v'r" "
5i,RK;i!PPKj't-|a-c/  ̂
(Maoebonian); lw-*dvertised :■> 
(KS naaatuad)
4 U * ]4 PDKv ■- J ; / : ; -  
V- "
NovoBrdo Vacant (lor LDK) Rom; 1 KS













































7 LDK; 2 AAK; 1 PDK; 1 SDA 
7 LDK; 3 PDK; 1 AAK
5 LDK; 2 PDK; 1 AAK; 1 
Bosniac
6 LDK; 2 PDK; 1 PSHDK; 1 
BSDAK; t AAK
4 LDK; 2 PDK;
1 AAK
4 PDK; 2 LDK; 1 AAK
10 PDK; 1 LDK 
3+2temporaryKA; Vacant:5KS
7 LDK; 1 PDK; 1 AAK
8 LDK; 4 PDK; 1 AAK; 1 
PShDK
5 LDK; 2 PDK
1 Bosniac; 1 Ashkali; 1 Turk; 
1 LDK: 1 PDK: vacant KS 
1DRSM (ctyMr); 1BSOAK; 2 
LDK; 2 PDK; Pending; 2Turic 
1 Bosniac; IRom 
2KS; 1Rom; Pend?;2LDK; 
1PDK:1AAK: vacant: 2KS 
1 Ashkali (Chair); 1 LDK; 1 








3 LDK; 2 PDK; 1 AAK; 1 Ashkali
2 LDK; 1 AAK; 1 Ashkali; 1 
Bosniac; 1 Turk; vacant: KS
3 LDK (chair); t PDK; t AAK; 1 
indep. Bosniac; 1 TDB (Turk)
Pending: 2 LDK; 1 PDK; 1 AAK;
4 community representatives 
1 LDK (Chair); t PDK; 2 
community repre. (1 PDASHK)




















S Directors; 1 re-advertisad
8LDK+ 2LDK a#.; IPShDK; •' 
Undsp. ■;
10 Directors ■..
3LDK+6LDK support; 2POK; 
lPSbDK;2lndep ■ , 1
8LpK+LDKaff.;lPSOK;l 
unknown afflHatkm ' :
V(recruited
7LOK *2LDK atf.; 2Msp.; 
lAAKaff. \
'pKSirii^vet^;:^.'-'"^
2 LDK aff.it POK; 31ndso.
7
Vacant seat 1 KA
V V
This is an unofficial working document comprising information from OMIK Democratisation Officers in FOs and RCs, the HQ DD Advisor on Minorities as 
well as from the Municipal Helpdesk (TTF). Please send any corrections or amendments to Stie.Kieldsen@omik.ore
(Democratisation Department).
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